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1. Economic development pillar
A. Enabling infrastructure development programme
Proposal 1.1 Connecting Mexico to the Electricity Interconnection System for the Countries 
of Central America (SIEPAC) and second SIEPAC circuit
Proposal 1.2 Gas pipeline between Mexico and the countries of Northern Central America
Proposal 1.3 Logistic corridors, co-modal integration and development
Proposal 1.4 Universal access to electricity generated by renewable energy sources in the countries 
of Northern Central America and the southern and south-eastern states of Mexico
Proposal 1.5 Pacific Plan, El Salvador
Proposal 1.6 North-south rail link in Guatemala
Proposal 1.7 Development of rural roads in Guatemala
Proposal 1.8 Modernization and improvement of drinking water and sanitation services, Honduras
Proposal 1.9 Road infrastructure logistics, Honduras
Proposal 1.10 Strategic investments for the energy subsector, Honduras
Proposal 1.11 Development of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec: multimodal interoceanic corridor, Mexico
Proposal 1.12 Autonomous solar panel infrastructure for pumping water in rural communities,  
State of Campeche
Proposal 1.13 Reconstruction of interregional feeder roads, State of Chiapas
Proposal 1.14 Modernization and expansion of Port Chiapas, State of Chiapas
Proposal 1.15 Highway between Acapulco International Airport and the new tourist  
development on the Pacific coast, State of Guerrero
Proposal 1.16 Rehabilitation of the market area of the Margarita Maza de Juárez Wholesale Market,  
State of Oaxaca
Proposal 1.17 Highway to the Papaloapan basin and bypass for the city of Tuxtepec, State of Oaxaca
Proposal 1.18 Access road to the new Port of Frontera, State of Tabasco
Proposal 1.19 Industrial and logistical infrastructure for trade with Central America, State of Tabasco
Proposal 1.20 Multimodal cabotage terminal in Alvarado, State of Veracruz
Proposal 1.21 Distributed power generation project, State of Yucatán
Proposal 1.22 Improving connectivity and mobility conditions in the most underdeveloped municipalities, 
State of Yucatán
B. Trade promotion and regional integration programme
Proposal 1.23 Facilitating trade between Mexico and the countries of Northern Central America
Proposal 1.24 Harmonizing standards and reducing technical barriers to trade: equalling capacities 
among the countries
Proposal 1.25 Deepening trade and production linkages through the Customs Union between El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico
5C O M P R E H E N S I V E  D E V E L O P M E N T  P L A N
C. Productive development programme
Proposal 1.26 Strengthening rural value chains and creating a support fund in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Mexico
Proposal 1.27 Strengthening the coffee value chain and the production systems of small coffee producers 
in Northern Central America and southern and south-eastern Mexico
Proposal 1.28 Digital cooperation agenda between Mexico and the countries of Northern Central America
Proposal 1.29 Towards a regional innovation system in Northern Central America and Mexico:  
integration in science, technology and innovation
Proposal 1.30 Promoting investment by the Salvadoran diaspora, El Salvador
Proposal 1.31 Walls of Prosperity: Guatemala–Mexico, Guatemala–Honduras and Guatemala–El Salvador 
cross-border development, Guatemala
Proposal 1.32 White Seal for local products, Guatemala
Proposal 1.33 Strengthening value chains for upgrading micro-, small and medium-sized 
enterprises, Guatemala
Proposal 1.34 Development of catalysing value chains to create opportunities in territories, Honduras
Proposal 1.35 Improving logistics performance, competitiveness and regional economic 
integration, Honduras
Proposal 1.36 Maya Ka’an: community development for tourism and the conservation of natural, historical 
and cultural resources, State of Quintana Roo
Proposal 1.37 Installation of a small-scale juice processing plant in the northern region of the 
State of Veracruz
D. Territorial development programme
Proposal 1.38 Strengthening institutional frameworks and territorial participation
Proposal 1.39 Local markets and public food procurement
Proposal 1.40 Basic investment for productive development, innovation and entrepreneurship: 
single investment fund
Proposal 1.41 Entrepreneurship: youth, women and indigenous peoples 
Proposal 1.42 Basic services for households and rural territories
Proposal 1.43 Development of intermediate cities: Isthmus of Tehuantepec, Tapachula and the northern 
border of Guatemala
Proposal 1.44 Territorial development of the Trifinio, El Salvador
Proposal 1.45 Surf City El Salvador: integral tourism development programme on the marine coastal  
strip, El Salvador
Proposal 1.46 Economic territorial development in Guatemala, Guatemala
Proposal 1.47 Strengthening the tourism sector in Guatemala, Guatemala
Proposal 1.48 Comprehensive territorial development in the Dry Corridor of Honduras, Honduras
E. Macroeconomics for development programme 
Proposal 1.49 Identification of fiscal spaces in order to implement the Comprehensive Development Plan
2. Social well-being pillar
A. Social and labour inclusion programme 
Proposal 2.1 Sustainable labour insertion for socially at-risk youth in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras 
and the southern and south-eastern states of Mexico
Proposal 2.2 Youth employment with gender awareness
Proposal 2.3 Building equality: leadership and empowerment of indigenous, Afrodescendent and Garifuna 
women in Northern Central America and south and south-east Mexico
Proposal 2.4 Closing inequality gaps for indigenous peoples
Proposal 2.5 Comprehensive strategies for the formalization of companies and employment in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and south and south-east Mexico
Proposal 2.6 Training for the future of work
Proposal 2.7 Non-contributory pensions and social protection for hard-to-cover groups: migrant workers 
and their families, independent workers, microenterprises, domestic workers and migrants
Proposal 2.8 Prevention and eradication of child labour
Proposal 2.9 Youth building the future in southern and south-eastern Mexico and in the countries 
of Northern Central America
Proposal 2.10 Reclaiming public spaces and creating technological research projects through participation 
and trainig of young people aged between 15 and 29, State of Campeche
B. Life-skills programme
Proposal 2.11 Ensuring the opportunity to access quality and relevant education at the primary  
and middle-school levels, in safe, resilient and violence-free settings, for all persons  
in regions with the highest migration rates
Proposal 2.12 “My New School” (Mi nueva escuela) programme, El Salvador
Proposal 2.13 Strengthening Communities, Guatemala
Proposal 2.14 University centre for the comprehensive development of southern and south-eastern Mexico 
and the countries of Northern Central America, State of Tabasco
C. Comprehensive child development programme
Proposal 2.15 Improve the coverage and quality of essential services for the comprehensive development 
of highly vulnerable infants in Northern Central America and Mexico
Proposal 2.16 Comprehensive early childhood care to prevent and reduce chronic malnutrition in 35 priority 
municipalities in two departments of Guatemala
Proposal 2.17 Crecer Juntos early childhood development programme, El Salvador
D. Lifelong health programme 
Proposal 2.18 Universal access to health services that are appropriate, timely and nearby, particularly 
in municipalities and territories where people are more likely to migrate
Proposal 2.19 Humanitarian and development interventions by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 
in Northern Central America and Mexico
E. Violence prevention and culture of peace programme
Proposal 2.20 Strengthening human security at the local level
Proposal 2.21 Preventing and responding to violence against children and adolescents and promoting 
the responsible use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) in El Salvador, 
Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico
Proposal 2.22 Regional programme for the protection, assistance and access to justice of migrants from 
Northern Central America and Mexico, with a focus on combating corruption
Proposal 2.23 Reinforcing Assistance to Child Victims of Trafficking (ReACT)
Proposal 2.24 Strengthening the rule of law, the administration of justice and the fight against impunity 
in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico
Proposal 2.25 Support for the implementation of comprehensive security and public coexistence policies
Proposal 2.26 Information management for gender-sensitive, evidence-based public policies  
on citizen security
Proposal 2.27 Implementation of an arts and crafts factory and provision of attention facilities  
for inclusive social development, a culture and the prevention of violence and crime,  
State of Quintana Roo
3. Environmental sustainability, climate change and adaptation, and disaster risk reduction pillar
A. Generation of knowledge, data and tools for adaptation to climate change and disaster risks programme
Proposal 3.1 Strengthening technical and institutional capacities to generate climate and geological data 
to prevent and manage disaster risks
Proposal 3.2 System of satellite accounts to measure disasters and their impact on regional and national 
development: methodological guide
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B. Programme for strengthened resilience to prevent disaster-driven displacement
Proposal 3.3 Institutional strengthening of the resilience of local and national governments in 
Northern Central America and southern and south-eastern Mexico for disaster risk 
reduction and preventing migration
Proposal 3.4 Protecting national public investments through disaster risk reduction and climate 
change response
Proposal 3.5 Agricultural microinsurance with climate change adaptation measures for small producers 
of basic grains and coffee
Proposal 3.6 Assisting and building the resilience of households and communities vulnerable to food 
insecurity in the Dry Corridor of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras
Proposal 3.7 Agricultural micro-insurance with climate change adaptation measures for small producers 
of basic grains and coffee, Honduras
Proposal 3.8 Strengthening the sustainable and climate change-resilient coffee value chain, Honduras
C. Climate change and nature-based solutions programme
Proposal 3.9 Sustainable seas and coastlines in Northern Central America and southern and  
south-eastern Mexico
Proposal 3.10 Sustainable production activities with nature-based solutions
Proposal 3.11 Small-scale afforestation, payment for ecosystem services and construction of a forest  
corridor in Northern Central America and south-eastern Mexico
Proposal 3.12 Climate change mitigation and adaptation, and creation of green jobs
Proposal 3.13 Tacaná Volcano Binational Geopark
Proposal 3.14 Sustainable water management for food security and sustainability, Guatemala
Proposal 3.15 Strengthening mechanisms for environmental sustainability and climate change mitigation 
and adaptation, Guatemala
Proposal 3.16 Sowing life in southern and south-eastern Mexico and Northern Central America, Mexico
4. Pillar for the integral management of the migration cycle
A. Comprehensive national response programme
Proposal 4.1 Strengthening immediate and long-term responses to forced displacement and human 
mobility in El Salvador, with a gender-equality- and human-rights-based approach
Proposal 4.2 Strengthening immediate and long-term responses to forced displacement and human 
mobility in Honduras
Proposal 4.3 Meeting the immediate needs and fostering the long-term local integration of migrants, 
refugees and asylum seekers in Mexico
Proposal 4.4 Provide greater opportunities and social inclusion for children, adolescents and their  
families by promoting local governance in the municipalities with the largest migrant 
populations in Honduras
Proposal 4.5 Strengthening immediate and long-term responses to forced displacement and human 
mobility, Guatemala
Proposal 4.6 Meeting the immediate needs and fostering the long-term local integration of Honduran 
migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in Mexico, Honduras
Proposal 4.7 Strengthening humanitarian assistance for migrants, State of Puebla
Proposal 4.8 Human mobility, assisted repatriation and reintegration, in the State of Puebla
B. Regional programmes
Proposal 4.9 Human mobility information management
Proposal 4.10 Protection and empowerment of women and girls throughout the migration cycle  
in the countries of Northern Central America and Mexico
Proposal 4.11 Migration and forced displacement of children, adolescents and families
Proposal 4.12 Human mobility, climate change and disasters
Proposal 4.13 Welcoming Cities: improving urban governance in the context of human mobility
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Proposal 4.14 Promoting regular labour migration and access to labour justice
Proposal 4.15 Strengthening border management and combating crime
Proposal 4.16 Preventing and combating migrant smuggling and crimes against migrants  
in Northern Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) and southern  
and south-eastern Mexico
Proposal 4.17 Improving access to community-based mental health and psychosocial services  
for migrants, displaced persons and host communities in the border regions  
of Northern Central America and Mexico
Proposal 4.18 Migrant protection and productive investment of remittances
Proposal 4.19 Promoting investment by the diaspora, El Salvador
Proposal 4.20 Labour insertion of Honduran migrant workers in the United States, Honduras
Proposal 4.21 Productive investment of remittances, Honduras
Proposal 4.22 Portability of social security contributions for undocumented immigrant workers  
in the United States, Honduras
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Foreword
The main purpose of this document is to address the structural causes of northward 
migration from the countries of northern Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Honduras and south-southeast Mexico. This process is associated with factors 
such as poverty, inequality, unemployment and the impact of natural disasters. The 
scale and severity of the situation have only increased with the coronavirus disease 
(COVID-19) pandemic.
It is therefore urgent to implement concrete strategies, policies and projects to make 
migration an option, not a necessity imposed by deprivation.
This means undertaking specific actions aimed at achieving economic growth with 
employment and attaining greater well-being, with a comprehensive vision and in 
the framework of a new development pattern. 
On 1 December 2018, on the occasion of the inauguration of President Manuel López 
Obrador of Mexico, the Presidents of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico 
signed a declaration in which they laid the foundations of understanding for a new 
relationship between the four countries through a Comprehensive Development Plan. 
The four signatory countries expressed their willingness to deepen cooperation on 
development and migration to make human mobility a choice rather than an obligation, 
and requested technical support from the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in the design and implementation of the initiative.
Although this approach was already relevant at the end of 2018, now, in the light of 
the difficult lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic, it is even more valid and 
more urgent.
In accordance with this mandate, ECLAC prepared a comprehensive proposal with 
guidelines for action based on local, national and subregional realities. The aim of 
the Comprehensive Development Plan is to contribute to ensuring that migration 
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in these countries is safe, orderly and regular and, at the same time, to tackle its 
structural causes in order to enhance people’s well-being and ensure that human 
mobility is a free choice.1
On 20 May 2019, ECLAC submitted a Comprehensive Development Plan proposal centred 
on three components: analysis of the economic, social and environmental situation; 
identification of areas of opportunity; and formulation of policy recommendations. 
These recommendations were grouped under four pillars: (i) economic development; 
(ii) social well-being; (iii) environmental sustainability, climate change and adaptation, 
and disaster risk reduction; and (iv) comprehensive management of the migration 
cycle. The first phase of this initiative was implemented in constant consultation 
with the national authorities and with contributions from a number of institutions, in 
particular funds, programmes and specialized agencies of the United Nations system 
(see the following diagram).
1 The objectives of the Comprehensive Development Plan are compatible with those of the Global Compact 
for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: to mitigate the adverse and structural factors that hinder people 
from building and maintaining sustainable livelihoods in their countries of origin; to reduce the risks 
and vulnerabilities migrants face at different stages of migration by respecting, protecting and fulfilling 
their human rights and providing them with care and assistance; to address the legitimate concerns 
of transit and destination States and communities; to create conducive conditions that enable all 
migrants to enrich societies; and to facilitate their contributions to sustainable development at local, 
national, regional and global levels. See United Nations, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration (A/RES/73/195), 2019 [online] https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/73/195.
Diagram 
Funds, programmes and specialized agencies of the United Nations system that contributed to the Comprehensive 












Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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On 12 September 2019, the Secretary-General of the United Nations established a 
special coordination mechanism, chaired by the Executive Secretary of ECLAC, to 
facilitate effective and integrated support by the funds, programmes and specialized 
agencies of the United Nations system to the Governments of the four countries. 
This document forms part of that mandate and seeks to streamline the process 
and to prepare an implementation agenda based on proposals stemming from the 
countries’ needs and the experience of different regional and international institutions, 
in accordance with international human rights laws, with a view to influencing the 
implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Global Compact 
for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. The jointly prepared set of proposals is at 
the heart of this initiative, providing the impetus and realism that the Plan requires.
This document incorporates the contributions to the Comprehensive Development Plan 
on which the United Nations system is working or that it proposes to take forward. 
There are both individual actions and actions coordinated between two or more funds, 
programmes or specialized agencies. Individual actions include: (i) those that are currently 
being implemented and are related to Comprehensive Development Plan proposals; 
(ii) actions and programmes that will come into operation in the 2020–2021 period, 
have financing and possess significant synergies with Comprehensive Development 
Plan objectives; and (iii) new projects to be incorporated into the set of proposals as 
they come on stream. In the case of coordinated actions, funds, programmes and 
specialized agencies at the regional level will form issue-based coalitions around the 
four Comprehensive Development Plan pillars.
Since its inception, the Comprehensive Development Plan has recognized the importance 
of the efforts and outcomes of the integration process deployed in Central America, in 
particular by the regional bodies and institutions of the Central American Integration 
System (SICA). For decades, Central America has been making significant efforts and 
has been allocating resources to deepen ties and promote integration between the 
countries in the subregion, which has resulted in the emergence of various institutions 
and spaces for dialogue and cooperation. In addition, the Central American regional 
space has mechanisms for liaising and cooperating with its neighbours, especially 
Mexico, such as the Tuxtla Mechanism for Dialogue and Coordination, the Mesoamerican 
Integration and Development Project and the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern 
Triangle.2 The Comprehensive Development Plan is aligned with these efforts and 
builds synergies in such areas as cooperation on trade facilitation, energy integration 
and managing the risk of extreme weather events.
History has shown that the Central American countries are capable of building 
agreements with innovative integration processes, as well as of entering into cooperation 
commitments with other Latin American countries, in particular Mexico. This new, 
ECLAC-coordinated, collective proposal wholeheartedly embraces the spirit of the 
2 In 1996, the Tuxtla Mechanism for Dialogue and Coordination was formalized as a space for political 
dialogue, the consolidation of peace and democracy and the promotion of cooperation between Mexico 
and the Central American countries. Subsequently, the Puebla-Panama Plan, which in 2008 became the 
Mesoamerican Integration and Development Project, consolidated the spirit of cooperation between 
Central America and Mexico and Belize, Colombia and the Dominican Republic subsequently joined 
it. Since 2008, within the framework of the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Tuxtla 
Mechanism for Dialogue and Coordination, the Mesoamerican Integration and Development Project 
has become a space for cooperation that facilitates the exchange of experiences and good practice, 
consensus- and capacity-building and the identification of resources to tackle regional priorities.
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Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America and the principles of 
the Esquipulas Accords, with an emphasis on peace, justice, solidarity, development, 
international cooperation and respect for the sovereignty of States. Those two eras 
of diplomacy should serve as inspiration for the new relationship that El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico are seeking to forge in order to address jointly the 
development challenges of the twenty-first century, including human mobility.
In recent years, human mobility (migration and forced displacement) from northern 
Central America has been at its most dramatic and complex, with the number of 
migrants in transit, returnees, unaccompanied minors and asylum-seekers having 
increased, as has the number of complete families and high-visibility caravans 
transiting through those countries and Mexico. Faced with this reality, which has 
raised human mobility to the highest priority on political and development agendas, 
the United Nations system is seeking to coordinate and generate actions that help 
to address the migration cycle comprehensively (origin, transit, destination and 
return), from a perspective that is not only humanitarian, but also economic, social, 
environmental, and centred around human security and human rights.
In parallel, on 14 August 2019 the nine state governments of Mexico’s south-southeast 
region (Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz 
and Yucatán) signed the Oaxaca Pact. Within the framework of the National Conference 
of Governors (CONAGO) and its Commission for the Comprehensive Development 
of the South-Southeast Region, these states will coordinate to attract growth and 
development and to mitigate poverty. The Oaxaca Pact provides for the creation and 
rehabilitation of railway, road connectivity, port and energy infrastructure projects. As 
the Comprehensive Development Plan is aligned with and complements and boosts 
the Oaxaca Pact, the Plan’s actions in Mexico will focus on these nine states.
On the occasion of the inauguration of President Alejandro Giammattei of Guatemala 
on 15 January 2020, the ECLAC Executive Secretary reported on the Comprehensive 
Development Plan’s progress to the President of Guatemala and the foreign ministers 
of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico. In bilateral meetings with the 
ECLAC Executive Secretary, the countries’ presidents and foreign ministers appointed 
institutions and officials to prioritize Comprehensive Development Plan projects and 
programmes in their respective countries. Subsequently, ECLAC officials visited the 
four countries and worked with the designated officials and their staff to establish 
linkages between the Comprehensive Development Plan and national development 
plans, Government plans and national goals and priorities. High-level officials in 
each country prioritized, selected and developed the initiatives contained in the 
Comprehensive Development Plan. 
The proposals in the Comprehensive Development Plan are innovative responses 
designed to renew and strengthen the relationship between northern Central America 
and the states of south-southeast Mexico. The proposals relaunch and scale up 
regional integration, building on existing achievements.
Effective implementation of the regional, national and local projects in the Comprehensive 
Development Plan will be a result of the actions of: national and local governments; 
regional integration institutions; private-sector and civil-society representatives; funds, 
programmes and specialized agencies of the United Nations system; international 
financial institutions; and donors of the funds needed to implement this agenda.
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Against this backdrop, this document charts a path towards an economically efficient, 
socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable style of development that meets 
the pressing demands generated by long- and short-term situations. It fosters 
economic development in countries of origin to enhance people’s well-being, founded 
on a human security and human rights approach. The proposal identifies innovative 
responses based on renewing and strengthening the relationship between northern 
Central America and Mexico, relaunching and scaling up integration. Adopting this 
perspective, the Comprehensive Development Plan:
 • Incorporates a human rights and human security approach (employment, income, 
education, social protection, public safety and livelihoods).
 • Puts people’s human rights at the centre.
 • Strengthens national efforts and priorities.
 • Proposes development policies for lagging areas.
 • Values, protects and capitalizes on the subregion’s natural wealth and cultural 
diversity for the benefit of its population.
 • Explores synergies and promotes regional integration.
 • Includes human mobility within a vision of sustainable development.
 • Incorporates a comprehensive view of the migration cycle (origin, transit, destination 
and return).
 • Re-examines matters relating to governance, institution-building and the creation 
of safe spaces in the cities and places of origin and the transit spaces of migrants 
in order to analyse and address them.
The pre-pandemic diagnosis already revealed the structural problems posed by 
economic development, welfare and social protection, environmental degradation 
and vulnerability to disasters, as well as the strong pressures that all this implies for 
forced and unsafe migration. As mentioned earlier, all these factors have worsened 
in the current context, where neither events, nor possible exit scenarios, nor the final 
toll of this major crisis can be predicted.
The complex reality of human mobility in this subregion stems from economic reasons, 
violence, the pursuit of family reunification and pressures arising from global warming. 
It encompasses regular migration, irregular migration, internal displacement and 
the movement of unaccompanied minors, refugees and asylum-seekers. It is not a 
short-term phenomenon but rather a structural condition. 
As all the indicators show, these structural determinants have worsened and deepened 
as a consequence of the pandemic, to levels that would have been difficult to predict 
just a few months ago. It is therefore no exaggeration to point out that a social 
process with the characteristics of a humanitarian crisis is now compounding the 
already complex mobility phenomenon.
In his presentation of “Policy Brief: The impact of COVID-19 on Latin America and 
the Caribbean,” António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, warned that 
the entire region is experiencing the worst economic, health, social and humanitarian 
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crisis in a century.3 That is the scale of the challenge that lies ahead. For the four 
countries involved in the Comprehensive Development Plan, this would lead to a sharp 
decline in economic growth, a significant increase in poverty and extreme poverty, 
violence and greater inequality, as the ECLAC COVID-19 Observatory in Latin America 
and the Caribbean has been pointing out.4
Just to give an idea of the depth and momentum of the process we are experiencing, 
ECLAC has estimated that the economies of all four countries will experience negative 
growth in 2020: -8.6% in El Salvador, -2.5% in Guatemala, -8.0% in Honduras and 
-9.0% in Mexico.5 This weak economic performance is expected to be accompanied 
by a sharp increase in poverty throughout this subregion: 6.5 percentage points in 
El Salvador, 3.0 percentage points in Guatemala, 4.2 percentage points in Honduras 
and 7.6 percentage points in Mexico.6 All this is compounded by the fact that, even 
before the health crisis, these countries had the highest poverty rates in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Historically, several of the nine Mexican states involved in the 
Comprehensive Development Plan have had the highest poverty rates in the country.
If the outlook was already complex before the pandemic, now it is even more serious, 
making the need to act even more urgent. There is a real risk that the post-pandemic 
period will confront us with less dynamic economies, more impoverished populations 
and more polarized societies— and this risk should not be underestimated.
We therefore consider the human security approach underpinning the Comprehensive 
Development Plan to be of the greatest importance— only with a comprehensive vision 
(that places people at the centre and allows them to access essential livelihoods and 
meet their various human needs, while guaranteeing them a life free from violence 
and helping to build a culture of peace) will it be possible to achieve development 
objectives and, in so doing, transform human mobility from a necessity to a free choice.
The COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare our weaknesses and this global event has 
revealed that a style of development based on deepening inequalities, increasingly 
insecure social reproduction, environmental degradation and weakened multilateralism 
and international cooperation is unsustainable.
This awareness underlies the different assumptions that the world will not and should 
not be the same after the pandemic and that, consequently, it is high time to discuss the 
foundations of a new regime of accumulation, a different welfare and social protection 
system, a new global environmental agreement and a global, regional and subregional 
governance commensurate with the challenges we face as a species and as a planet.
A closer look reveals that these are the objectives defined in the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, whose validity and relevance is evident, although the 
conditions for achieving them have now become much more complex and adverse. 
It is important to emphasize that this is a crisis of uncertain outcome.
3 See United Nations, “Policy Brief: the Impact of COVID-19 on Latin America and the Caribbean”, 2020 
[online] https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/sg_policy_brief_covid_lac.pdf.
4 See Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “COVID-19 Observatory in 
Latin America and the Caribbean: economic and social impact”, 2020 [online] https://www.cepal.org/
en/topics/covid-19.
5 See Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Preliminary Overview of the 
Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 2020 (LC/PUB.2020/17-P), Santiago, 2020.
6 See Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “Addressing the growing 
impact of COVID-19 with a view to reactivation with equality: new projections”, Special Report COVID-19, 
No. 5, 2020 [online] https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/45784/S2000470_
en.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
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There is a range of possible futures that depend on the immediate responses of 
Governments and society to the pandemic, as well as on its long-term consequences. 
This is the time to consider how to use economic stimulus packages in rebuilding 
economies and society to support a long-term change towards greater social equality 
and towards sustainable and inclusive practices. By taking a short-term approach, 
we are gambling with the long term future. How we recover is just as important as 
the recovery itself. The following assertion by the United Nations in the policy brief 
presented by the Secretary-General in July 2020 is therefore of paramount importance:
Recovery from the pandemic should be an occasion to transform 
the development model of Latin America and the Caribbean while 
strengthening democracy, safeguarding human rights and sustaining 
peace, in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.7
This can be summed up in the concrete and powerful proposition:
In Latin America and the Caribbean, building back better implies building 
back with equality.8
While these assertions are important for the whole of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
they are of particular relevance to the four countries involved in the Comprehensive 
Development Plan because many of the structural problems requiring solutions are 
both widespread and concentrated in these particular countries.
We start from the premise that signs of exhaustion of the prevailing style of development 
(including increasing flows of migrants and refugees) were there before the pandemic 
and that its serious economic and social effects will persist afterwards. COVID-19 
has intensified and accelerated a crisis that had been evolving for years.
Although common challenges are observed across the subregion, the magnitude 
of the effects will differ and, to a large extent, will reflect each country’s response 
to containing the health crisis and tackling the consequences of a socioeconomic 
crisis exacerbated by the external shock stemming from a crisis in the economic 
and environmental model. The effects will also be influenced by such factors as 
each country’s economic structure, institutions and history and the way in which it 
is integrated into the global economy. 
However, one cannot fail to note that it is very difficult to find solutions and ways 
forward solely within the framework of national structures. Deepening international 
cooperation and strengthening integration are crucial to designing a new development 
model. The Comprehensive Development Plan therefore brings together the four 
countries as a subregion that needs to strengthen its ties, cooperation and integration, 
particularly with south-southeast Mexico.
It is important to reassess the role of integration at a time of far-reaching changes 
that are shaking the foundations of the economy, society and international relations. 
These changes call for more and better integration and a framework of respect 
for multilateralism and international rules that facilitate achievement of the SDG 
targets and the economic and social development of small economies such as 
7 United Nations, “Policy Brief: the Impact of COVID-19 on Latin America and the Caribbean”, 2020 
[online] https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/sg_policy_brief_covid_lac.pdf.
8 United Nations, “Policy Brief: the Impact of COVID-19 on Latin America and the Caribbean”, 2020 
[online] https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/sg_policy_brief_covid_lac.pdf.
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those in Central America. Such changes also pose challenges for large economies 
such as Mexico’s, with respect to their relations and integration policies with the rest 
of Latin America, Central America and the Caribbean, specifically with El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras.
Reinterpreting the role of integration begins with identifying the changes and 
challenges that will face the subregion after the COVID-19 pandemic. The position 
of the countries in the subregion is doubly weak in the new environment: on the 
one hand, they are very open economies that have succeeded in becoming deeply 
integrated into global production processes through trade and investment; on the 
other hand, they are small economies with little room for manoeuvre. This makes 
integration and multilateralism necessary and vital paths for the subregion.
To state that the pandemic has exposed structural problems is also to acknowledge 
that any analysis of its consequences and implications should not be limited to its 
short-term effects. These effects are varied and, in many respects, serious. However, at 
this critical juncture, the focus should not be solely on short-term effects and impacts. 
It is also necessary to resist the temptation to consider the pandemic as a blip or 
brief hiatus, rather than as the manifestation of an extreme situation demanding a 
shift in direction, a turning point in the face of what is increasingly considered as a 
crossroads facing our civilization. In the short term, it is essential to envision and 
remember the long term.
When delivering the 18th Nelson Mandela Annual Lecture on 18 July 2020, the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations made a powerful appeal, in light of the 
consequences of COVID-19, to tackle the inequality pandemic, to build a new social 
contract and to endow society with a new global deal for what can be called a new era.
In the words of the Secretary-General:
COVID-19 is a human tragedy. But it has also created a generational opportunity.
An opportunity to build back a more equal and sustainable world.
The response to the pandemic, and to the widespread discontent that 
preceded it, must be based on a New Social Contract and a New Global 
Deal that create equal opportunities for all and respect the rights and 
freedoms of all.
This is the only way that we will meet the goals of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, the Paris Agreement and the Addis Ababa Action 
Agenda— agreements that address precisely the failures being exposed 
and exploited by the pandemic.
A New Social Contract within societies will enable young people to live in 
dignity; will ensure women have the same prospects and opportunities as 
men; and will protect the sick, the vulnerable, and minorities of all kinds.9
9 United Nations, “Secretary-General’s Nelson Mandela Lecture: “Tackling the Inequality Pandemic: a 
New Social Contract for a New Era” [as delivered]”, 18 July 2020 [online] https://www.un.org/sg/en/
content/sg/statement/2020-07-18/secretary-generals-nelson-mandela-lecture-%E2%80%9Ctackling-
the-inequality-pandemic-new-social-contract-for-new-era%E2%80%9D-delivered.
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In the same spirit, he makes an urgent appeal: 
Let’s face the facts. The global political and economic system is not 
delivering on critical global public goods: public health, climate action, 
sustainable development, peace.
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought home the tragic disconnect between 
self-interest and the common interest; and the huge gaps in governance 
structures and ethical frameworks.
To close those gaps, and to make the New Social Contract possible, we 
need a New Global Deal to ensure that power, wealth and opportunities 
are shared more broadly and fairly at the international level.
A new model for global governance must be based on full, inclusive and 
equal participation in global institutions.
Without that, we face even wider inequalities and gaps in solidarity —like those 
we see today in the fragmented global response to the COVID-19 pandemic.10
All the signs are that the pandemic is bringing us to the end of a way of producing, 
exchanging, distributing and consuming, to the exhaustion of a style of development, 
of the regime of accumulation. That is what we mean when we say that we are facing 
a new era.
In the subregion, the regime of accumulation (the set of norms, institutions, 
regulations and social relations around which the processes of production, circulation, 
distribution and consumption are structured during a historical period and with a certain 
technology base) has been characterized by a number of factors, with differences 
and nuances between countries, including: high concentration of property, wealth 
and income; strong trends towards financialization; growing and, in some cases, 
disadvantageous integration into the global economy and hyperglobalization; great 
structural heterogeneity; a marked trend towards primarization, extractivism and low 
production diversification; strong prevalence of capital over labour and deterioration of 
the functional distribution of income; high market power of companies and propensity 
for oligopolization; persistence of rentier and concentration practices; large overlap 
between political power and economic power; weak and inadequate taxation, with 
many regressive components; lax environmental regulations; a highly fossil fuel-reliant 
energy mix; and inadequate, fragmented, hierarchical welfare and social protection 
systems prone to commodification and residualism.
This is the structure underpinning the culture of privilege, which, in recent years (as 
demonstrated by the COVID-19 pandemic) has shown increasingly that it leads to poor 
economic growth, high inequality, persistent poverty and environmental degradation, 
four factors that constitute structural causes of human mobility. That is why the future 
needs to be different— and so does the style of development.
The three dimensions of the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development (economic, social 
and environmental) are interrelated and interdependent. That is why a comprehensive 
development proposal is being discussed. The environmental dimension should not 
10 United Nations, “Secretary-General’s Nelson Mandela Lecture: “Tackling the Inequality Pandemic: a 
New Social Contract for a New Era” [as delivered]”, 18 July 2020 [online] https://www.un.org/sg/en/
content/sg/statement/2020-07-18/secretary-generals-nelson-mandela-lecture-%E2%80%9Ctackling-
the-inequality-pandemic-new-social-contract-for-new-era%E2%80%9D-delivered.
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continue to be considered as an externality but as an integral part of the economic 
and social model, that is to say, a component just as important as the other two. 
Therefore it is not enough to consider solely the impact of the style of growth on the 
environment; we must also examine how the environmental dimension can be turned 
into a new engine of economic growth and development, in what ECLAC has called a 
big push for sustainability. As stated in the 2030 Agenda, the environmental dimension 
forces us to rethink and redefine existing models of production and consumption and 
their interrelationships. Simply put, development either will or will not be sustainable.
It should be made clear that the COVID-19 pandemic and other epidemic crises that 
have been experienced in recent times are related to such factors as the destruction 
of tropical forests, trade in wild species and patterns of intensive agrifood production 
with high concentration and confinement of animals. Faced with the urgent need 
for a speedy economic recovery, there is also the risk of pursuing growth at any cost 
without incorporating, or discounting, the imperative of sustainability. Here, too, in 
short-term decisions we are gambling with the long term.
One of the many lessons learned from COVID-19 to date is that it has revealed the 
limitations and weaknesses of social policies and social protection systems in ensuring 
people’s well-being and guaranteeing their rights, eliminating and preventing poverty 
and providing a set of certainties and assurances to enable people to fulfil their life 
plans and aspirations. The pandemic has exposed the precarious conditions in which 
tens of millions of people in the subregion live, in terms of work and income, effective 
access to fundamental rights (starting with health), safe water and adequate housing, 
all of which are basic conditions to meet health recommendations.
The welfare regime is considered as the set of relationships, norms, institutions, 
rights and regulations that embody the social compact during a historical period, 
through which access to well-being is (or is not) provided, or is provided to differing 
degrees, by a complex and interdependent interaction between the State, the market, 
households, communities and non-state public actors.
The key elements for defining the nature of a welfare regime are: the degree to 
which the basic requirements of human needs are recognized as rights; the degree 
of universality in effective access to and accreditation of the quality of services, 
entitlements and benefits; the degree of de-commodification and de-familiarization of 
welfare components; substantive equality between women and men; de-feminization 
of social service provision and access; the degree of alignment between the existing 
level of economic development and people’s standard of well-being; compliance with 
the principles of progressivity and maximum mobilization of resources; guaranteed 
attention to requirements at the different stages in the life cycle and the creation 
of intergenerational equity; consistency with the changing structure of social risks; 
strong recognition for social and cultural diversity; and the degree to which it does 
(or does not) reduce inequality, poverty, precariousness, discrimination, exclusion, 
hierarchization and stratification.
The pandemic has exposed the deep-seated weaknesses and failings of prevailing 
welfare and social protection systems in this subregion, which, with major differences 
between countries, are characterized by weak or, at best, fragmented universalism 
owing to the persistence of corporate schemes and to a growing trend, in recent 
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decades, towards commodification and residualism. Key aspects of welfare, such as 
care, also continue to be highly feminized and family-based, with a rigidly gendered 
division of labour.
They have been exposed as regimes that: have failed to facilitate steady progress 
towards social equality and poverty eradication; in essence, are not founded on 
a rights-based approach; and maintain wide social, gender, ethnic, territorial and 
age-group gaps. Taken as a whole, they lead to inadequate enjoyment of social rights, 
low social mobility, high levels of precariousness and limited social protection, as the 
COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted.
All this shows that the economic, social and environmental factors behind the escalation 
of migration, refugee and internal displacement processes not only persist but have 
worsened. Recent information on deteriorating living conditions in the Central America 
Dry Corridor and other regions points not only to the intensification of human mobility 
but also, as noted earlier, to a burgeoning humanitarian crisis. 
Therefore, the central tenet of the Comprehensive Development Plan is the need for 
a new type of development for the subregion from the perspective of sustainability, 
human security and human rights. The Plan comprises 29 policy recommendations 
and 114 specific project proposals grouped into the aforementioned four pillars: 
economic development; social well-being; environmental sustainability, climate 
change and adaptation, and disaster risk reduction; and comprehensive management 
of the migration cycle
Following the rationale of the 2030 Agenda, the Comprehensive Development Plan 
considers the four pillars as interdependent, which is why it has been designed 
as a coordinated set of proposals rather than as a collection of initiatives. It aims 
to serve as a link between the short term and the long term, between the fastest 
possible improvement in people’s living conditions and the creation of a new style of 
development, a different welfare and social protection regime, guaranteed sustainability 
and human mobility consistent with the rights-based approach. The Plan is therefore 
also part of this subregion’s contribution to compliance with the Global Compact for 
Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. 
As stated earlier, this Comprehensive Development Plan is the result of rich dialogue, 
lively interaction and deep deliberation between ECLAC, the funds, programmes and 
specialized agencies of the United Nations system and the national Governments of 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, as well as the subnational governments 
of the nine states of south-southeast Mexico involved in the Plan. Although the 
presidents of the four countries commissioned ECLAC to draw up the document in 
December 2018, the end product is the result of a collective effort involving multiple 
actors, where many voices were heard and a wide range of contributions were 
collected. All this enhanced the Comprehensive Development Plan and made it more 
all-encompassing.
To operationalize the Comprehensive Development Plan, this document makes 
project proposals available to the Governments of the countries, Central American 
regional integration institutions, funds, programmes and specialized agencies of the 
United Nations system, international financial institutions and potential donors, to 
initiate implementation of this cooperation and development strategy for El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and south-southeast Mexico.
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It is no exaggeration to say that we are at a turning point. The decisions made 
during these crucial months are likely to determine the path countries will take in 
the coming years, if not longer. Diagnosis, recommendations and inputs, as well as 
proposals prepared jointly with Governments, are the backbone of the Comprehensive 
Development Plan for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and south-southeast Mexico. 
However, they are just means to achieving the key aims: to improve economic 
performance; to enhance social well-being; to guarantee sustainability; and to ensure 
voluntary human mobility with full respect for human rights. After the pandemic, it 
will be crucial to strive to rebuild better, in a different way and, above all, with equality 
at the centre.
Alicia Bárcena
Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission  
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
Coordinator of the Special Coordination Mechanism 
to support implementation of the Comprehensive Development Plan 












General and specific objectives
Geographic coverage of the Comprehensive 
Development Plan for El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and south-southeast Mexico
Promote initiatives to improve economic performance, attract investment, increase 
trade, foster income generation and boost the creation of decent, worthwhile work, 
first and foremost in the territories that are more predisposed to migration
Create a sustainable development space across El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 
and south-southeast Mexico
Enhance well-being and make migration a choice rather than an obligation
Promote universal access to social rights and well-being for equality
Promote sustainability, resilience to climate change and comprehensive risk 
management, to mitigate the impact of climate change as a driver of migration
Guarantee the fundamental rights, care, protection, security and dignity of people 
throughout the migration cycle (origin, transit, destination and return), fostering safe, 




climate change and adaptation, 
and disaster risk reduction
Comprehensive management 
of the migration cycle
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Comprehensive Development Plan for El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and south-southeast Mexico
An innovative plan
Driving force: the political commitment of the four governments
Joined up proposal by the entire United Nations system
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Territorial dimension that recognizes historical and cultural affinities
Human security approach
Rapid response in a period of high uncertainty
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I .  PRIORITY AREAS FOR 
PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT IN 
NORTHERN CENTRAL AMERICA AND 
SOUTH-SOUTHEAST MEXICO
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Priority areas for promoting 
development in northern 
Central America and 
south-southeast Mexico
It is recognized that the northern countries of Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Honduras) and Mexico have heterogeneous economic and demographic 
characteristics. In 2018, Mexico’s population was nearly four times greater than 
that of northern Central America as a whole. In terms of total land area, El Salvador 
has the smallest area (21,041 square kilometres), while Mexico has the largest 
(1,964,375 square kilometres).
The above figures are reflected in significant differences in population density, ranging 
from 63.7 inhabitants per square kilometre in Mexico to 315.7 inhabitants per square 
kilometre in El Salvador. With regard to per capita income, Mexico’s is 2.5 times that of 
El Salvador, 2.2 times that of Guatemala and 3.7 times that of Honduras (see map I.1.A). 
As mentioned earlier, in Mexico the Comprehensive Development Plan is concentrated 
in nine states in the south-southeast: Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Puebla, 
Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz and Yucatán. These states, which in 2017 had a 
combined population of 34.7 million (28.1% of the country’s total population), also have 
heterogeneous economic and demographic characteristics. The states with the largest 
number of inhabitants are Veracruz (8.2 million), Puebla (6.3 million) and Chiapas 
(5.4 million), while the least populated state is Campeche, with 935,000 inhabitants 
(see map I.1.B). 
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Map I.1 
Northern Central America and Mexico and states of south-southeast Mexico: main dimensions
Mexico
Population: 124 737 789
Land area: 1 964 375
GDP: 9 798.1
Honduras
Population: 9 012 200
Land area: 112 492
GDP: 2 641.2
Guatemala
Population: 17 302 084
Land area: 108 889
GDP: 4 544.6
El Salvador
Population: 6 643 359
Land area: 21 041
GDP: 3 922.3
A. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico
Population (number of inhabitants)
Land area (square kilometres)
Per capita gross domestic product (GDP)(US$)
Veracruz
Population: 8 163 963
Land area: 72 815
GDP: 6 093.9
Yucatán
Population: 2 172 839
Land area: 39 340
GDP: 7 348.1
Quintana Roo
Population: 1 664 667
Land area: 50 350
GDP: 10 419.1
Chiapas
Population: 5 382 083




Land area: 51 833
GDP: 27 598.4
Tabasco
Population: 2 431 339
Land area: 24 661
GDP: 10 642.5
Oaxaca
Population: 4 061 497
Land area: 95 364
GDP: 3 993.5
Guerrero
Population: 3 607 210
Land area: 63 794
GDP: 4 212.8
Puebla
Population: 6 313 789
Land area: 33 919
GDP: 5 989.2
B. States of south-southeast Mexico
Population (number of inhabitants)
Land area (square kilometres)
Per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP)(US$)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official statistics.
The nine states cover a combined area of 505,963 square kilometres (25.7% of Mexico’s 
total land area): Oaxaca is the largest state (95,364 square kilometres) and Tabasco, 
the smallest (24,661 square kilometres).
Mexico’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is 1.3 times higher than the average 
for the nine states in the south-southeast. Guerrero, Oaxaca and Chiapas have the 
lowest per capita income, while Campeche, Quintana Roo and Tabasco have the 
highest (see map I.1.B).
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A. An economic model with mixed results 
and persistent structural lags
1.  The economic model of northern Central America and 
Mexico is characterized by macroeconomic stability 
and trade opening
It has been more than three decades since the northern countries of Central America 
abandoned the model of import substitution industrialization, with an important role 
for the State, and began the transition towards a model based on trade opening, 
with strong export incentives, financial liberalization and reduced State involvement 
in the economy, including company privatization and private-sector development.
The current paradigm has been characterized by the attraction of foreign-owned 
companies that set up export platforms for agro-industrial and manufactured products 
and, more recently, also for business services, largely targeted at the United States market.
Between 1990 and 2008, merchandise exports from El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras grew significantly, at an average annual rate of 9.5%, 10.8% and 11.3%, 
respectively. Merchandise exports from Mexico grew by 12.5% over the same period. 
Following the global financial and economic crisis, however, the average annual 
growth rate of exports slowed to 3.9% in El Salvador, 3.3% in Guatemala and 4.1% in 
Honduras, between 2010 and 2018, while in Mexico, exports grew by 8.2% over the 
same period (see figure I.1).
Figure I.1 




















2000 2001 2002 2003
(right axis)(left axis)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
   El Salvador    Guatemala   Honduras Mexico
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official statistics.
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As exports from the states of south-southeast Mexico are oriented strongly towards 
primary products, especially hydrocarbons, export growth is determined largely by 
the evolution of international prices. Mexico’s excellent export performance has been 
driven mainly by the states in its northern, central and Bajío regions, which have 
entered various global supply chains.1
Between 2007 and 2014, the combined exports from the nine states of south-southeast 
Mexico averaged 20.6% of the country’s exports. Between 2015 and 2017, their share 
fell to 10.9%, owing to a drop in international prices for primary products, especially 
hydrocarbons. In 2017, they totalled US$ 41.964 billion.
Between 2007 and 2017, the combined exports from the states of south-southeast 
Mexico decreased at an average annual rate of 2.2%, in contrast to 4% annual growth 
nationwide. The only states to have recorded growth during this period were 
Puebla (6.8%), Guerrero (5.2%) and Veracruz (2.3%), while the rest experienced sharp 
falls, in particular Campeche (7.9%) and Chiapas (4%).
Continuous flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) have been a direct result of 
the new model. Between 2000 and 2018, they averaged 3.4% of GDP in northern 
Central America and 2.7% in Mexico.
The new model has also been characterized by macroeconomic stability. Between 
2000 and 2018, inflation in northern Central America and Mexico was below 10% a year 
consistently (except for two years in Honduras), despite periods of global economic 
volatility and significant international price hikes for primary products (see figure I.2).
1 The Bajío (lowlands) is a geographic, historical, economic and cultural region of northwest-central 
Mexico, lying mostly north of the Lerma River. This region includes part of the states of Aguascalientes, 
Jalisco (central region and Jalisco highlands), northern Michoacán, Guanajuato, Querétaro, San Luis 
Potosí and Zacatecas.
Figure I.2 
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El SalvadorGuatemalaHonduras Mexico
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official statistics.
a Preliminary figures.
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The level of other macroeconomic variables, such as interest rates and current account 
deficit, remained low and relatively stable over the same period.
In 2017, FDI flows to the states of south-southeast Mexico totalled US$ 4.103 billion. 
Between 2011 and 2017, they averaged 14.2% of the national total. As a percentage 
of GDP, FDI in the nine states averaged 1.8% during the same period, below the 2.8% 
national average. The states where FDI accounted for the highest percentage of GDP, 
over the same period, were Oaxaca (3%), Quintana Roo (2.9%), Puebla (2.6%) and 
Guerrero (2.3%), while the states where FDI accounted for the lowest percentage of 
GDP were Campeche and Chiapas, with 0.8% each.
Inflation in the states of south-southeast Mexico has been very similar to the national 
average. Between 2000 and 2018, the annual change in the consumer price index 
averaged 4.7% (the national average was 4.6%).
2.  The model has generated modest rates of economic 
growth, although in recent years rates have exceeded 
the regional average
Economic growth rates in northern Central America and Mexico have been modest 
in recent years. Between 1991 and 2018, the Mexican economy expanded at an 
average annual rate of 2.5%, while average annual growth in the northern countries 
of Central America was 3.5%.
Growth rates in northern Central America contrast with those of other Central American 
countries, such Costa Rica (4.3%) and Panama (5.8%) (see figure I.3).
Figure I.3 













Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official statistics.
34 C O M P R E H E N S I V E  D E V E L O P M E N T  P L A N
However, in recent years (2014–2018) the growth rate of northern Central America 
and Mexico outstripped average annual growth in Latin America and the Caribbean 
as a whole (0.4%).
Between 1990 and 2017, the combined GDP of the nine states of south-southeast 
Mexico grew at an average annual rate of 1.5% (1 percentage point below the national 
average). Average growth in Quintana Roo, Yucatán and Puebla was the highest, while 
in Campeche it fell (see figure I.4).
Figure I.4 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official statistics.
3.  Moderate economic growth rates have been associated 
with low productivity growth and weak linkages between 
the export sector and the rest of the economy
The modest growth in GDP is linked closely with low labour productivity growth. During 
the period under review, the average growth rate was 1.3% in El Salvador, followed by 
0.7% in Guatemala, 0.4% in Honduras and 0.3% in Mexico (see figure I.5).
These values compare negatively with average productivity growth over the same 
period in Central America (1.5%), the world 2.0% and the United States (1.5%).
Between 2006 and 2017, labour productivity grew at an average annual rate of 0.03% in 
the nine states of south-southeast Mexico, compared with a national average of 0.38%.
Investment in both science and technology and innovation, two key drivers of 
productivity growth, has remained low.
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Figure I.5 











































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official statistics.
Research and development spending as a percentage of GDP has remained virtually 
unchanged over the past 15 years. According to the latest data available, Mexico earmarks 
0.53% of its GDP for research and development, El Salvador 0.13%, Guatemala 0.03% 
and Honduras 0.02%, far less than world leaders in the field, such as Sweden (3.26%) 
and the Republic of Korea (4.23%). In the specific case of northern Central America, the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has highlighted 
significant weaknesses in national innovation systems and very few regional linkages.2
In spite of the many public efforts to strengthen production linkages between 
domestic companies and export-oriented transnational companies, domestic value 
added continues to be low.
Indicators of Latin America’s input-output matrix show that the domestic value 
added incorporated into manufacturing exports in Honduras and Mexico is less than 
50%, meaning that more than half the intermediate products and services needed to 
produce and export these products are imported (see figure I.6).
2 See R. Padilla (ed.), Sistemas de innovación en Centroamérica: fortalecimiento a través de la integración 
regional, ECLAC Books, No. 118 (LC/G.2559-P), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2013.
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Figure I.6 
Northern Central America and Mexico: domestic value added incorporated into exports in the secondary sector, 2011
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official statistics.
The main destination for exports is the United States: while El Salvador and Guatemala 
send 34% of their exports to the United States and Honduras sends 40%, Mexico’s 
sends an even larger share (76.5%).
Despite their geographic proximity, trade between Mexico and northern Central America 
is a small proportion of total trade and is heavily skewed in Mexico’s favour. In 2017, 
just 0.12% of Mexico’s total imports came from Guatemala, 0.10% from Honduras and 
0.04% from El Salvador. In contrast, 11.1% of Guatemala’s total imports came from 
Mexico, compared with 7.3% of El Salvador’s total imports and 7.4% those of Honduras.
Figure I.7 
Trade between Mexico and northern Central America, 2014–2018
(Percentages)
A. Share of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras 
in Mexico’s merchandise trade 
B. Mexico’s share in the merchandise trade of countries 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official statistics.
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4. Structural change is focused on activities with low 
productivity growth
Northern Central America and Mexico have undergone profound structural change in 
recent decades. The importance of the primary sector declined drastically in all four 
countries, to the benefit of the secondary and tertiary sectors (see figure I.8).
Figure I.8 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official statistics.
Structural change has also occurred in the states of south-southeast Mexico, 
characterized by outsourcing of economic activity. While in 1990, the tertiary sector 
contributed 42.2% of GDP, in 2017 it contributed 56.1%. In 2017, the primary sector 
had the largest share of GDP in Chiapas and Oaxaca (6.8% and 6.1%, respectively), the 
secondary sector continued to have a large share in Campeche’s economy, mainly 
because of its oil industry (85%), and the tertiary sector had a large share in Quintana 
Roo’s economy (88.3%), owing to tourism (see table I.1). 
Despite this structural change, productivity growth has been sluggish, as mentioned 
earlier. ECLAC concludes that, in Mexico’s case, structural change has been accompanied 
by a displacement of employment from sectors with relatively high productivity growth 
into activities with low, or even negative, productivity growth.3
Nor has structural change has been accompanied by environmental protection, 
employment with rights and better social conditions for the population. In other 
word, structural change has been far from progressive.
3 See R. Padilla Pérez and F. Villarreal, “Structural change and productivity growth in Mexico, 1990–2014”, 
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, vol. 41, June 2017.
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Table I.1 




Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary
National total 4.0 38.9 57.1 3.3 31.0 65.6
 Southern Mexico 4.1 53.7 42.2 3.8 40.1 56.1
 Campeche 0.4 93.5 6.1 1.0 85.0 14.0
 Chiapas 8.5 38.0 53.6 6.8 21.1 72.0
 Guerrero 5.8 14.8 79.4 5.5 17.6 76.9
 Oaxaca 6.6 25.9 67.5 6.1 22.4 71.4
 Puebla 6.3 31.0 62.7 4.1 35.2 60.7
 Quintana Roo 1.6 16.0 82.4 0.8 10.9 88.3
 Tabasco 1.9 72.4 25.7 1.7 64.7 33.6
 Veracruz 6.2 38.9 54.9 5.4 31.0 63.6
 Yucatán 6.0 22.9 71.1 3.7 27.2 69.1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official statistics.
Note: Calculated on the basis of constant 2013 prices.
The shift in employment towards sectors with low productivity growth is associated 
closely with growth in low-value-added service activities, such as small-scale 
commerce. According to ECLAC estimates of informal employment rates in countries 
of the region, the rate is 55.8% in El Salvador, 57% in Guatemala, 53.9% in Honduras 
and 45.8% in Mexico.
In 2017, 64.1% of people in work (non-agricultural) in El Salvador had an informal job 
(more than 1.4 million people). The share was 65.9% in Guatemala (3 million people) 
and 73.3% in Honduras (1.8 million people). In the nine states of south-southeast 
Mexico, around 2.2 million Mexicans had informal jobs (non-agricultural) in the second 
quarter of 2019. The state with the most informal employment as a share of total 
employment (non-agricultural) is Oaxaca, with 75.4%. It is followed by Guerrero (72.7%), 
Puebla (66.1%), Chiapas (65.6%), Veracruz (61.5%) and Tabasco (60.4%). All these 
states have percentages above the national average of 52%.
Strikingly, a large proportion of informal employment is in the formal sector (formal 
economic units) and in households. According to International Labour Organization 
(ILO) estimates, based on household surveys, 6.6%% of people with informal jobs 
in El Salvador work in the formal sector of the economy and 5.4% in households. In 
Guatemala, the shares are 14.1% and 4.7%, respectively, while in Honduras they are 
13.5% and 4.8%, respectively.
Informal employment does not affect all population groups equally. Women and young 
people tend to be more exposed to it than men and adults. In El Salvador in 2017, the 
incidence of informal employment among 15–24-year olds was 69.4%, while among 
those over the age of 25 it was 63%. In Guatemala, the incidence was 78.8% among 
young people and 61.7% among those over the age of 25, while in Honduras it was 
83.2% and 70.4%, respectively.
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Levels of informal employment are also higher among women than among men. In 
El Salvador, while 72% of women workers (non-agricultural) have an informal job, this 
drops to 56.6% among men. A gap is also seen in Guatemala (69.3% among women 
and 63.2% among men), Honduras (76.9% and 69.7%, respectively) and Mexico (56.3% 
and 48.8%, respectively). In the states of south-southeast Mexico, which have the 
highest rates of informal employment, there is also a significant gender gap. In 
Oaxaca, for example, 80.8% of women are in informal employment, compared with 
69.3% of men.
There are also geographical differences. In less urbanized areas of Mexico, the informal 
employment rate is 59.7% for men and 69.4% for women, while in more urbanized 
areas, the rate is 41.9% for men and 46.9% for women.
Using a different methodology from that employed for the above estimates, Mexico’s 
National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) estimates that 69.2% of the 
employed population in the states of south-southeast Mexico worked in the informal 
sector in 2017.4 Chiapas and Oaxaca have the highest rates of informal employment 
and Quintana Roo the lowest (see table I.2).
Table I.2 











Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official statistics.
In recent decades, rural areas have also undergone major changes in terms of 
productive activities and interaction with urban areas, as well as access to and use 
of new technology.
In spite of the differences between the northern countries of Central America, there 
is a general trend towards diversification of economic activities in rural areas, with 
growing importance of manufacturing and services (see figure I.9). 
4 According to the methodology of the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), informal 
workers include those working in unregistered microbusinesses, own-account workers in subsistence 
agriculture and workers without social security coverage whose services are used by registered 
economic units.
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Figure I.9 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official statistics.
According to data from population censuses, the rural population engaged in farming 
in the states of south-southeast Mexico5 decreased from 67% to 59% between 2000 
and 2010.6
The agrarian structure is highly polarized, characterized by growing concentration of 
land ownership. On the one hand, family farming accounts for the vast majority of 
farming activities (95% in Central American countries). On the other hand, medium- and 
large-scale farms compete with large oligopolistic agribusiness companies oriented 
mainly towards the export market.
5.  Public and private investment is insufficient
Investment is a key factor that correlates positively with economic growth. However, 
investment ratios in northern Central America and Mexico are below those of other 
Central American economies and other regions of the world. 
Over the period 1990–2018, average total investment for northern Central America 
and Mexico as a whole was 19% of GDP, identical to the Latin American and Caribbean 
average for the same period (19% of GDP) but below that of Nicaragua (23.9%) and 
Panama (27.3%) (see figure I.10).
Public investment in northern Central America and Mexico, as a percentage of GDP, 
averaged 3.5% over the period 1990–2018, while private investment averaged 15.5% of 
GDP. This performance has hinged upon a strategy of public spending restraint, to 
the detriment of investment (see figure I.11).
5 Puebla is not included in this data for the rural population engaged in farming because this state was 
not included in the original source of information.
6 See F. Contreras, “Dinámica laboral en los hogares rurales en México”, Hogares y trabajadores en México 
en el siglo XXI, B. García, E. Pacheco and J. Najera (eds.), Mexico City, El Colegio de México, 2017.
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Figure I.10 
Northern Central America, Mexico and selected regions: average total investment, 1990–2018 













































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank and official statistics.
Figure I.11 
Northern Central America and Mexico: average public and private investment, 1990–2018
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official statistics.
In 2017, total investment in the nine states of south-southeast Mexico averaged 
21.9% of GDP.
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6. Poor financial inclusion stands in the way of fast 
economic growth
Financial inclusion is defined as the population’s access to a wide range of financial 
services tailored to their needs, offered by a variety of regulated providers.
Financial inclusion can provide opportunities for achieving the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), by providing the means for making and receiving payments, as well 
as for accumulating assets safely, leveraging available assets to invest in education, 
health and productive activities, and mitigating risk.
Despite significant progress in access to financial services in recent years, Mexico 
and northern Central America lag behind the Latin American average.
Mexico is one of the countries in the region with the highest percentage of over 
15-year-olds excluded from the financial system (58.7 million people).
According to Mexico’s National Survey of Financial Inclusion (ENIF), in 2018 the 
proportion of adults who did not use at least one regulated financial product in Mexico’s 
southern region was 32.4% and in its south-central and eastern region it was 39.7%, 
both of which exceed the 31.7% national average.7
In El Salvador, just 24% of women over the age of 15 have an account in a formal 
financial institution. While this rises to 42% in Guatemala, it is still below the 52% 
average for Latin America and the Caribbean (see figure I.12). 
7 The data from the 2018 National Survey of Financial Inclusion are classified by region. The southern 
region includes the states of Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Tabasco, Quintana Roo and Yucatán. 
The south-central and eastern region includes the states of Mexico, Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla, Tlaxcala 
and Veracruz. See National Banking and Securities Commission/National Institute of Statistics and 
Geography (CNBV/INEGI), National Survey of Financial Inclusion (ENIF) 2018 [online database] http://
en.www.inegi.org.mx/programas/enif/2018/.
Figure I.12 

















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official statistics.
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More than half the financially excluded population states that their main reason for 
not having an account in a regulated financial institution is the perception of not 
having sufficient income. In Guatemala, the proportion is 63%.
With regard to savings, although 78.5% of Mexicans claimed to have saved in the 
12 months prior to being interviewed, only 15.2% answered that they had saved 
exclusively with regulated financial institutions.
According to the regional classification of the National Survey of Financial Inclusion, 
in Mexico’s southern region, the proportion of adults who save is 79.7%, while the 
proportion claiming to have saved formally is 15.3%. In its south-central and eastern 
region, the proportion of adults who do not save increases to 23.2%, while the 
proportion who save in formal institutions is just 12%.
High levels of exclusion are also seen in the countries of northern Central America: of 
the 40% of northern Central Americans who reported having saved recently, only 11% 
of Salvadorans, 12% of Guatemalans and 15% of Hondurans saved with a regulated 
financial institution.8
There is a significant gender gap in financial inclusion in the countries involved in the 
Comprehensive Development Plan. The widest gap is seen in El Salvador, where it is 
14% (men have greater inclusion), while in Honduras and Mexico the gap is around 8% 
and in Guatemala 4%.9
This limits not only the amount of savings allocated to education, health and productive 
activities but also possibilities for accessing and using other financial services, such 
as credit and insurance.
7. Labour income accounts for a dwindling share of value 
added but a growing share of capital, which increases 
inequality and reduces purchasing power and growth 
in domestic demand
Since the 1970s, there has been a downward trend in labour income as a share of 
GDP throughout the world. In Latin America, starting in the mid-2000s, there was a 
slight recovery in the share of labour income, which continued even after the global 
financial crisis.
However, this recovery did not extend to Mexico and Central America where, according 
to the latest data, the labour income share of GDP is less than 30% (see figure I.13).
8 The information for northern Central America comes from A. Demirgüç-Kunt and others, “The Global 
Findex Database 2017: Measuring Financial Inclusion and the Fintech Revolution”, Washington, D.C., 
World Bank, 2018, while the information for Mexico comes from National Banking and Securities 
Commission/National Institute of Statistics and Geography (CNBV/INEGI), National Survey of Financial 
Inclusion (ENIF) 2018 [online database] http://en.www.inegi.org.mx/programas/enif/2018/.
9 See World Bank, Global Financial Inclusion Database [online] https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/
dataset/global-financial-inclusion-global-findex-database.
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Figure I.13 
Latin America (15 countries)a: share of wages in gross domestic product (at market prices), weighted average for the total 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official statistics.
a Average weighted by current GDP in dollars.
ECLAC estimates, based on the functional distribution of national income by 
sector and the relative importance of these sectors at state level, suggest that the 
proportion of value added distributed as remuneration to wage workers in the states 
of south-southeast Mexico is 25.7%, below the 29% national average.
This stems from a low labour income share in Campeche (9.4%) and Tabasco (18.4%), 
which reflects the greater relative importance of extractive activities, where just 6.2% 
of the national value added is distributed as remuneration to wage workers. In the 
other states in the south-southeast, where the main economic activity is services, 
labour income as a share of GDP is above the national average.
The decrease in the labour share of income implies that wages are growing at a slower 
rate than average labour productivity. In the case of Mexico and Central America, this 
is unfolding in a context of slow labour productivity growth.
The negative trend in labour income as a share of GDP is reflected in greater income 
inequality because stagnant wage growth is concentrated in the lower-income population.
As ownership of capital is concentrated in the higher-income segments of the population, 
the larger proportion of income they receive in rents from physical and financial assets 
exacerbates the already high economic inequality. This income concentration impacts 
on the purchasing power of wage workers, undermining growth in domestic demand.
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8.  Tax collection rates are low and marked by high avoidance 
and evasion 
Tax revenues collected as a percentage of GDP in Guatemala and Mexico are among the 
lowest in the region and the world, with 10% and 13%, respectively, collected in 2018. 
Tax revenues collected in both El Salvador and Honduras accounted for 18% of GDP 
(see figure I.14). The averages for the countries of Latin America and the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) were 15.6% of GDP and 34.2% of 
GDP, respectively.
Figure I.14 
Northern Central America and Mexico: tax revenues, 2018 



















Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Dominican
Rep.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official statistics.
In 2017, tax collection rates in the states of south-southeast Mexico were extremely 
low, equivalent to 2.1 percentage points of state GDP as a whole. In 2017, tax revenues 
accounted for between 0.06% and 0.78% of each state’s GDP. This points to a weak 
tax system and heavy reliance on cash transfers from the Federal Government (see 
figure I.15).
In some countries, there is a steady increase in public debt, with a resulting increase 
in interest payments. El Salvador’s total non-financial public sector debt-to-GDP ratio 
was 72.8% in 2018, which is bordering on a problematic level of debt sustainability. 
In Guatemala, public debt was 21.5% of GDP, the lowest of all countries in northern 
Central America and Mexico (see figure I.16).
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Figure I.15 
States of south-southeast Mexico: tax revenues, 2017
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official statistics.
Figure I.16 
Northern Central America and Mexico: total public debt, 2017 and 2018
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official statistics.
In 2017, indebtedness in the states of south-southeast Mexico was equivalent to 
0.83% of state GDP as a whole. Although this figure seems relatively low, if debt is 
considered as a percentage of tax revenue, indebtedness ranged from 7.7% in Yucatán 
to 179.7% in Campeche.
In 2018, debt service averaged 3.9% of GDP in the northern countries of Central America 
and Mexico. In Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, it accounted for around 2.2% of GDP, 
while in El Salvador it was equivalent to 9.3% of GDP.
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In addition, the fastest-growing (export-oriented) sectors enjoy big tax incentives. 
Loss of tax revenue, as a result of exemptions from income, value added, foreign 
trade, social security and other taxes, accounted for 3.8% of GDP in El Salvador, 2.3% 
in Guatemala and 3.9% in Mexico in 2017.10
Most export manufacturing activities are covered by export promotion regimes that 
offer generous tax incentives, in terms of tariffs, taxes on income and assets and 
municipal and other taxes. In 2017, the share of merchandise exports under special 
regimes was 49.4% in Honduras and 38.5% in Mexico, with lower values in Guatemala 
and El Salvador (34.3% and 20%, respectively).
B. High and persistent poverty and inequality, 
in a context of demographic pressures 
and chronic violence
1.  Progress in social development in recent years has 
been insufficient
In northern Central America, primary education coverage (population aged 15–19 having 
completed primary education) is over 80%, with the exception of Guatemala where it 
is 62% among men and 57% among women. In Mexico, primary education coverage 
is 96.4% for men and 97.4% for women.
The infant mortality rate has fallen to 11.9 per 1,000 live births in El Salvador, 27 per 
1,000 in Guatemala and 30 per 1,000 in Honduras, from levels close to 50 per 1,000 in 
the mid-1980s. However, rates are still far higher than those of developed countries.
Another indicator that has shown some improvement, although it is still at a high 
level, is the percentage of the population living in extreme poverty. Progress has been 
greatest in El Salvador, where the rate has dropped to 8.3% in 2017 (from 17.5% in 
2000), and in Honduras, with a rate of 18.8% in 2016 (compared with 27.3% in 2000). 
In Guatemala, there has been less of a decrease (15.4% in 2014, compared with 16.9% 
in 2000).
In terms of diet, food production exceeds the population’s requirements by 18% in 
El Salvador, 16% in Guatemala, 19% in Honduras and 32% in Mexico. Better distribution 
of income and food production would therefore suffice to fulfil the right to a healthy 
and varied diet.
However, despite efforts to reduce them, the levels of many forms of violence remain 
high, including: disappearances, with more than 58,000 missing persons in northern 
Central America between 2010 and 2018; gender-based violence, with 40,000 rapes 
reported in northern countries of Central America between 2010 and 2017; child-specific 
violence; and a strong presence of armed criminal groups.11
10 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Fiscal Panorama of Latin America 
and the Caribbean, 2019 (LC/PUB.2019/8-P), Santiago, 2019.
11 See United Nations Development Group, “Snapshot of the situation. Northern countries of Central America: 
protection concerns”, New York, 2019, unpublished.
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The homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in northern Central America decreased 
in 2017 compared with 2015, while Mexico shows the opposite trend. However, very 
high levels persist: in 2018, the average homicide rate in northern Central America 
was 1.5 times higher than the Latin American average and these countries are still 
among the world leaders for death by violence.
Femicide rates in the northern countries of Central America and Mexico are among the 
highest in the world: 898 per 100,000 women in Mexico, 232 in El Salvador, 235 in 
Honduras and 172 in Guatemala.12 This represents only a small portion of violent 
deaths of women, as most cases are not registered as femicides but as murders.
2. Northern countries of Central America and the states 
of south-southeast Mexico face demographic pressures
Between 1950 and 1975, population growth in northern Central America was high and 
its population increased at an average annual rate of 2.8%. When a population grows 
that fast, it doubles every 25 years. As a result, the number of inhabitants in these 
three countries increased from 6.9 million in 1950 to 13.7 million in 1975. Although 
the rate of growth slowed thereafter, it is estimated that the population will have 
reached 34.3 million by 2020 and 47.6 million by 2050.
According to projections from the National Population Council (CONAPO), the combined 
population of the states of south-southeast Mexico will have risen to 39.1 million 
by 2030 and 42.3 million by 2050. While their growth rate will gradually decline in 
the future, it will continue to be above the Mexican average (see figure I.17).
12 See Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “Femicide or feminicide” 
[online] https://oig.cepal.org/en/indicators/femicide-or-feminicide.
Figure I.17 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations, World Population Prospects 2019 
[online database] https://population.un.org/wpp/; National Population Council (CONAPO), “Proyecciones de la Población de México 
y de las Entidades Federativas, 2016–2050“ [online] https://datos.gob.mx/busca/dataset/proyecciones-de-la-poblacion-de-mexico-
y-de-las-entidades-federativas-2016-2050.
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The high population growth in northern Central America between 1950 and 1975 
was the result mainly of a reduction in mortality rates (especially among minors), 
while fertility rates remained constant at above 6 children per woman.13 As the 
demographic transition progressed in these countries, fertility began to decline (to 
between 2.2 children per woman and 3.2 children per woman, that is to say, close to 
the population replacement level). In the states of south-southeast Mexico, the crude 
death rate in 2020 will be similar to the national rate (6 per 1,000 inhabitants). The 
average fertility rate will be the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman, albeit with 
variations between federal entities. With 77 pregnancies per 1,000 young people aged 
15–19 in 2018, Mexico is the OECD country with the highest teenage pregnancy rate. 
In the years of high population growth, the public policy challenge was to serve 
the child population, focusing on maternal and child health and primary education. 
In 1970, children under 15 years of age accounted for 45.6% of the population in 
El Salvador, 45.8% in Guatemala, 47.7% in Honduras and 46.5% in Mexico. As a result of 
demographic change, in 2020 their share will shrink to 26.5% in El Salvador, 33.3% in 
Guatemala, 30.5% in Honduras and 25.5% in Mexico. In the states of south-southeast 
Mexico, children under 15 years of age accounted for 27.8% of the population in 2019, 
although the child population in Chiapas and Guerrero is higher than the Mexican 
average (25.5%).
The largest age group in the countries and federal entities is 15–49 years, with a share 
in 2020 estimated at 52.6% in El Salvador, 53.5% in Guatemala, 55.1% in Honduras 
and 53% in Mexico. This last figure is very similar to the average for the states of 
south-southeast Mexico (52.3%) in 2019.
The age distribution of their population provides northern Central America and 
Mexico with both challenges and opportunities because, unless timely action is 
taken, persistent socioeconomic inequalities could prevent them from capitalizing 
on demographic opportunities (see figure I.18). The demographic dividend currently 
being enjoyed by northern Central America and the states of south-southeast Mexico, 
offers opportunities owing to the heavy concentration of people in the working-age 
group, especially the 15–49 age group. To harness the potential of this segment of 
the population to the full, it is vital to create decent employment and reduce existing 
income lags among both men and women. It is also necessary to invest in young 
people who find it difficult to complete their education, acquire the skills required by 
the labour market and join the market under the right conditions.14
Children under the age of 15 (representing one third of all the inhabitants of northern 
Central America and south-southeast Mexico) create a growing demand for quality 
education, nutrition, care and the chance to grow and develop in safe and supportive 
settings.15 Investing in this age group would promote equality and, at the same time, 
would prepare the future workforce for their countries’ development.
13 Corresponding to the total fertility rate, that is to say, the average number of children that women of 
reproductive age (15 to 49 years) would have if fertility conditions were to remain constant.
14 See Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), The social inequality matrix 
in Latin America (LC/G.2690(MDS.1/2)), Santiago, 2016.
15 See Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), The social inequality matrix 
in Latin America (LC/G.2690(MDS.1/2)), Santiago, 2016.
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Figure I.18 
Northern Central America and south-southeast Mexico: population by age group, 2020
(Thousands of inhabitants)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations, World Population Prospects 2019 
[online database] https://population.un.org/wpp/; National Population Council (CONAPO), “Proyecciones de la Población de México 
y de las Entidades Federativas, 2016–2050“ [online] https://datos.gob.mx/busca/dataset/proyecciones-de-la-poblacion-de-mexico-
y-de-las-entidades-federativas-2016-2050.
Demographic transition in northern Central America and Mexico is driving the growing 
demand for personal care services (for persons who are older, sick or have disabilities), 
without the countries responding with national care policies. The majority of this 
unpaid work falls on women, which limits their labour force participation and wastes 
the dividend they represent for national economies. 
Population dynamics are also at work at household level. The national trend in 
northern Central America and Mexico is towards a decrease in the average size of 
households. Around 2016, household sizes stood at 3.7 members in El Salvador and 
Mexico, 4.4 in Honduras and 4.8 in Guatemala. However, this average masks major 
differences when segmented by income. According to income quintile, the poorest 
households in all countries have on average more members (4.9), while those in the 
highest quintile have fewer members (3.3). There are also differences within countries. 
In the federal entities of south-southeast Mexico, the average number of household 
members ranges from 4.2 in Chiapas to 3.4 in Quintana Roo.16
The age composition of households is diverse. The average number of children under 
the age of 12 per household is 1.5 in all four countries under study. Most household 
members are in early adulthood, with an average age of 28.8 in all four countries. The 
youngest households are found in Honduras (average age 27.5 years) and Guatemala 
(average age 25.6 years). In contrast, in El Salvador and Mexico, the average age of 
household members exceeds 31 years.
16 See National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), “Encuesta Intercensal 2015” [online] https://
www.inegi.org.mx/programas/intercensal/2015/.
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The decline in the number of children in households affects the economic dependency 
ratio, which has also decreased in recent decades and, as countries are still at the 
incipient stage (Guatemala), moderate stage (Mexico and Honduras) or moderate to 
advanced stage (El Salvador) of population ageing, they do not yet face the challenges 
that countries in the region’s Southern Cone currently do. However, emerging needs 
are heterogeneous and demonstrate households’ vulnerability depending on their 
members’ stage of life: children are concentrated in the poorest households, whereas 
older persons are concentrated in the richest households (see figure I.19). Household 
composition has also diversified. Currently, 1 in 10 Mexican households is a single-parent 
household; 1 in 10 is a single-person household and 1 in 10 is a household comprising 
a couple with no children. Together, these three types of household make up 30% of 
the total.17
3. Explosive and disorderly urbanization with 
great inequalities
Urbanization in the northern countries of Central America is an ongoing process, unlike 
in Mexico, which has a level of urbanization close to that of high-income countries. 
In 2018, the urban population ratio was 72% in El Salvador, 51% in Guatemala, 57% in 
Honduras and 80% in Mexico.18
17 See El Colegio de México/United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women 
(UN-Women), “El progreso de las mujeres en el mundo 2019–2020: familias en un mundo cambiante. 
Ficha México”, Mexico City, 2019.
18 United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects 2018: Highlights (ST/ESA/SER.A/421), New York, Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), 2019, p. 26.
Figure I.19 
Northern Central America and Mexico: household dependency ratio by income quintile, around 2016
(Number of dependents per worker)
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Source: World Bank, Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) [online] https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/
dataset/socio-economic-database-latin-america-and-caribbean.
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The annual growth rate of the urban population over the period 2015–2020 will average 
2.1% and, despite the fact that the rural population of Guatemala and Honduras 
currently makes up nearly half their total population, both countries will experience 
rapid urbanization in the future. In El Salvador and Mexico, declining fertility will be 
the biggest factor influencing growth in the urban population’s share of the total 
population (see figure I.20).
Figure I.20 










































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects 
2018 [online database] https://population.un.org/wup/.
In the states of south-southeast Mexico, the urbanization process is heterogeneous. 
In 2015, the urban population ratio in Yucatán and Quintana Roo was 84.5% and 88.9%, 
respectively, which is even higher than the national average. In Oaxaca and Chiapas, 
the urban population ratios are around 50%, similar to Guatemala’s ratio (see map I.2).
Urbanization in the subregion takes the form of explosive expansion of capital-city 
suburbs, secondary cities and road corridors between urban centres. Nowadays, the 
inhabitants of northern Central America live in cities of very different sizes: 4 large 
metropolises (with over 1 million inhabitants), 20 cities with between 100,000 inhabitants 
and 1 million inhabitants and 80 cities with 15,000-100,000 inhabitants. In 2015, 
the population of south-southeast Mexico was concentrated in towns with fewer 
than 500 inhabitants (33.5%) and in cities with over 100,000 inhabitants (31.6%).
A factor common to the three northern Central American countries is that urbanization 
does not stem from a process of industrialization but from a weakening of traditionally 
rural production structures and strong growth in the informal economy. Another 
phenomenon observed is high urbanization from population displacement and migration 
to tourist areas, as is happening in the state of Quintana Roo in south-southeast Mexico.
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Map I.2 
Northern Central America and south-southeast Mexico: urban population, 2018
(Percentages)





Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects 
2018 [online database] https://population.un.org/wup/; National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), Encuesta Intercensal 
2015 [online database] https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/intercensal/2015/.
Much of the urban population in these countries is living in precarious housing and in 
poverty. In 2016, 31% of Guatemala’s urban population was living in slums, informal 
settlements or inadequate housing, compared with 40.4% in Honduras. This drops 
to 22.4% in El Salvador and 16% in Mexico (see figure I.21).
Figure I.21 











Source: United Nations, Global SDG Indicators Database [online] https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/database/.
The main consequence of sociospatial segregation in cities, together with overcrowded 
housing, deterioration of public spaces and services and growing disparities between 
residential areas and informal settlements, is to deprive millions of people of decent 
living conditions, forcing them to live in environments characterized by increased social 
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conflict and deterioration of the social fabric. Indeed, large-scale urban growth, without 
adequate planning, access to services such as education, employment or security, 
or consolidated institutions, can create an environment of insecurity and violence.19 
According to data on homicides in cities, a significant proportion of homicides are 
committed in urban centres, a phenomenon that does not necessarily affect only 
the largest cities. In Honduras, for example, the city with the highest homicide rate 
is La Ceiba, followed by San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa.20
Gangs are one of the most important aspects of social conflict in urban areas. In 
2018–2019, the Attorney General of El Salvador started a total of 7,412 criminal 
proceedings for gang-related organized crime.21 Nationwide in Mexico, 31.9% of the 
population had seen or heard violent gangs (pandillas) in the country’s main urban 
areas during the third quarter of 2019.22
4.  The development model of northern countries 
of Central America and Mexico has failed to create 
sufficient employment, especially for young people
In the northern countries of Central America, roughly 700,000 young people reach 
working age (15 years) each year and, in Mexico, they number around 2.3 million. 
While not all these young people either wish or need to work at this stage in their 
lives, there is an expectation that they will eventually do so, making it necessary for 
the labour market to have the capacity to offer them decent jobs.
Annual net job creation in northern Central America is an estimated 580,000 jobs 
and, in Mexico, around 1.6 million.23 This job creation continues to be less than what 
is needed, especially for young people, and is very precarious owing to high informal 
employment rates in these countries. The unemployment rate among 15–24-year 
olds is higher than the national average. In Guatemala in 2016, 9.8% of 15–24-year 
olds were unemployed, with a lower incidence (1.6%) among people aged 25 and 
over. This was also true of El Salvador (9.8% among 15–24-year olds and 3.1% among 
people aged 25 and over). In Honduras and Mexico, the gap between the two age 
groups is 5.5 and 4.4 percentage points, respectively (see figure I.22). In the states 
of south-southeast Mexico, people aged 15–29 have unemployment rates close to 
5% but with great disparities. For instance, in the states of Guerrero and Oaxaca, the 
unemployment rate is below 3%, while in the state of Tabasco, the rate exceeds 12% 
(see figure I.23). Furthermore, women’s labour force participation rate remains very low.
19 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Homicide, development and the Sustainable 
Development Goals”, Global Study on Homicide 2019, Vienna, 2019 [online] https://www.unodc.org/
documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet_4.pdf.
20 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Homicide in cities”, DATAUNODC [online 
database] https://dataunodc.un.org/data/homicide/Homicide%20in%20cities.
21 See Attorney General’s Office, Memoria de labores 2018–2019, San Salvador, 2019 [online] http://www.
fiscalia.gob.sv/wp-content/uploads/memorias-pdf/Memoria-de-Labores-2018-2019.pdf.
22 See National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), National Survey on Urban Public Safety 
(ENSU) [online database] http://en.www.inegi.org.mx/programas/ensu/default.html#Tabulados.
23 In Mexico, the annual target is to create 1.2 million jobs, a figure lower than that proposed in this 
document. This is because the figure of 1.2 million takes into consideration the fact that, in practice, 
not all young people reaching working age seek a job, mainly because they include many women 
who cannot enter the labour market because they are required to perform unpaid domestic work. This 
document proposes a figure of 1.6 million as it considers that the population that fails to enter the 
labour market should be included in the target figure.
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Figure I.22 
Northern Central America and Mexico: unemployment rate, by sex and age, 2018 
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Source: United Nations, Global SDG Indicators Database [online] https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/database/.
Figure I.23 
States of south-southeast Mexico: unemployment rate by age group, 2019
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of National Institute of Statistics and Geography 
(INEGI), National Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE) [online database] http://en.www.inegi.org.mx/programas/enoe/15ymas/. 
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Despite the fact that the national unemployment rate remains low in Guatemala 
and Mexico (2.5% and 3.4%, respectively) and moderate in El Salvador and Honduras 
(7% and 6.7%, respectively), informal employment plays an extremely important role 
in the economy, as mentioned earlier.
An insufficient supply of jobs and high informal employment rates in the northern 
countries of Central America, coupled with demand for workers in the United States 
economy, are among the leading structural causes behind the migration phenomenon 
in the subregion. In El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, more than two thirds of 
job-seekers resort to the informal economy or to migration. Demand for foreign labor in 
the United States continues to grow and is met largely by migrants from Latin America.
5.  High levels of inequality and poverty are seen in northern 
Central America and Mexico 
Northern Central America and Mexico have high inequality in the distribution of income 
and wealth. In Guatemala, the richest 20% of the population holds just over half the 
country’s income (50.7%). This is followed by Mexico and Honduras, countries that 
also have severe inequality, with the richest 20% holding just over 47% of income. 
While El Salvador shows slightly lower levels, inequality in the country is still high 
(see figure I.24). Levels of inequality in the states of south-southeast Mexico are 
slightly higher than the national average and than those in northern countries of 
Central America, with close to (and in some states slightly more than) 50% of income 
concentrated in the hands of the richest 20% of the population (see figure I.25).
Figure I.24 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), CEPALSTAT [online database] https://estadisticas.cepal.org/
cepalstat/portada.html?idioma=english.
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Figure I.25 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of National Institute of Statistics and Geography 
(INEGI), National Survey of Household Income and Expenditure (ENIGH) 2016 [online database] http://en.www.inegi.org.mx/programas/
enigh/nc/2016/.
Nearly half the northern Central American population is living in poverty and between 
12% and 19% suffer from extreme poverty, meaning that they do not have enough income 
to meet their basic food requirements. In rural areas, levels are critical: in Guatemala, 
65.8% of the rural population was living in poverty in 2014 and, in Honduras, 64% of the 
rural population was living in poverty in 2016. This drops to 52.2% in El Salvador (2017) 
and 59.6% in Mexico (2016). The figure for Mexico is still extremely high considering 
the number of Mexicans affected by this scourge, as well as the country’s economic 
development and per capita GDP (see figure I.26).
Poverty affects men and women differently. The data on the population without 
own income, by sex, show that the percentage of women without own income is 
several times higher than that of men. In El Salvador, 16.1% of men have no own 
income, compared with 41.6% of women. In Guatemala, the shares are 14% and 51%, 
respectively, while in Honduras they are 14% and 39.3%, respectively.24 Earning one’s 
own income gives a person the power to decide how to manage their own earnings 
to cover their personal needs and those of other household members, which makes 
this a key indicator for women’s lack of economic autonomy.
24 See Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “People without incomes 
of their own” [online] https://oig.cepal.org/en/indicators/people-without-incomes-their-own.
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Figure I.26 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), CEPALSTAT [online database] https://estadisticas.cepal.org/
cepalstat/portada.html?idioma=english.
The unequal distribution of care work between men and women prevents women 
from joining the labour market and accessing study opportunities on equal terms. 
Although the data sources are not uniform, the information available suggests that 
women in the countries under study spend three times as much time as men on 
unpaid work (see table I.3).
Table I.3 
Northern Central America and Mexico: unpaid working time by own income and sex, latest 
year availablea
(Hours per week)
Country Women with own income
Women without 
own income Men with own income
Men without 
own income
El Salvador 33.7 49.8 18.7 30.4
Guatemala 36.4 45.2 10.4 12.2
Honduras 30.3 37.7 14.2 19.6
Mexico … … … …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “Unpaid work time by own 
income and sex” [online] https://oig.cepal.org/en/indicators/unpaid-work-time-own-income-
and sex.
a The figures for El Salvador refer to 2017, for Guatemala to 2017 and for Honduras to 2009.
The rural poverty rate in the states of south-southeast Mexico (73.2%) is higher than the 
northern Central American average. Rural poverty and extreme poverty are particularly 
acute in the states de Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero, with a poverty rate of more than 
80% and an extreme poverty rate of 60% in Chiapas (see figure I.27).
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Figure I.27 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of National Institute of Statistics and Geography 
(INEGI), National Survey of Household Income and Expenditure (ENIGH) 2016 [online database] http://en.www.inegi.org.mx/programas/
enigh/nc/2016/.
Poverty affects indigenous and Afrodescendent populations more than it does other 
population groups. According to the latest data available on Guatemala, in 2014 poverty 
affected close to 70% of indigenous and Afrodescendent populations combined, while 
in Mexico the percentage exceeded 50% in 2015.
6. Social inclusion is poor and the exercise of social rights 
is limited
(a) Education
Education coverage in northern Central America is still far from universal. Lack of 
access to secondary and tertiary education is one of the factors determining the 
predominant education profile, characterized by a low average number of years of 
schooling, mainly among the rural population, as well as by gaps between men and 
women that can even exceed one year, as in the case of Honduras (see figure I.28).
Although levels of education in Mexico are higher than in northern countries of 
Central America, those in Mexico’s southern and south-eastern states are lower, 
particularly in Chiapas, Guerrero and Oaxaca, where average years of schooling are 
similar to those of Honduras and El Salvador (see figure I.29).
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Figure I.28 
Northern Central America and Mexico: average years of schooling of the economically active population 15 years of 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), CEPALSTAT [online database] https://estadisticas.cepal.org/
cepalstat/portada.html?idioma=english. 
Figure I.29 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). 
Note: Average years of schooling completed by the economically active population 15 years of age and older, by sex. The weighted averages 
are based on data from 2015.
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Quality early childhood education, coupled with family caregiving, is essential for children 
to develop properly and for them to start primary school at the right age. However, in 
northern Central America, preschool education coverage is below the regional average 
of 56%, with 25% in El Salvador and 19% in Honduras. Mexico’s coverage is 60%.25 The 
adjusted net enrolment rate one year before the official primary school entry age is 
far short of universal coverage, with the exception of Mexico. In Guatemala, coverage 
is 85%, in El Salvador 81% and in Honduras 78%.
In northern Central America, it is more common for children without access to early 
childhood services to come from the most excluded populations, to live in inaccessible 
areas and to face disadvantages. According to data from the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF), 38,833 children in El Salvador dropped out of school between 
2014 and 2016 because of violence (11% of total dropouts). In the region, the estimated 
share of children aged 3–4 with adequate early childhood development is 83%, 
compared with 82% in Mexico, 81% in El Salvador and 80% in Honduras.26
The percentage of 15–24-year olds in the northern countries of Central America 
who are not included in two institutions crucial to social inclusion (education and 
employment) is higher than the 22% regional average. The figure is 37% in Mexico, 28.4% 
in El Salvador, 27.7% in Honduras and 27.3% in Guatemala.27 Violence also influences 
early school leaving and young people’s learning abilities and life plans.28
Furthermore, the education available is generally of poor quality and largely 
irrelevant, which limits the opportunities of young people and adults to access jobs 
in higher-productivity sectors. This can be seen clearly in the wage gaps that exist 
between young people and adults. In such countries as El Salvador and Guatemala, 
young people have an average income up to 70% lower than that of the adult population, 
despite having higher qualifications.29
Inequality is also expressed in access to education as determined by geographical 
location. Urban education coverage is much greater than rural education coverage and 
this is more evident at the secondary level than at the primary level. The proportion 
of 1524-year olds who are not studying or in paid employment is also higher in rural 
areas than in urban areas. In addition, average years of schooling in urban areas are 
practically double those of rural areas (see figure I.30).
25 See United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), The State of the World’s Children 2019. Children, Food and 
Nutrition: Growing Well in a Changing World, New York, 2019.
26 See United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), The State of the World’s Children 2019. Children, Food and 
Nutrition: Growing Well in a Changing World, New York, 2019.
27 See International Labour Organization (ILO), ILOSTAT [online database] https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/.
28 In Mexico, for example, 60% of teenage girls aged 15–17 claim to have experienced at least one episode 
of violence in their lives. The consequences of violence against girls are multiple and lifelong, as they 
impact on their well-being and physical and mental health. They also contribute to unwanted or early 
pregnancy and early school leaving, undermining their learning abilities and self-esteem, as well as 
child development and the healthy building of identities and life plans.
29 See M. Marinho and V. Quiroz, “Estratificación social: una propuesta metodológica multidimensional 
para la subregión norte de América Latina y el Caribe”, Project Documents (LC/MEX/TS.2018/28), 
Mexico City, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2018.
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Figure I.30 
Northern Central America and Mexico: education coverage by level and average years of schooling, latest year available
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), CEPALSTAT [online database] https://estadisticas.cepal.org/
cepalstat/portada.html?idioma=english.
The indigenous population is also at a disadvantage with respect to access to 
education. In Mexico, the average for the population as a whole is completion of the 
third grade of secondary school, while the indigenous population barely completes 
primary education and indigenous language-speakers complete only the fifth grade 
of primary school. If this advance is treated as one grade per decade, the indigenous 
population is almost three decades behind the national average.
In El Salvador and Honduras, women have higher education coverage at all levels and 
longer average years of schooling (see table I.4). Nonetheless, women’s higher gross 
enrolment rate and longer average years of schooling fail to translate into labour 
market access on equal terms with men.
Table I.4 
Northern Central America and Mexico: education coverage by level and average years of schooling, by sex, 
latest year available
(Percentage of the total population)
Level of education 
El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Primarya 88.4 90.4 76.5 72.6 86.1 91.6 97.1 98.0
Secondaryb 40.1 40.3 33.2 32.8 37.1 45.7 53.6 53.3
Tertiaryc 27.0 30.2 17.2 19.2 22.2 30.3 38.3 38.6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), CEPALSTAT [online database] https://estadisticas.cepal.org/
cepalstat/portada.html?idioma=english.
a Percentage of population aged 15–19 having completed primary education, by sex. 
b Percentage of population aged 20–24 having completed secondary education, by sex.
c Gross enrolment rate in tertiary level of education, by sex.
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While the information available on education coverage in the nine states of 
south-southeast Mexico does not allow a direct comparison with the data presented 
above, evidence from alternative indicators shows levels of coverage similar to the 
Mexican national average. Over the period 2016–2017, Mexico’s secondary school 
graduation rate averaged 85.5%, while the average for the south-southeast was 74.8%. In 
upper secondary education, the national average was 64.4%, while the south-southeast 
average was 60.7%.30 However, an analysis of individual states shows that, in most 
of the states reviewed, coverage is below the national average (see table I.5).
Table I.5 




Level or type of education
Primary Secondary Upper secondary
Campeche 95.3 82.1 62.1
Chiapas 94.6 84.2 66.4
Guerrero 97.4 83.1 68.4
Oaxaca 88.3 81.3 66.2
Puebla 100.7 87.5 74.5
Quintana Roo 103.9 86.9 66.1
Veracruz 99.0 85.1 80.1
Yucatán 97.6 83.1 62.5
Source: National Institute of Educational Evaluation (INEE), on the basis of General Directorate of Educational 
Planning, Programming and Statistics, Estadísticas Continuas del Formato 911 [online] http://
www.f911.sep.gob.mx/2019-2020/.
Note: this indicator refers to the estimated number of students graduating from a specific level of 
education (primary or secondary) or type of education (upper secondary) in a given school year 
for every 100 new students who were enrolled as many school years back as that level or type of 
education lasts (see National Institute of Educational Evaluation (INEE), Panorama Educativo de 
México. Indicadores del Sistema Educativo Nacional 2018. Educación básica y media superior, Mexico 
City, 2019).
Over and above access to educational opportunities, all four countries are facing a learning 
crisis. Based on the latest data (2015) from the OECD Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) survey, the percentage of 15-year-old Mexican students 
who failed to attain minimum levels of proficiency in reading and mathematics was 
42% and 57%, respectively. Data from PISA for Development (PISA-D) (2018) show 
higher percentages of students who scored below the minimum levels of proficiency 
in Honduras and Guatemala: 70% in reading and 85% in mathematics in Honduras and 
70% and 89%, respectively, in Guatemala. Although El Salvador has not participated 
in standardized assessments of learning in recent years, it will take part in the new 
PISA round in 2021.
(b) Health
Although nobody would refute that the Central American countries have made 
considerable progress with a number of health indicators in recent decades, major 
30 See National Institute of Educational Evaluation (INEE), Panorama Educativo de México. Indicadores del 
Sistema Educativo Nacional 2018. Educación básica y media superior, Mexico City, 2019.
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challenges remain, both for the population as a whole and for specific groups 
experiencing clear disadvantages in access to timely care and to quality services 
with a territorial approach, including indigenous and Afrodescendent populations. 
The epidemiological profile of Central American countries is in transition, characterized 
by a reduction in the incidence of transmissible diseases and an increase in chronic, 
non-transmissible diseases. At the same time, they must respond to the pressures 
of persistent transmissible diseases, such as cholera, dengue fever and Chagas 
disease, as well as some emerging diseases, such as the Zika virus and chikungunya.31 
Compounding all this are unresolved challenges, such as maternal and infant mortality, 
gaps in sexual and reproductive health services and high levels of teenage motherhood.
The general lag can be seen in life expectancy at birth. While it was 73.9 years in 
Guatemala, 74.2 years in El Salvador and 73.8 years in Honduras in the period 2015–2020, 
this is still nearly two years shorter than average life expectancy in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (75.7 years). In Mexico, average life expectancy is 77.3 years, with sharp 
differences between states. According to data from the National Population Council 
(CONAPO), in 2017 life expectancy in the nine states of south-southeast Mexico was 
shorter than average life expectancy in Latin America. With an average life expectancy 
of 72.9 years, the state of Guerrero is below the northern Central American average, 
while the state of Chiapas has the same years of life expectancy as Guatemala and 
the state of Oaxaca has the same years of life expectancy as Honduras.
Maternal and child health indicators reveal wide disparities between countries. With 
regard to maternal mortality, Honduras reports a figure of 74 women per 100,000 live 
births, higher than the Latin American average of 58 women per 100,000 live 
births, while El Salvador has a much lower ratio, albeit higher than that of Mexico. 
Guatemala’s rate is much higher than El Salvador’s (see table I.6). In the states of 
south-southeast Mexico, average mortality is 41.5 women per 100,000 live births, 
with marked differences between states.32 In Chiapas, there are 58.3 deaths among 
women per 100,000 children, in Guerrero the figure is 53.9 and, in Campeche, it 
is 50.4, all of which rates are above the Mexican average and rates in El Salvador. 
Table I.6 
Northern Central America and Mexico: maternal and infant mortality
Country Maternal mortality ratio(per 100,000 live births)
Under-five mortality
(per 1,000 live births)




Latin America and the Caribbean 58.0 19.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Pan American 
Health Organization/World Health Organization (PAHO/WHO), Situación de Salud en las Américas: 
Indicators Básicos 2017, Washington, D.C., 2017.
31 See Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “ODS 3: Garantizar una vida 
sana y promover el bienestar para todos a todas las edades en América Latina y el Caribe”, Santiago, 
2019 [online] https://www.cepal.org/sites/default/files/static/files/ods3_c1900667_press_2.pdf.
32 See National System of Statistical and Geographical Information (SNIEG), “Base de datos del Subsistema 
de Información sobre Nacimientos”, Mexico City, 2016 [online] https://www.snieg.mx/cni/indicadores.
aspx?idorden=1.3.
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Mortality is related to safe delivery conditions. Guatemala is the country that faces 
the biggest challenge in this area, given that only 43% of pregnant women receive 
the recommended medical care and just 66% of deliveries take place in hospital 
(see table I.7). While the average is close to 96% in south-southeast Mexico, there 
are also disparities between states. Chiapas is the state that is furthest below the 
average, with only 89.7% of deliveries attended by trained health personnel.33
Table I.7 
Northern Central America and Mexico: prenatal care and hospital deliveries, 2016
(Percentages)
Country Prenatal care by trained personnel Hospital deliveries




Latin America and the Caribbean 86.7 93.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Pan American 
Health Organization/World Health Organization (PAHO/WHO), Situación de Salud en las Américas: 
Indicators Básicos 2017, Washington, D.C., 2017.
In terms of under-five mortality, Guatemala and Honduras are in the worst situation, 
with figures higher than both the regional average and the rates in El Salvador and 
Mexico. In the states of south-southeast Mexico, infant mortality is above the national 
average.34 Chiapas and Oaxaca are the states with the highest infant mortality rate, 
with 18.9 and 17.2 infant deaths per 1,000 live births, respectively.
(c) Food and nutrition security
In Honduras, 49.3% of the population are living with moderate food insecurity and 17.7%, 
with severe food insecurity. These rates are slightly lower in Guatemala and El Salvador, 
where moderate food insecurity is 43.6% and 40% and severe food insecurity is 16.4% 
and 12.7%, respectively.35 This level of undernutrition stems not from a shortage of 
food but from poor food distribution.
According to the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy 
(CONEVAL), 16.7% of the population of the states of south-southeast Mexico experiences 
moderate food deprivation and 11.9%, severe deprivation. However, there are differences 
between federal entities. Tabasco has the highest levels of food deprivation, both 
moderate (24.3%) and severe (22.5%). It is followed by Guerrero, Campeche and 
Oaxaca, where the proportion of the population experiencing severe food insecurity 
is 15.1%, 14.3% and 14.1%, respectively.
33 See National System of Statistical and Geographical Information (SNIEG), “Base de datos del Subsistema 
de Información sobre Nacimientos”, Mexico City, 2016 [online] https://www.snieg.mx/cni/indicadores.
aspx?idorden=1.3.
34 See National System of Statistical and Geographical Information (SNIEG), “Base de datos del Subsistema 
de Información sobre Nacimientos”, Mexico City, 2016 [online] https://www.snieg.mx/cni/indicadores.
aspx?idorden=1.3.
35 See Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “Food security indicators” [online] 
http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-fs/ess-fadata/en.
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Compounding undernutrition, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico face 
a double burden of malnutrition. On the one hand, there is chronic malnutrition 
and, on the other, overweight and obesity, coupled with a nutritional imbalance, 
that is to say, excess consumption of macronutrients (carbohydrates and fats) and 
insufficient intake of micronutrients (vitamins and minerals). According to the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), between 19% and 23% of 
the adult population (aged 18 and over) in northern Central America is obese, rising to 
28.4% in Mexico. In El Salvador, 22.7% of women aged 15–49 have anaemia, compared 
with 16.4% in Guatemala, 17.8% in Honduras and 14.6% in Mexico. One of the main 
causes of malnutrition has been a change in the food environment as a result of 
trade liberalization, which has led to increased imports of corn sugar and processed 
food from the United States.
Guatemala and Honduras also have a very high prevalence of low height for age and 
huge inequalities between rich and poor households. In Guatemala, the percentage of 
children with low height for age is 65.9% in poorer households, compared with 17.4% 
in rich households, while in Honduras the figures are 42.1% and 8%, respectively. Even 
though the prevalence is lower in El Salvador and Mexico, wealth inequality persists. 
In El Salvador, the prevalence of a person with low height for age in poor households 
is 23.6%, compared with 5.3% in rich households, while in Mexico the prevalence is 
22.9% and 4.9%, respectively.36
(d) Basic household services
In El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, there have been significant advances 
in access to safe drinking water, sanitation and electricity. Access to safe drinking 
water in the home is, on average, over 80% in all four countries. Despite advances in 
access to improved sanitation facilities, roughly one third of Guatemalan households 
still have no access to sanitation, exposing their members to an increased likelihood 
of contracting transmissible diseases. With regard to electricity access, while Mexico 
has coverage of more than 95% of households nationwide, in Honduras approximately 
20% of households lack this basic service.
Despite the progress observed at the national level, significant gaps persist between 
rural and urban households in access to safe drinking water, sanitation and electricity. 
While the gaps between urban and rural households in terms of access to safe drinking 
water are around 10 percentage points, the gaps in access to sanitation services are 
almost 30 percentage points, as in Guatemala. 
There are also qualitative gaps between households according to geography and 
income level. Some of the most vulnerable households seek technological solutions 
that do not guarantee quality access to safe drinking water or sanitation facilities37 
and increase environmental pollution and the spread of infectious and contagious 
disease vectors. In cases where households have no connection to a clean water 
supply, they resort to wells or water trucks, which exposes them to more frequent 
service interruptions, and when they have no access to mains sewerage, they resort 
to latrines or septic tanks.
36 See United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), A Familiar Face: Violence in the Lives of Children and 
Adolescents, New York, 2017.
37 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), The Inefficiency of Inequality 
(LC/SES.37/3-P), Santiago, 2018.
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This means that the rural population and those living in less affluent households 
find it more difficult to achieve adequate levels of well-being to perform well in their 
day-to-day activities. This reveals situations of inequality and reproduction of inequality 
that must be overcome by means of social programmes and public policies which, 
in this case, prioritize the rural population. 
Access to Internet services is another gap to be filled among countries involved in 
the Comprehensive Development Plan. In 2016, 45.8% of Mexico’s urban households 
had Internet access in the home, compared with 28% in El Salvador and 13.9% in 
Guatemala in 2014. Among rural households, home Internet access rates drop sharply, 
to 7.3%, 2.3% and 1.4%, respectively.
(e) Social protection
In northern Central America, in 2017, enrolment or contribution to the pension system 
among employed people was far below the regional average of 51.9%.38 Rates were 
25.9% in El Salvador, 18.8% in Guatemala, 19.9% in Honduras and 41.7% in Mexico. In 
the case of women, their lower labour force participation, higher unemployment rates, 
biases in some labour regulations and lack of policies enabling women to balance 
the demands of paid and unpaid work have a negative impact on contributory social 
protection coverage.
Low enrolment levels lead to a small percentage of people receiving a pension at 
retirement age. In 2017, just 17.6% of older persons in El Salvador received a pension 
at retirement age. In Honduras, the percentage of retirees receiving a pension was 
only 10.2%, compared with 28.3% in Guatemala, while in Mexico it was 81.6% (see table I.8).
Table I.8 
Northern Central America and Mexico: pension system coverage, 2017
(Percentages)
Country Pension system coverage among employed people
Pension system coverage among 
the population aged 65 and over
Latin America 51.9 76.2




Source: A. Arenas de Mesa, Los sistemas de pensiones en la encrucijada: desafíos para la sostenibilidad en 
América Latina, ECLAC Books, No. 159 (LC/PUB.2019/19-P), Santiago, Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2019.
As regards non-contributory social protection (designed to guarantee appropriate 
levels of well-being for people’s development, while facilitating and ensuring access 
to social services and social advocacy policies), in 2017, coverage of the population 
and expenditure were below the regional average. Although northern Central America 
and Mexico had conditional transfer programmes, their coverage and the resources 
available to implement them tended to be low. This was particularly so in El Salvador 
and Guatemala (with 5.97% and 5.94%, respectively), compared with the Latin American 
and Caribbean average of 20.7%.
38 Refers to (contributors/employed population)*100.
68 C O M P R E H E N S I V E  D E V E L O P M E N T  P L A N
The situation is much the same with social pensions: in 2017, the coverage and 
expenditure of El Salvador’s social pension policy was just 4.0% of the population 
aged 60 or over, which seems inadequate considering that 25.9% of employed 
Salvadorans are enrolled in the pension system. The same is true in Guatemala, where 
social pension policy covered less than 10% of people in the retirement age bracket. 
These data reflect the acute economic vulnerability of older persons in northern 
Central America and Mexico.
Lastly, the proportion of vulnerable people (such as children, persons with severe 
disabilities and mothers with newborns) who are covered by minimum social protection 
is very low. In Guatemala, only 3.1% of children have access to a social protection 
allowance, while in Mexico it is 28.4% of children (see figure I.31).
Figure I.31 
Northern Central America: children, persons with disabilities and mothers with newborns who are covered by social 

























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International Labour Organization (ILO), ILOSTAT 
[online database] https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/. 
Note: In Guatemala, mothers with newborns receive maternity benefits only if they are covered by contributory schemes. 
a No information is available for El Salvador.
7. Social spending is insufficient
Social spending in these countries, which includes funding for policies in such areas as 
social protection, education and health, housing, community services and recreational 
activities, has stalled or even fallen. Between 2011 and 2016, social spending as 
a percentage of GDP increased by only 0.49 percentage points in El Salvador and 
by 0.33 percentage points in Mexico, while in Guatemala and Honduras it fell by 
0.56 percentage points and 1.58 percentage points, respectively. In all four countries, 
central government social spending as a percentage of GDP was below the regional 
average of 11.2% of GDP (see figure I.32).
69C O M P R E H E N S I V E  D E V E L O P M E N T  P L A N
Figure I.32 
Northern Central America and Mexico: public social spending, 2000–2016
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), CEPALSTAT [online database] https://estadisticas.cepal.org/
cepalstat/portada.html?idioma=english.
Per capita social spending in the northern countries of Central America is far lower 
than in Mexico. In 2016, per capita social spending in Honduras and Guatemala was 
approximately one fifth of Mexico’s (US$ 201 and US$ 220, respectively), while in 
El Salvador it was less than one third (US$ 316).
Even though Mexico’s social spending is higher than in Central American countries, it 
is still not enough to bridge current gaps, particularly in the states of south-southeast 
Mexico. The federalized spending allocated to this subregion (meaning the funding 
transferred from central government to the states) is 26.3% of total federalized 
spending).39 This is not sufficient to tackle the social challenges of a subregion that 
is home to around one quarter of the country’s population. Veracruz is the state that 
is allocated the highest percentage of federalized spending, amounting to 0.05% of 
national GDP. It is followed by Campeche, Quintana Roo and Yucatán, with each state 
allocated around 0.01% of national GDP.40
The biggest item of central government social spending is education. In 2018, it 
accounted for 61.9% of public social spending in Honduras, around 42% in Guatemala 
and El Salvador and 35.8% in Mexico. Out of the four countries, Honduras allocates 
the highest share of public social spending to health (29.9%) and Mexico allocates 
the highest proportion to social protection (39.4%) (see figure I.33).
39 Programmable federalized spending refers to federal funds that are actually implemented by the states 
and are allocated mainly to basic education, teacher training, technology education, adult education, 
infrastructure and the social protection system for health.
40 Own estimates on the basis of Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP) statistics.
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Figure I.33 
Northern Central America and Mexico: allocation of public social spending by the central government, 2018
(Percentage of total public social spending) 















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), CEPALSTAT [online database] https://estadisticas.cepal.org/
cepalstat/portada.html?idioma=english. 
8. Human security and violence
To eradicate the problem of insecurity facing the region, there needs to be a shift 
from the concept of national security to one of human security.41 The purpose of 
national security is to provide protection from external and internal threats that 
jeopardize the viability of the nation State. However, to tackle the problem of lack of 
human security, governments should adopt public policies that not only place people 
and their multiple needs at the centre and generate full social development but also 
guarantee people’s lives, within a framework of respect for human rights.42 Poverty 
reduction and enhanced well-being will allow the social and community fabric to be 
rewoven gradually.
According to annual opinion polls by Latinobarómetro Corporation, just over half 
of Salvadorans reported violence as their main problem, followed by one third of 
Mexicans and Guatemalans. Only 20% of Hondurans considered violence to be their 
main problem, in line with the rest of Latin America (see figure I.34).
41 Also called “multidimensional security” by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC): 
a human-centred approach to security that encompasses economic development, social justice, 
environmental protection, democratization, disarmament and respect for human rights and the rule 
of law.
42 There must be basic preventive measures, namely guaranteeing jobs with proper working conditions 
and higher pay, as well as access to justice, education and health, and other human rights. Policies 
aimed at achieving cultural change with respect to women are also key to reducing the many forms and 
types of violence they experience daily. Government service delivery must be inclusive and enhanced 
in order to strengthen ties between citizens and the State and contribute to stability and prospects 
for peace. See C. Delgado and others, The World Food Programme´s contribution to improving the 
prospects for peace: preliminary report”, Solna, World Food Programme /Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (WFP/SIPRI), 2019 [online] https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/
wfp_global_report.pdf.
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Figure I.34 
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Source: Latinobarómetro Corporation, Banco de Datos [online] https://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp.
Even though they are not in a state of conflict, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras 
show some of the highest levels of violence in the world. Over the period 2010–2018, 
homicide rates in these three countries were between 4 times and 17 times higher 
than the global average. Despite a significant reduction in recent years, these levels 
were comparable to those of countries at war. Between 2016 and 2018, more than 
187,000 people were victims of homicide in these three countries, more than the 
total number of civilians killed in Iraq over the same period (164,736 people). These 
countries also top the global statistics for other expressions of violence, such as violence 
against women. Other indicators, normally associated with severe humanitarian crises 
and conflict situations, have also increased in recent years: internal displacement, 
child recruitment, food insecurity and human rights abuses. The number of refugee 
and asylum applications from nationals of these three countries tripled between 
2014 and 2017.
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in 2017 El Salvador, 
Honduras and Guatemala were ranked first, third and ninth, respectively, among the 
10 countries in the world with the highest death rate from homicide, followed by 
Mexico in twelfth place. The average death rate from homicide in the subregion is four 
times higher than the global average.43 Homicide rates in Guatemala and Honduras 
increased between 2000 and 2015 but have improved since, even though they remain 
high. In El Salvador, the rate increased substantially between 2010 and 2015, since 
when it has been decreasing gradually. In contrast, in Mexico, after declining between 
2010 and 2015, the rate began to rise again as from 2015 (see table I.9). However, 
south-southeast Mexico has rates below the national average, with the exception 
of Guerrero and Quintana Roo, which have levels similar to those of El Salvador and 
Honduras (see table I.10).
43 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Study on Homicide 2019, Vienna, 2019.
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Table I.9 
Northern Central America and Mexico: homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants, 2000–2017
Country 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016 2017
El Salvador 60.5 64.4 64.7 105.4 83.1 61.8
Guatemala 24.9 40.8 40.7 29.4 27.3 26.1
Honduras 48.7 43.6 76.1 57.5 56.5 41.7
Mexico 10.6 9.1 22.0 16.5 19.3 24.8
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Study on Homicide 2019, Vienna, 2019.
Table I.10 
States of south-southeast Mexico: homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants, 2000–2018
Entity 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016 2017 2018
Campeche 9.4 6.1 5.8 7.3 10.0 7.8 7.8
Chiapas 10.8 6.9 4.1 10.3 10.2 10.8 9.3
Guerrero 25.7 18.3 45.7 67.7 71.9 71.9 51.8
Oaxaca 20.3 15.1 19.0 20.2 19.7 24.4 20.3
Puebla 7.6 5.7 6.4 10.1 11.6 16.9 18.0
Quintana Roo 8.2 6.8 10.9 9.5 12.3 28.1 49.8
Tabasco 4.8 4.8 8.6 15.0 17.5 18.0 20.4
Veracruz 6.0 4.7 6.0 12.2 15.5 21.6 14.9
Yucatán 2.5 2.0 1.7 2.7 3.0 2.4 2.5
South-southeast Mexico 10.8 7.9 11.7 17.6 19.4 23.0 20.0
Mexico 10.9 9.4 22.6 17.1 20.0 25.9 28.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of National 
Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), “Conjunto de datos: defunciones por homicidios” 
[online] https://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/proyectos/bd/continuas/mortalidad/
defuncioneshom.asp?s=est.
These high homicide rates are accompanied by low conviction rates (number of people 
convicted as a percentage of the number of homicides in the same year). According 
to data from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), in 20142015 only 10% of the homicides registered in El Salvador resulted in 
a conviction, well below the Latin American average (28%) and world average (35%). 
According to UNODC data, conviction rates in Honduras and Guatemala were even 
lower (6% and 7%, respectively). The circumstances of crime also vary across the 
subregion. In 2016, 80.1% of the homicides registered in El Salvador were committed 
with a firearm, followed by 76.9% in Honduras and 64.8% in Mexico. The most recent 
data for Guatemala (2014) for the same indicator is 82.6%. These percentages reveal 
major challenges for gun control. 
The incidence of other types of violent crime also poses major challenges for northern 
Central America and Mexico. An analysis of the incidence rates of serious assaults per 
100,000 inhabitants reveals marked differences between countries involved in the 
Comprehensive Development Plan.44 There were 93.3 serious assaults in El Salvador 
44 Serious assault is defined as intentional or reckless application of serious physical force inflicted upon 
the body of a person resulting in serious bodily injury. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), Global Study on Homicide 2019, Vienna, 2019.
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in 2015, 42.5 in Mexico and 26.2 in Honduras in 2017 and 11.2 in Guatemala in 2016. 
The crime of robbery shows a different distribution: Mexico registered 2.2 robberies 
per 100,000 inhabitants in 2017, Guatemala 0.45 in 2016, Honduras 0.11 in 2017 and 
El Salvador 0.05 in 2015.45
Despite the existence of other types of crime, such as sexual exploitation or offences 
related to organized crime, the countries do not report official figures on the matter.46 
Violence and insecurity limit people’s freedom of movement and access to basic 
services. Violence, from gangs and organized crime, impacts on free movement 
and leads to confinement and displacement. According to UNHCR, in 2017 around 
245,000 refugees or asylum seekers from northern countries of Central America 
were registered as fleeing from multiple forms of violence and the strong presence 
of armed criminal groups. 
Violence is not homogeneous and national data often mask major differences between 
regions of the country or between different population groups, who are not affected 
by violence in the same way or with the same intensity: 
 • The male homicide rate is higher than the female homicide rate but women 
are affected by situations of conflict and crime that expose them to human 
trafficking and femicide and, in the case of female migrants, to organized crime 
networks. According to the Global Study on Homicide 2019, El Salvador had a 
rate of 13.9 female homicides per 100,000 population, compared with 116 male 
homicides per 100,000 population. Honduras had a rate of 8.4 female homicides 
per 100,000, compared with 75.2 male homicides per 100,000. In Guatemala, the 
rate was 7.8 female homicides and 55.8 male homicides and, in Mexico, 5.3 female 
homicides and 44.5 male homicides.47
 • According to UNICEF data, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras are among the 
10 most dangerous countries in the world to be a teenage boy, in terms of the 
number of homicides of boys aged 10–19.48 The same three countries also figure 
among the top 10 countries for homicides of teenage girls aged 10–19 and they 
are the only three where there is no war or no ongoing conflict has been declared. 
According to UNICEF, 63 out of every 100 missing persons between 2010 and 2017 
were under 20 years of age.
45 Robbery is defined as unlawfully taking or obtaining property with the use of force or threat of force 
against a person with intent to permanently or temporarily withhold it from a person or organization. 
See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), International Classification of Crime for Statistical 
Purposes, version 1.0, Vienna, 2015.
46 Sexual exploitation is defined as acts of abuse of a position of vulnerability, power or trust, or use of 
force or threat of force, for profiting financially, physically, socially or politically from the prostitution 
or sexual acts of a person. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), International 
Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes, version 1.0, Vienna, 2015.
47 The latest data for El Salvador, Honduras and Mexico are from 2017 and the latest data for Guatemala 
are from 2014. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Study on Homicide 2019, 
Vienna, 2019.
48 See United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), A Familiar Face: Violence in the Lives of Children and 
Adolescents, New York, 2017.
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 • Violence is having an alarming impact on young people. According to data provided 
to UNODC by the Member States, in 2016 the homicide rate for adolescents 
and young adults aged 15–29 was 156 per 100,000 inhabitants in El Salvador 
and 93 per 100,000 inhabitants in Honduras.49 According to data from the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), between 2013 and 2018 a total 
of 7,064 homicide victims in northern Central America were minors (an average 
of three deaths per day).
To a large extent, violence has become normalized in the region and is part of the daily 
reality of the population in these four countries. It is of special concern to see that 
violence forms part of the education and development of children and adolescents, 
who often reproduce as adults the violent way of resolving conflict they learned in 
childhood. In Honduras, 18.4% of young people claim to have experienced physical 
violence from their parents before the age of 18. 
In terms of institutional capacity for security, resources differ from country to country. 
The northern countries of Central America have between 14 times and 29 times 
less police personnel than Mexico. According to the latest data provided to UNODC 
by the Member States, Mexico had 4.44 police officers per 100,000 inhabitants in 
2017 (4.21 in 2010), while El Salvador had 0.23 in 2015 (0.21 in 2010), Guatemala 
had 0.31 in 2014 (0.25 in 2010) and Honduras had 0.15 in 2017 (0.14 in 2011).50 This 
compares with 6.7 police officers per 100,000 inhabitants in the United States in 
2017. As Mexico is a federal republic, unlike northern countries of Central America, it 
has different levels of public security administration. In 2018, each of the states of 
south-southeast Mexico had an average of around 6,000 officials assigned to state 
public security, in addition to federal and municipal personnel. The most urbanized 
areas in these states have more material resources for security. On average, these 
nine Mexican states have 556 video surveillance cameras administered by the state 
police. Yucatán is the state with the largest number of cameras (1,323) and Campeche, 
the smallest number (221). Guerrero, Oaxaca, Tabasco and Veracruz have a network 
of panic buttons ranging in number from 20 units to 401 units.51 
9. Weak governance and institutions undermine people’s 
capacity and ability to exercise their rights
Persistent weaknesses in governance and institutions in northern Central America and 
Mexico are confirmed by various indicators.52 Transparency International’s 2018 global 
corruption perceptions index, which includes 180 countries and ranks them based 
on the opinion of analysts and experts, places El Salvador in 113th place, followed by 
Honduras (132nd), Mexico (138th) and Guatemala (144th).
49 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Killing of children and young adults”, Global 
Study on Homicide 2019, Vienna, 2019.
50 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Criminal justice personnel”, DATAUNODC 
[online database] https://dataunodc.un.org/crime/CJP.
51 See National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), Censo Nacional de Gobierno, Seguridad 
Pública y Sistema Penitenciario Estatales 2018 y 2019 [online] https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/
cngspspe.
52 Governance is defined as the set of practices, processes, customs, rules, and so on, through which 
the various public sector and civil society stakeholders, trade associations and lobbyists interested 
in the implementation of common initiatives, and all the actors involved therein, interact. See World 
Bank, World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law, Washington, D.C., 2017.
75C O M P R E H E N S I V E  D E V E L O P M E N T  P L A N
According to the report on the 2018 Latinobarómetro annual public opinion poll of 
Latin American countries, only 11% of Salvadorans interviewed said they were satisfied 
with the country’s democracy, compared with 16% of Mexicans, 18% of Guatemalans 
and 27% of Hondurans. The World Bank’s 2017 government effectiveness index ranked 
the northern countries of Central America among the lowest in Latin America, giving 
El Salvador a score of 38, Guatemala 26.9 and Honduras 33.7. Mexico’s score was 52.4.53 
Over the past 12 years, while Latin America’s middle class has expanded, that of 
northern Central America has contracted and poverty has declined less than the 
regional average. While democracy became the established form of government, little 
progress has been made in building institutions that create opportunities for economic 
and social development. Institutional distortions in these countries still make it more 
feasible and cost-effective to purchase goods and services in third markets. Despite 
the fact that northern Central America and Mexico have mechanisms to counteract 
organized crime (including corruption, human trafficking and migrant smuggling) and 
have adopted measures to prosecute the illicit financial flows derived from organized 
crime (especially corruption), such flows have been a cause of growing concern for a 
number of years because they lead to heavy losses of tax revenue for States.54 These 
institutional weaknesses and poor governance lead to the creation of competitive 
domestic markets and perpetuate structural imbalances of low productivity, high 
inequality and poor resilience in northern Central America and south-southeast Mexico.
Public-private partnerships unfold in a territory characterized by weak State entities. 
The main implementers of the Comprehensive Development Plan will be public 
administrations at every level (federal, national, departmental or municipal, as the 
case may be) and their main focus will be public-private partnerships, through the 
instrument of public procurement. The proper functioning of public procurement 
systems for public inputs, goods and services is therefore a prerequisite for the 
Comprehensive Development Plan to produce results.
Over the past 20 years (especially the last 5, when there has been a string of 
corruption scandals), the main focus of public procurement developments has been 
on increasing transparency, public scrutiny and accountability for transactions. In the 
countries involved in the Comprehensive Development Plan, more modest progress has 
been made in evaluating the performance of public suppliers and contractors. There 
have been even fewer instances where the public sector has managed to increase 
efficiency (doing more with less), reduce waste along the supply chain and improve 
the quality-price ratio of contracted public inputs, goods and services. Although there 
have been a number of cases in all four countries where public institutions have 
succeeded in increasing value for money in public procurement, these achievements 
tend to encompass only part of the chain and the ability to sustain value for money is 
still rudimentary. In other words, public procurement systems in all four countries are 
53 This indicator, based on survey data and expert opinions, assesses perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the efficacy of the civil service and its degree of independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the government’s commitment 
to such policies, and the effectiveness of the civil service and its degree of independence from political 
pressure. The indicator ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the lowest effectiveness and 100, 
the highest.
54 Illicit financial flows include securities, money and monetary instruments that have been obtained 
legally but are transferred unlawfully. They also include securities, money and monetary instruments 
acquired through illegal activities and crime, including corruption, tax evasion, tax avoidance and fake 
international trade invoicing.
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still a long way from taking into consideration responsible production and consumption 
and their positive and negative impacts on the community, the environment and 
future generations. 
The sustainability of development is in doubt when a significant proportion of citizens 
claim to no longer see democracy and governance as the means for improving their 
quality of life. In northern Central America and Mexico, inequality and institutional 
weakness are interdependent factors which, in practice, do not foster change. Unless 
institutions have clear rules of the game, shared by all actors linked to a specific area 
of public action, to guide their interactions and decisions, in all likelihood traditionally 
excluded groups will be unable to assert their interests in political action. As a result, 
institutions have ended up expressing the concerns of certain sectors, which tend to be 
those that are the most informed and closest to power. This leads to decision-making 
being based on a particular rationale that meets the interests and values of well-defined 
stakeholders acting out of their need to adopt or shift objectives, undermining or 
altering public policies and institutional arrangements themselves.
In the current context, the role of government and public institutions in implementing 
development agendas has never been more critical. The pledge of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development to leave no one behind calls for institutionalized processes 
of participation among poor and marginalized people and other stakeholders. Inclusive 
institutions are crucial in ensuring that no one is overlooked. This requires institutions 
to support the different dimensions of inclusion, including social security, health, 
education and work.55 
Mexico, Guatemala and El Salvador have initiated efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development by developing institutional agreements that allow 
government institutions and other stakeholders to collaborate to achieve the objectives 
outlined in the 2030 Agenda. However, it is essential to expand efforts relating to 
coverage and the quality of the social pillar of the 2030 Agenda, offering citizens 
legal certainty, management capacity and sufficient resources to exercise their rights 
and build their capacity.
C. Environmental sustainability, climate change 
and disasters
Northern Central America and Mexico have a valuable natural and cultural heritage 
that deserves and needs to be preserved and cherished for its contribution to the 
development of current and future generations. Central America’s ecosystems are 
home to roughly 7% of the world’s biodiversity and Mexico has been identified as 
a megadiverse country because it harbours between 10% and 12% of the world’s 
biodiversity.56 The states of south-southeast Mexico are those with the greatest 
55 See R. Martínez (ed.), Institutional frameworks for social policy in Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC 
Books, No. 146 (LC/PUB.2017/14-P/Rev.1), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2019.
56 See National Biodiversity Institute, Biodiversidad en Centroamérica, San José, 2004; J. Sarukhán and 
others, Capital natural de México. Síntesis: Evaluación del conocimiento y tendencias de cambio, perspectivas 
de sustentabilidad, capacidades humanas e institucionales, Mexico City, National Commission for the 
Knowledge and Use of Biodiversity (CONABIO), 2017.
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biological diversity. Chiapas, Oaxaca and Veracruz are home to more than 30% of the 
country’s registered vascular plants,57 more than 25% of its registered amphibians, 
around 24% of its reptiles, more than 60% of its birds and over 30% of its mammals, 
while the Yucatán peninsula has around 25% of Mexico’s registered fish species.58 
Although the pattern of development has caused these stocks to dwindle, they provide 
many environmental services, including crop wild relatives, pollination, pest control 
and the regulation of moisture, the water cycle and the local climate.
All four countries have established strategies, policies and legislation to tackle disaster 
risk and climate change, which provide for multisector and inter-agency actions. Some 
institutions have considered it necessary to set up climate change risk-management 
units and have made progress in including economic risk assessments of extreme 
events (particularly extreme weather events) in methodological guides on formulating 
and evaluating public investment, as well as environmental impact assessments and 
elements to ensure the economic, social and environmental sustainability of such 
projects.59 Biodiversity and environmental services are also important in promoting 
sustainable development, green jobs and integrated natural resource management 
models (such as an ecosystem approach). It is better to conserve and make good use 
of natural capital than to restore ecosystems. There are opportunities to create jobs 
and build local capacity for the benefit of local communities themselves.
The northern countries of Central America, together with the other countries in the 
Central American Integration System (SICA), play an active part in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Within the SICA framework, 
the Central American Commission on Environment and Development (CCAD) has 
promoted a Regional Strategy on Climate Change (ERCC) and, more recently, a 
2018–2022 implementation plan. Over the past decade, they have contributed to 
negotiations on the creation of institutions for tackling adaptation and the losses 
and damage associated with climate change, as well as taking advantage of the 
financial mechanisms of the Green Climate Fund, insisting on equal treatment for 
adaptation and mitigation. Recent initiatives approved by the Green Climate Fund 
in northern Central America include investment support actions, fostering resilience 
in the Guatemalan highlands and climate resilience measures in the Dry Corridor 
agroecosystems of El Salvador (RECLIMA). The Central American countries, in particular 
those in northern Central America, have put forward some innovative and inclusive 
proposals, including: the landscape approach; the ecosystem approach; adaptation-based 
mitigation to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and foster 
conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks in developing countries (REDD+); the putting a human face on climate change 
approach; and the alliance for education to tackle this global phenomenon.
One of the most relevant actions is the Economics of Climate Change in Central America 
and the Dominican Republic (ECC-CARD) Initiative, where the SDGs are linked with a 
proposal for sustainable and inclusive adaptation (see diagram I.1). The experience 
57 Vascular plants include flowering plants, pines, firs and ferns. Non-vascular plants do not have flowers 
and reproduce by spores, such as algae and mosses.
58 Own estimate on the basis of publications from each State. See National Commission for the Knowledge 
and Use of Biodiversity (CONABIO), “Estados en proceso” [online] https://www.biodiversidad.gob.mx/
region/EEB/estados.html.
59 For example, the Climate Change Adaptation and Strategic Risk Management Directorate (DACGER) at 
the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT) of El Salvador, or the Climate Change Directorate 
at the Secretariat for Infrastructure and Public Service (INSEP) of Honduras.
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gained in recent decades has confirmed the importance of defining risks and 
appropriate measures for various sectors based on established development goals, 
such as poverty reduction, water management, agriculture, food and nutrition security, 
ecosystem protection, energy security and efficiency, land-use planning and disaster 
prevention by strengthening infrastructure.
Diagram I.1 
Sustainable and inclusive adaptation and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the Economics of Climate Change in Central America 
and the Dominican Republic (ECC-CARD) Initiative. 
Lack of capital and alternative livelihoods lead to overexploitation of the environment 
by poor populations. The general pattern of development and poor risk management 
have created a vicious circle of human impoverishment and environmental degradation, 
which will only worsen as climate change progresses. The technology gap and poor 
productive capacity in the subregion also contribute to this trend. In order to move 
towards a pattern of growth combining technical progress, equality and environmental 
sustainability, capacity needs to be built to develop the innovations required to 
decouple growth from emissions. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has characterized the human right to 
a healthy environment as fundamental for the existence of humankind, with both 
individual and collective connotations, in that it is owed to both present and future 
generations. It concluded that the rights to life and personal integrity require States 
to prevent significant environmental damage within and outside their territory and 
that this, in turn, requires them to: regulate, supervise and monitor the activities under 
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their jurisdiction that could cause significant damage to the environment; carry out 
environmental impact assessments; prepare contingency plans; and mitigate any 
significant environmental damage.60
1.  Vulnerability and climate change impacts are increasing
Temperature and precipitation patterns have changed. Between 1970 and 1999, the 
temperature in the region increased by 0.1 degrees Celsius (°C). By 2020 it could be 
as much as 2.2 °C hotter.61 
According to the global adaptation index of the University of Notre Dame, in 2017 
Honduras had the lowest adaptability among the countries of northern Central America, 
being ranked 122th out of 181 countries, followed by Guatemala (111th) and El Salvador 
(108th). Mexico ranked 76th.
According to the municipal climate change adaptability index of the National Autonomous 
University of Mexico (UNAM), 19% of municipalities in the states of south-southeast 
Mexico have high adaptability, 58% moderate, 22% low and 1% very low. Chiapas is the 
state with the least adaptability, with 51% of its municipalities classed as having low 
adaptability and 3% as very low. At the other extreme is Quintana Roo, with six of its 
nine municipalities classed as having high adaptability and one, very high adaptability.62
According to the Germanwatch global climate risk index for the period 1998–2017, 
Honduras is the country with the second highest number of reported climate impacts 
in the world, Guatemala is fourteenth, El Salvador sixteenth and Mexico fifty-third. 
Extreme weather events have been a significant cause of the increase in world 
hunger in the past five years. There is considerable evidence available of the human 
security-related risks of climate change, some of which hinge on issues of food 
security, such as food price volatility.63
Municipal-level risk indices for hydrometeorological events in Mexico classify the 
Yucatán peninsula as being at high and very high risk for hurricanes and tropical 
storms across much of its territory: almost 100% of the population of Quintana Roo 
and 85% that of Yucatán are at high or very high risk. As regards drought, nearly 20% of 
the population of Oaxaca and Puebla and 10% that of Guerrero, Chiapas and Veracruz 
are at high or very high risk.64
60 See United Nations, Climate change and poverty: report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and 
human rights (A/HRC/41/39), NewYork, 2019.
61 H. Hidalgo, E. Alfaro and B. Quesada-Montano, “Observed (1970–1999) climate variability in Central America 
using a high-resolution meteorological dataset with implication to climate change studies”, Climatic 
Change, vol. 141, No. 13–28, 2017.
62 For a municipal-level overview of the risk situation in the nine states of south and southeast Mexico, see 
Government of Mexico, Atlas Nacional de Riesgos [online database] http://www.atlasnacionalderiesgos.
gob.mx/archivo/atlas.html. See R. Monterroso and others, Vulnerabilidad y adaptación a los efectos 
del cambio climático en México, Mexico City, National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), 2013 
[online] http://atlasclimatico.unam.mx/VyA.
63 See C. Delgado and others, The World Food Programme´s contribution to improving the prospects for 
peace: preliminary report”, Solna, World Food Programme /Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (WFP/SIPRI), 2019 [online] https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/wfp_global_
report.pdf.
64 See M. Jiménez and others, “Mapas de índices de riesgo a escala municipal por fenómenos 
hidrometeorológicos”, Mexico City, National Disaster Prevention Center, 2012.
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According to the DARA Foundation’s Climate Vulnerability Monitor, the level of climate 
vulnerability in 2010 was low in Mexico, moderate in Guatemala and El Salvador and 
severe in Honduras. By 2030, vulnerability is predicted to have increased, with Mexico 
moving to a moderate level of vulnerability, Guatemala and El Salvador to a high level 
and Honduras to a critical level (see figure I.35).
Figure I.35 
Northern Central America and Mexico: level of climate vulnerability, 2010 and 2030

















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of DARA Foundation/ Climate Vulnerable Forum 
(CVF), Climate Vulnerability Monitor, 2nd Edition: A Guide to the Cold Calculus of a Hot Planet, Madrid, 2012.
The UNAM climate change vulnerability index classifies 3% of municipalities in the states 
of south-southeast Mexico as having very high vulnerability, 25% high, 52% moderate 
and 19% low. Chiapas is the most vulnerable state, with 62% of its municipalities having 
high and very high vulnerability, followed by Oaxaca, with 34% of its municipalities in 
these two categories.65
The Central America Dry Corridor has suffered recurrent cases of severe drought that 
have affected the production of staple grains. According to FAO data, around 3.5 million 
people were affected by drought in the Dry Corridor in 2018 and some 2.2 million lost 
their crops.66 In September 2019, Honduras declared a state of emergency due to 
drought, after suffering damage to between 50% and 60% of its staple grain crops, such 
as maize and beans, which had been sown for harvesting in the first half of August. 
According to a report on climate change and land by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), published in 2019, the food system is heavily dependent on 
maize and bean production, and long-term climate change and variability significantly 
65 See R. Monterroso and others, Vulnerabilidad y adaptación a los efectos del cambio climático en México, 
Mexico City, National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), 2013 [online] http://atlasclimatico.
unam.mx/VyA.
66 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “Adverse climate events in the 
Central American Dry Corridor leave 1.4 million people in need of urgent food assistance”, FAO Regional 
Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, April 2019 [online] http://www.fao.org/americas/noticias/
ver/es/c/1191839/.
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affect the productivity of these crops and the livelihoods of smallholder farmers. 
This, in turn, impacts on the relationship between migration and climate change.67
As a result of climate variability and change, by 2030 coffee yields are expected to 
have decreased by 6% in Guatemala and Honduras and by 13% in El Salvador (under 
the most pessimistic scenario). By 2100, the drop in yields in coffee plantations is 
predicted to have extended to most Central American countries, with a reduction of 
36% in Guatemala, 33% in Honduras and 58% in El Salvador.68
Some impact assessments of coffee yields in central Veracruz (Mexico), point to 
losses of between 12% and 34%, under the most pessimistic scenario, by the end of 
the century, depending on the coffee-growing region and the model predicting the 
climate change scenario.69
In its Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C, the IPCC estimates that climate 
change could force between 3 million and 16 million people into extreme poverty, 
mainly because of its impact on agriculture and food prices.70 It states that climate 
change and variability could exacerbate inequalities, hitting especially hard people 
disadvantaged by gender, age, race, class or disability. The report also warns that the 
benefits of adaptation and mitigation projects and funding to combat climate change 
may accrue to some and not others, so reinforcing or exacerbating inequalities.71
2. Degradation of the natural heritage is increasing
Under the most pessimistic scenario, by the end of the century the regional temperature 
is estimated to have increased by between 3.6 °C and 4.7 °C in Central America and by 
between 3.5 °C and 4.5 °C in southern Mexico, compared with the period 1980–2000. 
Precipitation is estimated to have decreased by between 18% and 35% in Central America 
and by between 10% and 27% in south-southeast Mexico, over the same period.72 In 
Mexico, a 0.7 °C increase could produce changes in up to 34.7% of transitional areas, 
moving them into warmer latitudinal regions and lower humidity regions.73
67 The migrant caravan phenomenon has highlighted the influence of environmental changes on migration. 
See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change and Land: an IPCC special 
report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, 
and greenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems, Geneva, 2019.
68 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)/Central American Agricultural 
Council, Impactos potenciales del cambio climático sobre el café en Centroamérica (LC/MEX/L.1169), 
Mexico City, 2014.
69 See J. Brigido and others, “Estimación del impacto del cambio climático sobre fertilidad del suelo y 
productividad de café en Veracruz, México”, Tecnología y Ciencias del Agua, vol. 6, No. 4, Jiutepec, Mexican 
Institute of Water Technology, 2015.
70 See O. Hoegh-Guldberg and others, “Impacts of 1.5º C global warming on natural and human 
systems”, Global Warming of 1.5 C: An IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 C above 
pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening 
the global response to the threat of climate change, Geneva, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), 2018.
71 See J. Roy and others, “Sustainable development, poverty eradication and reducing inequalities”, Global 
Warming of 1.5 C: An IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 C above pre-industrial levels 
and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response 
to the threat of climate change, Geneva, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2018.
72 See L. Galindo (ed.), La economía del cambio climático en México, Mexico City, Secretariat of the Environment 
and Natural Resources, 2010; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and others, 
The Economics of Climate Change in Central America: Summary 2012, (LC/MEX/L.1016), Mexico City, 2013.
73 A. Chávez Durán and others, “Sensibilidad de zonas bioclimática de México frente al cambio climático”, 
Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Agrícolas, vol. 5, No. 10, November-December 2014.
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The impact of climate change on biodiversity was estimated using the biodiversity 
potential index. Under the most pessimistic scenario, the simulations show a decrease 
of 36% in the biodiversity potential index in Central America by 2050 and one of 58% 
by the end of the century (see map I.3), while in Mexico the decrease is estimated 
to be 5% and 45%, respectively.74
Holdridge life zones measure the potential impact of climate change on forest 
ecosystems. Under the most pessimistic scenario, the area with suitable conditions 
for the four types of tropical dry forest would double and their share of the total would 
rise from 11% to 39% in Central America, while the area of the eight types of tropical 
rainforest would shrink significantly.
Climate change will continue to impact river basins and, hence, a number of human 
and productive activities, including hydroelectric power generation. At the Chixoy plant 
in Guatemala and Cerrón Grande in El Salvador, there will be an estimated reduction in 
hydropower generation of over 20% by 2020, compared with average power generation 
in the historical periods available. By 2050, the reductions are expected to exceed 
40% in both hydropower plants and, by the end of the century, they are expected to 
exceed 80% at Chixoy and 70% at Cerrón Grande.75
74 See L. Galindo (ed.), La economía del cambio climático en México, Mexico City, Secretariat of the 
Environment and Natural Resources, 2010; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) and others, The Economics of Climate Change in Central America: Summary 2012, (LC/MEX/L.1016), 
Mexico City, 2013.
75 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), La economía del cambio climático en 
Centroamérica: dos casos de impactos potenciales en la generación de hidroelectricidad. Serie técnica 2012 
(LC/MEX/L.1070), Mexico City, 2012.
Map I.3 
Central America: evolution of the biodiversity potential index, 2005, and under scenario A2 in 2100
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) and others, The Economics of Climate Change in Central America: Summary 2012, (LC/MEX/L.1076), Mexico City, 2013.
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Integrated approaches to water resources management allow resources and capabilities 
to be used in an efficient, cost-effective and sustainable way. This will be increasingly 
important as demand for water rises in response to population growth and as climate 
change impacts are felt. Other benefits include fewer conflicts over water, such as in 
transboundary basin management and other competing uses.76
3. Environmental degradation in cities is growing
In Latin America and the Caribbean, around 80% of the population lives in areas 
considered as urban. In 2015, the urban population accounted for 69% in El Salvador, 
56% in Guatemala, 54% in Honduras, 77% in Mexico,77 67% in south-southeast Mexico 
and as much as 88% in Quintana Roo and 84% in Yucatán.78 Within cities, there is a 
growing process of migration from central urban areas to the suburbs.
Rapid urban development has been accompanied by: greater demand for transport, 
public services, inputs and products; lack of comprehensive urban planning, impacting 
on levels of exposure to disasters; and greater pressure on natural resources and 
environmental products and services in general. Cities are showing worrying signs 
of sociospatial segregation.
The negative consequences include increased greenhouse gases, vehicular traffic 
and road accidents, soil degradation, water pollution, cardiopulmonary diseases 
and vulnerability to disasters. Temperature rises have spurred the reproduction of 
vectors and increased the incidence and prevalence of diseases such as dengue, 
Zika and chikungunya. 
The rate of motorization in Latin America, measured by the number of inhabitants 
with a vehicle per 100 inhabitants, rose from 10 in 1990 to 26.5 in 2012.
In 2016, the capital cities of the northern countries of Central America (San Salvador 
in Guatemala and Tegucigalpa in Honduras) and Mexico City registered an annual 
average concentration of atmospheric particulate matter of less than 2.5 microns in 
diameter (PM2.5) above the maximum concentration recommended by the World Health 
Organization (WHO). With regard to the upper threshold recommended by the European 
Union, only Mexico City registered levels below this value (see figure I.35). According 
to data available for 2014, the cities of Oaxaca and Mérida had an average annual 
PM2.5 concentration of 13.16 micrograms per cubic metre (μg/m3) and 13.58 μg/m3, 
respectively (above the WHO recommended limit), while the city of Puebla had an 
annual average concentration of 29 μg/m3 and the city of Xalapa had 50.85 μg/m3, 
with higher levels of disaster vulnerability than the northern Central American cities 
and above permissible levels in the European Union standard.79
76 See United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Global Environment Outlook 5. Summary for 
Policymakers, Nairobi, 2012.
77 See Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), CEPALSTAT [online database] 
https://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/portada.html?idioma=english.
78 See National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), “México en cifras” [online] https://www.
inegi.org.mx/app/areasgeograficas/.
79 See National Air Quality Information System, “Indicadores de la calidad del aire” [online] https://
sinaica.inecc.gob.mx/scica/.
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Figure I.36 
Mexico City and northern Central American capitals: concentration of atmospheric 
particulate matter of less than 2.5 microns in diameter (PM2.5) and health standards, 2016
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of A. Bárcena 
and others (eds.), Economics of climate change in Latin America and the Caribbean: a graphic view 
(LC/TS.2017/84/Rev.1), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), 2018.
4. Disasters, economic losses and unresolved vulnerabilities 
are impacting on people’s well-being and on 
production sectors
Between 1970 and 2019, the world was hit by 12,795 disasters due to natural 
phenomena. Asia was the worst-affected continent (with 39.5% of disasters), followed 
by the Americas (24%).80 In the Americas, 16.6% of disasters were concentrated in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. South America suffered 47.3% of the disasters 
registered in the region, followed by Central America (30.6%) and the Caribbean (22%).81
Between 2005 and 2017, low and lower-middle income countries accounted for 54% 
of economic losses, 58.2% of affected people and 87.6% of deaths.82 Disasters have 
a cumulative and persistent effect on economic activity, to such an extent that they 
could cause deviations from the path of long-term economic growth. As a result of 
disasters, 4 out of every 10 families in the world are at risk of poverty. Social and 
economic inequalities are exacerbated by disasters, heightening the vulnerability of 
women, especially indigenous women.
80 EM-DAT International Disaster Database (see [online] https://www.emdat.be/).
81 In 1988, the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), with the support of the World 
Health Organization and the Belgian Government, launched the EM-DAT International Disaster Database. 
82 See Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters/United Nations Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (CRED/UNDRR), Economic Losses, Poverty and Disasters 1998–2017, Geneva, 2019 [online] 
https://eird.org/americas/docs/61119_credeconomiclosses.pdf.
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Mexico is one of the top 10 countries in the world in terms of absolute losses over the 
period 1998–2017, totalling US$ 46.5 billion (mainly from storms), while El Salvador 
and Honduras are among the top 10 countries in terms of losses as a percentage of 
GDP (7% and 4.2%, respectively).83 At a time when climate change is increasing both 
the frequency and severity of extreme weather events, disasters will continue to pose 
major obstacles to sustainable development for as long as incentives to develop 
hazard-prone areas, such as floodplains, vulnerable coasts and seismic zones, exceed 
the perceived disaster risk.
Northern Central America and Mexico have made progress in enhancing disaster 
preparedness and response, as well as with early warning systems. However, progress 
is still limited in terms of managing the underlying risk, such as poverty, environmental 
degradation, rapid urbanization and population growth in hazard-prone areas.
Despite their shared exposure and vulnerability, each subregion in the Americas has 
different characteristics. Central America and the Caribbean have greater physical 
vulnerability owing to the small size of their territories and economies. Central America 
and Mexico are located in the zone of Atlantic hurricanes and recurring cyclones from 
the Pacific. In some Central American countries, not only do storms affect their coasts 
but also track across their entire territory, as happened with Hurricanes Joan-Miriam 
and Cesar, in Nicaragua, and Hurricane Mitch, which affected all countries.84
In northern Central America and Mexico, hydrometeorological events are responsible 
for 70% of disasters registered, followed by geophysical events (16.5%) and climate 
events (8%). Hydrometeorological and climatological events are responsible for the 
largest proportion of people affected (around 68%).
According to figures from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), in 
2018 climate-related disasters impacted a number of countries in the Americas and 
led to 1,687,000 internal displacements.85 
In Central America and Mexico, sudden disasters associated with natural hazards caused 
the internal displacement of at least 3 million people over the period 2008–2017, 
the vast majority in Mexico.86 The increase in the number of displacements is related 
to both intensive events (large-scale but infrequent events) and extensive events 
(smaller-scale but more recurrent events affecting small areas). In fact, international 
movements do not tend to occur immediately after an event but a long time afterwards.
IDMC estimates (2019) suggest that 80% of the displaced population worldwide 
lives in urban areas. The urban dimensions of disaster displacement pose challenges 
for cities, which are playing an ever greater role in the sustainable development 
83 See Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters/United Nations Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (CRED/UNDRR), Economic Losses, Poverty and Disasters 1998–2017, Geneva, 2019 [online] 
https://eird.org/americas/docs/61119_credeconomiclosses.pdf.
84 See O. Bello, L. Ortiz and J. Samaniego, “Assessment of the effects of disasters in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, 1972–2010”, Environment and Development series, No. 157, (LC/L.3899), Santiago, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2014.
85 See Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019, 
Geneva, 2019.
86 See D. J. Cantor, Cross-Border Displacement, Climate Change and Disasters: Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)/Platform on 
Disaster Displacement, 2018 [online] https://www.unhcr.org/protection/environment/5d4a7b737/
cross-border-displacement-climate-change-disasters-latin-america-caribbean.html.
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landscape.87 Building urban resilience to disasters, including those stemming from the 
effects of climate change, is a key factor in the region’s environmentally sustainable 
development and in understanding the impact of disaster displacement.
According to the database of ECLAC assessments of large-scale events between 
1972 and 2010, 49.5% of sector-specific impacts were in the social sector, 34.1% in 
the production sector and 16.4% in infrastructure.88 
Regardless of the type of disaster, damage in the social sector is concentrated in 
housing, while damage in the production sector is concentrated in the agriculture 
and forestry subsector and the trade and services subsector, and infrastructure 
damage is concentrated in transport. Given that many of these disasters occur in 
rural areas,89 the combined impact on the housing sector and on the production 
sector that employs most of the population in the affected areas creates incentives 
for migration. Social protection can serve as an effective platform for providing the 
population with humanitarian assistance in response to a disaster, through investment 
to help improve its response to emergencies.90
One slow-impact but high-frequency weather events is drought. The situation in the 
Central America Dry Corridor is emblematic. In 2018, around 3.5 million people were 
affected and some 2.2 million lost their crops. Around 1.4 million of these people 
were in urgent need of humanitarian aid.91 El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras are 
experiencing one of the severest droughts of the past 10 years.92
Taken together, the impact assessments of natural phenomena registered in northern 
Central America and Mexico between 1970 and 2019 total 47.9 million affected 
inhabitants and cumulative damage of more than US$ 63 billion at 2008 prices 
(see table I.11).
87 See Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019, 
Geneva, 2019.
88 See O. Bello, L. Ortiz and J. Samaniego, “Assessment of the effects of disasters in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, 1972–2010”, Environment and Development series, No. 157, (LC/L.3899), Santiago, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2014.
89 This conclusion is based on the fact that most agricultural activities take place in rural areas, where 
there have been losses of US$ 7.375 billion. Added to ecosystem and environmental losses worth 
US$ 1.83 billion, total losses in rural areas for these two components alone amount to US$ 9.205 billion. 
These losses and damage account for 40% of the total.
90 See A. Solórzano, “Study on Shock-Responsive Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Guatemala case study”, Oxford, Oxford Policy Management/World Food Programme (OPM/WFP), 2017; 
R. Beazley, “Protección social reactiva frente a emergencias en América Latina y el Caribe. El Salvador: 
respuesta a la sequía de 2018“, Oxford, Oxford Policy. Management/World Food Programme (OPM/WFP), 
2019; “Study on Shock-Responsive Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean. EL Salvador 
case study”, Oxford, Oxford Policy Management/World Food Programme (OPM/WFP), 2018.
91 See World Food Programme (WFP), “El Salvador. Evaluación de Seguridad Alimentaria en Emergencias 
(ESAE): impacto de la sequía 2018 en la seguridad alimentaria de hogares de pequeños productores 
agrícolas”, Rome, 2018; “Evaluación de la seguridad alimentaria: el Corredor Seco de Honduras”, 
Rome, 2018.
92 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “Adverse climate events in the 
Central American Dry Corridor leave 1.4 million people in need of urgent food assistance”, FAO Regional 
Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, April 2019 [online] http://www.fao.org/americas/noticias/
ver/es/c/1191839/.
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Table I.11 
Northern Central America and Mexico: number of disasters registered and impacts 
by country, 1970–2019
Country Events registered Deaths People affected Total damage  (thousands of dollars)
El Salvador 59 4 390 4 771 977 6 690 210
Guatemala 104 27 952 16 243 477 4 443 132
Honduras 81 26 759 6 730 203 5 164 379
Mexico 238 17 559 20 166 828 53 074 515
Total 482 76 660 47 912 485 69 372 236
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), EM-DAT International Disaster Database [online] 
https://www.emdat.be/.
Note: Reflects only events and data recorded in the EM-DAT International Disaster Database.
According to disaster assessments conducted in Mexico by the National Centre for 
Disaster Prevention (CENAPRED) between 2000 and 2015, damage from tropical 
cyclones, floods, extreme rainfall and drought totalled more than US$ 26.3 billion 
and affected over 11 million people. Impacts on south-southeast Mexico accounted 
for US$ 3.45 million of this damage, with 5 million people affected.93
Despite the benefits of investing in disaster risk reduction and financial preparedness 
as a resilience measure, official development assistance continues to take a reactive 
(ex post) approach, although this trend has begun to reverse slightly in recent years. 
Between 2005 and 2017, 89% of official development assistance was allocated to 
emergency response, while just 3.8% was allocated to risk reduction and 7.1%, to 
reconstruction and rehabilitation.94 Even though reconstruction has the potential 
to help to build resilience, it can also reproduce vulnerabilities and risks if it fails to 
include risk management considerations. 
A reactive approach overlooks the endogenous nature of disasters, which are 
exacerbated by underlying social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities that 
build up over time. This decontextualization leads to disasters being characterized as 
unexpected and unforeseeable events, wasting opportunities for reduction, prevention 
and financial protection. 
Early warning and prevention efforts should include a human rights approach. Early 
warning information on climate change effects should be disseminated and made 
accessible to individuals and the various stakeholders to ensure better crisis resilience. A 
further suggestion is to establish mitigation plans in consultation with affected groups.
93 See National Disaster Prevention Center (CENAPRED), “Impacto socioeconómico de desastres de 2000 a 
2015”, 2017 [online] https://datos.gob.mx/busca/dataset/impacto-socioeconomico-de-desastres-de-
2000-a-2015.
94 See Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters/United Nations Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (CRED/UNDRR), Economic Losses, Poverty and Disasters 1998–2017, Geneva, 2019 [online] 
https://eird.org/americas/docs/61119_credeconomiclosses.pdf.
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5. In the Central America Dry Corridor, the northern countries 
of Central America are those most vulnerable and 
exposed to drought or extreme rainfall 
The Central America Dry Corridor is a subregion of tropical dry forest, shared by the 
northern Central American countries and Nicaragua (and to a lesser extent by parts of 
Costa Rica and Panama). The estimated population of this subregion is 10.5 million 
people, most of whom live in northern Central America.95
The historical aridity index for the Central American subregion shows an average 
value of 1.6 for the period 1950–2000, classified as humid. Under the worst-case 
climate change scenario, the average aridity index would drop to 1.4 by 2030 (still in 
the humid category) and to 1.2 by 2100, moving it into the subhumid-humid category 
(see map I.4).
95 Proyecto Regional Corredor Seco Centroamericano, Estudio de caracterización del Corredor Seco 
Centroamericano, vol. I, Rome, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2012.
Map I.4 
Central America: historical aridity index and aridity index with climate change, scenario A2, 1950–2000, 2030 and 2100
Subhumid-humid Humid
A. 1950–2000 B. 2030 C. 2100
0.90–1.25 1.25–1.60 1.60–1.95 1.95–2.30 2.30–2.65 2.65–3.00
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of ECLAC and others, La economía del cambio 
climático en Centroamérica: impactos potenciales en la aridez y los meses secos (LC/MEX/L.1074), Mexico City, 2012.
The impact of climate change on staple grain yields is already apparent and will 
become even more so over the course of this century, with a detrimental effect on 
the food and nutrition security of vulnerable and marginalized population segments.
Under the most pessimistic climate change scenario, maize yields will fall by 7% in 
Guatemala, 9% in El Salvador and 11% in Honduras by 2030. By the end of this century, 
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the reduction will be 22% in Guatemala, 37% in El Salvador and 42% in Honduras.96 
In the case of Mexico, under the most pessimistic scenario, maize yields will drop 
by 15% by 2050 compared with the average for the period 1980–2006.97 According 
to the IPCC report on climate change and land degradation, it will be small-scale 
subsistence farmers who will be hardest hit by this drop in yields as they have no 
resilience mechanisms or alternative sources of income.
In 2018, the severe food insecurity rate in Central America was 10.6%, while moderate 
food insecurity affected 20.9% of the population. Although the prevalence of food 
insecurity is slightly higher for women than for men all around the world, the biggest 
gaps are found in Latin America.98
6. Northern Central America and Mexico are facing growing 
water scarcity
According to ECLAC estimates, water resource availability will remain at current levels 
until around 2030, when it will begin to decline, and the reductions will be significantly 
higher in the final three decades of this century. The Latin American and Caribbean 
region has 31% of the world’s freshwater resources.99
Under the most pessimistic climate change scenario, the reduction in total water 
availability by the end of the century will be 82% in El Salvador, 62% in Guatemala 
and 69% in Honduras (see figure I.37).
In all countries, around 2025, total renewable water availability is expected to begin 
to reduce the ecological volume of water.
Per capita availability will decrease sharply. Under the most pessimistic climate 
change scenario, which assumes the current rising trend in emissions, the reduction 
in per capita water availability will be 93% in El Salvador, 88% in Guatemala and 96% 
in Honduras.100
According to the atlas of water vulnerability to climate change in Mexico, published 
by the Mexican Institute of Water Technology (IMTA), Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas and 
Tabasco have low and very low vulnerability, whereas Veracruz, Puebla, Campeche, 
Yucatán and Quintana Roo have areas with moderate vulnerability. Under the most 
pessimistic climate change scenario, the water quality risk index places south-southeast 
Mexico at high and very high risk by the end of the century, leaving only Tabasco at 
moderate risk. If adaptation measures were taken, the risk would be low.101
96 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)/Central American Agricultural Council, 
Impactos potenciales del cambio climático sobre los granos básicos en Centroamérica (LC/MEX/L.1123), 
Mexico City, 2013.
97 L. Galindo (ed.), La economía del cambio climático en México, Mexico City, Secretariat of the Environment 
and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT), 2010.
98 See Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and others, The State of Food Security 
and Nutrition in the World 2019: Safeguarding against economic slowdowns and downturns, Rome, 2019.
99 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Latin America and the Caribbean: Environment Outlook. 
Summary for decision makers, Panama City, 2010.
100 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), La economía del cambio climático 
en Centroamérica: reporte técnico 2011 (LC/MEX/L.1016), Mexico City, 2011.
101 See F. Arreguín (ed.), Atlas de vulnerabilidad hídrica en México ante el cambio climático, Jiutepec, Mexican 
Institute of Water Technology, 2015.
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Figure I.37 
Northern Central America: evolution of total renewable water availability, by baseline scenarios, B2 and A2,  
2000–2004 to 2100
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of ECLAC, La economía del cambio climático en 
Centroamérica: reporte técnico 2011 (LC/MEX/L.1016), Mexico City, 2011.
7. There is major progress with access to electricity and use 
of renewable energy sources 
In both Mexico and northern Central America, there has been huge progress in 
access to electricity. In 2017, the electrification rate in the states of south-southeast 
Mexico attained 97.9% (7.5 percentage points higher than in 2000), leaving around 
420,000 people (115,000 homes) still without access to electricity. In the same year, 
the electrification rate in northern Central America was approximately 87% (around 
20 percentage points higher than in 2000). While the benefits of electricity were 
extended to some 13 million people over the reference period (2000–2017), it still 
left 3.5 million people (around 789,000 homes) without access to this basic service 
(see figure I.38).
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Figure I.38 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and states of south-southeast Mexico: electricity coverage, selected years
(Percentages)















El Salvador Honduras South-southeast Mexico
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of National Institute of Statistics and Geography 
(INEGI); National Institute of Statistics, XII Censo Nacional de Población y VII de Vivienda, Tegucigalpa, 2018; Department of Statistics 
and Censuses (DIGESTYC), and National Electric Power Company.
Note: The estimated coverage of the nine states of south-southeast Mexico in 2017 was 98.2%.
In northern Central America, the use of renewable energy sources (hydroelectric 
power, geothermal power, biomass in agro-industry, and wind and solar power) has 
also increased substantially. Over the period 2000–2018, electricity generation from 
renewables grew by 130%. This made it possible to cover increases in electricity 
consumption and to augment the share of renewables by more than 7 percentage 
points (from 59% to 66.3%). In Mexico, the renewables share has risen more significantly 
in recent years. The development of wind energy in the state of Oaxaca has played 
an important role in this (see figure I.39).
All four countries have made good progress with the medium- and large-scale 
penetration of renewable energy sources. There has been a big push towards the 
development of variable renewable energy sources (solar and wind) in all countries, 
reaching record levels in Honduras (22% of national electricity production in 2017), 
with rock-bottom global purchase prices in auctions in Mexico. The sugar agro-industry 
in Guatemala and Honduras has also made surprisingly heavy use of the heat from 
bagasse, employed in sweetener processing and electricity cogeneration. Geothermal 
energy is used in all four countries, with Mexico and El Salvador attaining a world 
level of excellence owing to their experience and long history of using this resource 
and to the capabilities of their respective research centres.
Northern Central America and Mexico have abundant renewable energy resources and 
have approved laws to foster and promote the modern use of renewables, with the 
aim of cutting energy costs and prices, improving energy security and contributing 
to greenhouse gas reduction. 
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Figure I.39 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and states of south-southeast Mexico: share ofrenewable energy and energy available for 
domestic consumption, 2000 to 2018 and 1990 to 2017
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Percentage share of energy from renewable sources Energy for national consumption (gigawatt hours)
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Guatemala El Salvador Honduras South-southeast Mexico
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Secretariat of Energy and official figures from 
the countries of Central America.
In light of technological progress and trends that presage a long-term global structural 
change in energy systems, all four countries have also initiated a large-scale energy 
transition. In the case of Mexico, the policy for implementing these changes was 
enshrined in the Energy Transition Law.
Noteworthy outcomes have also been achieved in electricity interconnection and 
international power transactions. Between 2010 and 2018, Mexico exported to 
Guatemala around 4 terawatt hours (TWh), which, owing to the marginal price differential 
between the two electricity markets, yielded a profit of around US$ 125 million. This 
was almost double the investment made to establish the electricity interconnection 
between the two countries and enabled Guatemala’s State electricity company to 
continue subsidizing low-income consumers in that country.
In the five-year period from 2013 to 2018, El Salvador imported around 6 TWh, 
mainly from Guatemala. According to official estimates, this allowed a cumulative 
reduction in tariffs of around US$ 125 million (US$ 25 million per year). This is 150% 
higher than the capital contributed by El Salvador’s State electricity company to the 
Electricity Interconnection System for the Countries of Central America (SIEPAC). The 
above figures illustrate the benefits of international electricity interconnections and 
explain the countries’ interest in expanding this infrastructure and advancing energy 
integration in the subregion. 
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8.  Energy transition is inadequate and contentious 
Hydropower continues to be the second most widely used renewable resource after 
biomass. Although currently it is used mainly in the development of small- and 
medium-capacity projects, with very large private and public investment, unfortunately 
there are glaring shortcomings in social and environmental licensing. This has provoked 
growing public opposition. In line with the human rights approach to development, 
action should be taken to ensure that the people affected by such initiatives are 
involved in project design, implementation and evaluation. By ensuring that human 
rights impact assessments are carried out prior to tendering projects and guaranteeing 
genuine shared benefits, such opposition could be prevented and initiatives could 
help implement the rights of affected communities and individuals.
In some countries, public opposition has increased in the face of limited progress 
with rural energy infrastructure and the poor quality and management of electricity 
services. In Honduras, this issue (compounded by erratic policies for electricity 
purchasing and excessive incentives for promoting renewable energy) has led to a 
severe deterioration in the finances of the State electricity company, with negative 
repercussions on the country’s public finances. In Guatemala, inadequate policies 
and legal and regulatory frameworks have allowed municipalities to turn electricity 
billing into a tax collection mechanism, where the electricity charge is a only a small 
part (especially for low-income families), leading to growing social discontent and 
calls for electricity distribution services to be nationalized or renationalized.
In northern Central America and Mexico, 32 million people (one in five families) have 
no access to modern fuels for cooking (50% live in Mexico, 33% in Guatemala, 15% in 
Honduras and 2% in El Salvador), meaning that they turn to local sources of energy 
(fuelwood and biomass residues) and traditional stoves. Such stoves lack proper 
systems for disposing of emissions, undermining people’s health, especially that 
of women and children. A significant portion of such biomass residues is collected 
with no heed to the sustainable use of forests, which contributes to deforestation. 
Paradoxically, much of the agricultural and forestry waste goes unused and could 
encourage forest fires.
Hydrocarbons (mostly derived from oil but also from natural gas in the case of Mexico) 
and electricity satisfy the largest share of final energy consumption. Hydrocarbons 
are used mainly in transportation and, together with electricity, also satisfy the 
needs of the industrial, commercial, residential and other sectors. The energy mix is 
supplemented by local energy sources, forming two patterns of consumption: one 
with a very high share of modern energy sources (Mexico and El Salvador) and the 
other with a high share of traditional energy sources (Guatemala and Honduras). 
Mexico has the highest share of hydrocarbons and Guatemala, the highest share of 
biomass (see figure I.40).
With the partial exception of El Salvador and Mexico, the multidimensional dimension 
of poverty has failed to give adequate consideration to energy. Low-income sectors 
of the population, especially in rural areas, face much greater obstacles than the rest 
of the population in acquiring their subsistence energy basket. Energy poverty and 
lack of other basic services are drivers of migration flows.
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Figure I.40 













Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Secretariat of Energy and official statistics.
Note: El Salvador’s final energy consumption matrix is very similar to that of Mexico, while the matrix of Honduras is very similar to that of 
Guatemala. The data for Mexico relate to the national total.
The current models of energy organization and management provide for private sector 
participation. In some countries, State energy companies remain strong, while in others 
they have been substantially reduced. Despite the obvious increase in investment for 
the development of new electricity production capacity, the current organization of 
the electricity industry does not appear appropriate for promoting rural energization 
and providing universal access to modern energy services. Community participation 
models (such as cooperatives, small- and medium-sized energy and environmental 
service companies, municipal corporations and non-governmental organizations) 
could lead the way in furthering the aforementioned goals and reducing the prevailing 
social and environmental conflict in the territories.
In the states of south-southeast Mexico, an average 64.7% of the population has 
access to modern fuels (liquefied petroleum gas and electricity), compared with 
89.7% in El Salvador, 39.1% in Guatemala and 51.1% in Honduras.
9.  Rural electrification coverage is insufficient
Conditions of access to housing (including housing quality and overcrowding) and 
access to basic services, especially electricity, are the basic infrastructure shortcomings 
that have the heaviest impact on poverty.
In 2018, an estimated 5.6 million people in northern Central America and Mexico had 
no electric power supply (11% and 1.5% of the population, respectively). 
The lack of such basic services, particularly electricity, has negative consequences for 
the population’s educational level, health, communications (such as the Internet) and 
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employment opportunities, which drives people into poverty and hence to emigrate 
in search of better opportunities. This is particularly marked in rural areas, in small 
and remote settlements and communities and in city suburbs. 
The biggest lags in access to modern energy sources are found in rural and semi-urban 
areas and in the smallest and most remote settlements. The geographical location, 
smaller size and greater dispersion of dwellings, coupled with poor infrastructure, 
make the delivery of modern energy services to such areas more expensive and less 
profitable from a business standpoint (see figure I.41). 
Figure I.41 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
Note: The figures for 2017 in Guatemala and for 2018 in south-southeast Mexico are estimates.
Owing to their remoteness (from substations and distribution transformers), dispersion 
and low potential demand, the electrification of these areas (referred to as “last-mile” 
connections) is very costly and generally not an attractive business proposition for the 
electricity distribution companies that have concessions in the respective territories 
(such as in El Salvador and Guatemala).
In many territories and rural areas, there is an environment of conflict stemming 
from low social investment and the fact that the population has obtained little or 
no benefit from the (public or private) exploitation of renewable energy. This conflict 
is linked to regressive pricing structures (which penalize consumers that use energy 
more efficiently), the integration of electricity billing with other services (Guatemala) 
and the steady downgrading of social safeguards (reduction in subsidies in Guatemala 
and Honduras). All this has led to threats and assaults against community advocates 
seeking to improve the implementation of their rights. Environmental advocates and 
advocates for the right to land and territory have been particularly vulnerable in this 
regard; many of the most assaulted advocates come from indigenous communities.
96 C O M P R E H E N S I V E  D E V E L O P M E N T  P L A N
D. Distress migration is the most dramatic 
manifestation of a development model 
characterized by multiple exclusions, 
rigidities and weaknesses
1.  Reasons for migrating are multifactorial
The predominant migration trend in Central America and Mexico is to the north. By 
2015, roughly 25 million migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean had embarked 
on their journey northward and were living North America.102
The reasons for migrating are diverse. According to surveys of returnees from Mexico 
in 20172018, the main reasons for northern Central Americans emigrating were as 
follows (see figure I.42):103
 • Lack of employment and an economic crisis in their country of origin.
 • Low income for their work and poor working conditions in their country of origin.
 • Violence and insecurity.
 • Family reunification.
102 See International Organization for Migration (IOM), World Migration Report 2018, Geneva, 2018, p. 92.
103 Based on the responses of migrants deported to their countries of origin by the United States authorities.
Figure I.42 
Northern Central America: reasons for deciding to migrate (first option), 2017–2018 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Colegio de la Frontera Norte and others, Survey 
of Migration at the Southern Border of Mexico [online] www.colef.mx/emif.
Two distinct reasons were cited by 40% of those surveyed, including a combination of 
economic and violence-related motives, reflecting the multi-causal nature of human 
mobility in the region.
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A further two major reasons for migrating, which are not reflected in the abovementioned 
survey, are lack of access to social services (such as health and education) and 
vulnerability to climate change and natural disasters.
Children and adolescents migrate mainly because they lack educational opportunities, 
they are victims of different types of violence or they seek reunification with family 
members who, in most cases, are already in the north, mainly Mexico. 
The high incidence of violence as a reason for people to migrate is also reflected in 
the number of refugees and asylum seekers from northern Central America, totalling 
around 353,000 in 2018. However, in the case of El Salvador and Guatemala, numbers 
are below the levels registered in the early twenty-first century (see figure I.43).
Figure I.43 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), Refugee Data Finder [online database] https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/.
In the case of the states of south-southeast Mexico, the main reasons why people 
emigrated to the United States were to look for work (83%), family reasons (5%) or 
to study (4%).104
According to a study on food security and emigration by the World Food Programme 
(WFP) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), with the support of 
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the Organization of 
American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), there is 
a clear link between migration and food security. Of the households surveyed in 
Dry Corridor communities of northern Central America that are characterized by high 
levels of migration, 47% were in a situation of food insecurity and 72% had adopted 
emergency survival strategies, such as selling household assets. The main causes 
104 These were return migrants who had lived in the United States in the five years prior to 2018. Estimates 
based on data from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), National Survey of 
Demographic Dynamics 2018, Aguascalientes, 2018.
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of emigration reported by the interviewees were lack of employment or economic 
difficulties (65%), low income (19%) and violence and insecurity (9%), with only 1% 
citing family reunification as a reason for emigrating.105
Probably one of the biggest push factors for migration from northern Central America 
and Mexico to the United States is the wage gap.
In northern Central America in 2018, the average minimum wage of US$ 628 purchasing 
power parity (PPP) was 36% that of the United States.
Mexico reported an even greater lag in the minimum wage: just 14% that of the 
United States in 2018 and 17% in 2019. Doubling the minimum wage in the northern 
border region of Mexico in 2019 reduced this gap by 12 percentage points (29%). 
There are also significant gaps in the average wage (see figure I.44 and figure I.45).
105 See Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and others, Food Security and Emigration: why people flee and 
the impact on family members left behind in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, Washington, D.C., 2017.
Figure I.44 
Northern Central America, Mexico and the United States: monthly minimum wage, 2018 and 2019
(Purchasing power parity dollars)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International Labour Organization (ILO), ILOSTAT 
[online database] https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/; United States Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (CPS) [online] www.census.
gov/programs-surveys/cps.html; World Bank, World Bank Open Data [online database] https://data.worldbank.org/; Ministry of 
Labor and Social Welfare, “Tarifas de salarios mínimos vigentes a partir del 1º de enero de 2018” [online] https://www.mtps.gob.
sv/avisos/salarios-minimos-2018/; Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, “Acuerdo Gubernativo Número 297-2017”, Diario de Centro 
América, vol. 308, No. 72, Tegucigalpa, 2017; General Directorate of Salaries, “Tabla de salario mínimo, vigente a partir del 1 de enero del 
año 2018” [online] http://www.trabajo.gob.hn/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Tabla-SM-2018-ipc-4-73.pdf; “Tabla de salario mínimo, 
vigente a partir del 1 de enero del año 2019” [online] http://www.trabajo.gob.hn/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Tabla-Salario-2019.
pdf; National Commission of Minimum Wages, “Salarios Mínimos. Vigentes a partir del 1º de enero de 2018” [online] https://www.
gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/285013/TablaSalariosMinimos-01ene2018.pdf; “Salarios Mínimos. Vigentes a partir del 1º de 
enero del año 2019” [online] https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/426395/2019_Salarios_Minimos.pdf; United States 
Department of Labor, “Minimun wage” [online] https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimumwage.
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Figure I.45 
Northern Central America, Mexico and the United States: monthly average wage, 2018 and 2019
(Purchasing power parity dollars)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International Labour Organization (ILO), ILOSTAT 
[online database] https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/; United States Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (CPS) [online] www.census.
gov/programs-surveys/cps.html; World Bank, World Bank Open Data [online database] https://data.worldbank.org/; Ministry of 
Labor and Social Welfare, “Tarifas de salarios mínimos vigentes a partir del 1º de enero de 2018” [online] https://www.mtps.gob.
sv/avisos/salarios-minimos-2018/; Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, “Acuerdo Gubernativo Número 297-2017”, Diario de Centro 
América, vol. 308, No. 72, Tegucigalpa, 2017; General Directorate of Salaries, “Tabla de salario mínimo, vigente a partir del 1 de enero del 
año 2018” [online] http://www.trabajo.gob.hn/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Tabla-SM-2018-ipc-4-73.pdf; “Tabla de salario mínimo, 
vigente a partir del 1 de enero del año 2019” [online] http://www.trabajo.gob.hn/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Tabla-Salario-2019.
pdf; National Commission of Minimum Wages, “Salarios Mínimos. Vigentes a partir del 1º de enero de 2018” [online] https://www.
gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/285013/TablaSalariosMinimos-01ene2018.pdf; “Salarios Mínimos. Vigentes a partir del 1º de 
enero del año 2019” [online] https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/426395/2019_Salarios_Minimos.pdf; United States 
Department of Labor, “Minimum wage” [online] https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimumwage.
Although average wages (PPP) among northern countries of Central America and 
Mexico are remarkably close, a considerable gap persists between them and the 
United States. The combined average wage in northern Central America and Mexico 
is worth only 15% of the United States average wage.
2.  Human mobility from northern Central America and 
Mexico is concentrated heavily on the United States
Mexico and the northern countries of Central America have a negative migration balance, 
with the result that the number of people born in those countries living abroad now 
stands at more than 15.4 million. The country with the largest share of its nationals 
living abroad as a percentage of the national population is El Salvador, where nearly 
a quarter of the population has emigrated (22.1%). It is followed by Mexico (8.9%), 
Honduras (6.9%) and Guatemala (5.8%).
Most emigrants from the region reside in the United States (88.9%). In the case of 
emigrants from Guatemala, 5% live in Mexico and a significant absolute number 
of emigrants from Honduras, El Salvador and Mexico live in a European country 
(see table I.12).
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Table I.12 
Northern Central America and Mexico: international migration, 2015
(Number of people)
Indicator El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico
Population 6 312 478 16 252 429 8 960 829 125 890 949
Emigrants 1 436 158 1 017 517 648 520 12 339 062
Immigrants 42 045 76 352 28 070 1 193 155
Net migration balance -1 394 113 -941 165 -620 450 -11 145 907
Absolute migration rate (percentage) -22.1 -5.8 -6.9 -8.9
Emigrants in the United States 1 276 489 881 191 530 645 12 050 031
Emigrants in Mexico 10 054 53 128 15 027 …
Emigrants in Europe 29 995 19 918 44 292 118 767
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations, 
World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, New York, 2017; Trends in International Migrant Stock: 
The 2015 Revision (POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015), New York, 2015. 
Note: The term migrants refers to people born in a certain country of origin who reside abroad (emigrants) 
or people born in another country who reside in a destination country (immigrants). The term is 
usually identified with absolute or lifelong migration.
According to UNHCR consolidated figures up to mid-2019, in the United States 
there were 305,591 refugees and asylum seekers from northern Central America and 
47,358 from Mexico.
Over the fiscal period 2014–2017, the United States granted 4,378,221 permanent 
resident cards, 18% of which were to people from northern Central America and 
Mexico (815,434 visas).
Over the fiscal period 2016–2018, the United States issued a total of 492,360 H-2A visas 
(for temporary agricultural workers). Approximately 93% of these visas were granted 
to people from northern Central America and Mexico (461,611 visas).
Student and exchange visitor visas issued in the United States account for approximately 
10% of non-immigrant visa registrations. In the 2017 fiscal year, around 2.5 million 
non-immigrant visas were issued, almost 250,000 of which were for people from 
countries involved in the Comprehensive Development Plan.106
Migration to the United States from south-southeast Mexico is low, with the exception 
of the states of Guerrero, Oaxaca and Puebla, where 13.2%, 8.3% and 4.1% of families, 
respectively, receive remittances. Of total remittances received by Mexico, 18.9% goes 
to households in south-southeast Mexico (see figure I.46).
106 See United States Department of Homeland Security, “Nonimmigrant admissions”, 2017 [online] 
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/nonimmigrant.
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Figure I.46 
States of south-southeast Mexico: families receiving remittances and percentage of remittances received  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of National Institute of Statistics and Geography 
(INEGI), National Survey of Household Income and Expenditure (ENIGH).
Northern Central America and Mexico are the main beneficiaries of the Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), which allows unlawful immigrants who arrived in the 
United States as children to remain there and to access services. In January 2019, as 
a country of origin, Mexico had approximately 543,630 DACA beneficiaries, El Salvador 
had 25,920, Guatemala had 17,700 and Honduras had 16,300.107 
El Salvador and Honduras have also been the main beneficiaries of Temporary Protected 
Status (TPS) in the United States, which grants temporary residence to nationals from 
a country facing armed conflict, natural disasters or other extraordinary conditions that 
prevent them from returning safely. In November 2018, El Salvador had 251,526 TPS 
beneficiaries, as a result of an earthquake, and Honduras had 80,633, as a result of 
Hurricane Mitch.108
The Central America-4 Free Mobility Agreement (CA4) is a relevant policy for regular 
and facilitated migration. This regional treaty, signed in June 2006, established the 
free movement of citizens between El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 
without the requirement of a passport and through fast-track procedures. The 
agreement also created a harmonized visa regime for nationals from other countries 
or, in other words, a single Central American visa to simplify travel (by land) between 
the four countries.




108 Congressional Research Service. 2019. Temporary Protected States: Overview and Current Issues. 
Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RS20844.pdf.
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There are opportunities for strengthening the CA-4 to ensure that freedom of 
movement is actually translated into a transfer of social, economic and political 
rights for migrants once they leave their country of origin. While the CA-4 facilitates 
legal movement between the four Central American nations, many policies regarding 
the rights of foreign citizens are determined at the national level in the countries’ 
respective constitutions and immigration laws. This means that, even though the CA-4 
allows nationals of signatory countries to travel with few restrictions, the enjoyment 
of social services and participation in the labour market still depend largely on the 
individual legislation of receiving countries.109
The return and reintegration of migrants who are unable or unwilling to remain in host 
or transit countries is arousing renewed political interest in national and international 
policy-making. Many migrants end up in situations of hardship and irregularity, while 
others are eventually deported by governments or return voluntarily.
Between January 2016 and August 2019, there were 731,982 returnees from Mexico and 
the United States to the northern countries of Central America. Of these, an average 81% 
were men and 19% were women. Between January 2019 and August 2019, the majority 
of returnees from Mexico and the United States were heading to Honduras (79,417) 
and Guatemala (72,960), with far fewer bound for El Salvador (25,858 returnees) 
(see figure I.47).110
109 See Central American Integration System (SICA), “Convenio de Creación de la Visa Única Centroamericana 
para la Libre Movilidad de Extranjeros entre las Repúblicas de El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 
y Nicaragua” [online] https://www.sica.int/documentos/convenio-de-creacion-de-la-visa-unica-
centroamericana-para-la-libre-movilidad-de-extranjeros-entre-las-republicas-de-el-salvador-guatemala-
honduras-y-nicaragua_1_82962.html.
110 See International Organization for Migration (IOM), Northern Triangle Migration Information Management 
Initiative [online] https://mic.iom.int/webntmi/.
Figure I.47 
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Source: International Organization for Migration (IOM), Northern Triangle Migration Information Management Initiative [online] https://mic.
iom.int/webntmi/.
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The well-being of these migrants, their families and communities depends partly on 
how they reintegrate upon their return. Reintegration is a crucial part of a comprehensive 
approach to migration management that seeks to ensure the orderly and humane 
return and reintegration111 of migrants, both those who participate in assisted voluntary 
return programmes (migrants who are unable or unwilling to remain in host or transit 
countries and wish to return voluntarily to their countries of origin) and those who 
are deported by governments.112
According to the IOM Assisted Voluntary Return Programme, between 4 November 2018 
and 26 July 2019, a total of 1,791 migrants availed themselves of assisted voluntary 
return. Most were returning from Mexico, 22% of whom were heading for Honduras, 
20% to El Salvador and 8% to Guatemala.
There are also links between networks smuggling migrants from Latin America to the 
United States. The UNODC global study on smuggling of migrants concludes that the 
business around the smuggling of Central American migrants to Mexico and from 
there to the United States is worth around US$ 2 billion per year.113
The majority of refugees and asylum seekers from northern Central America are in 
the United States, although their relative share of the total decreased from 90% in 
2015 to 79% in mid-2019. In contrast, a growing number of people are choosing 
Mexico as their country of asylum and the proportion of refugees and asylum seekers 
from northern Central America who are in Mexico increased from 3% in 2015 to 12% 
in mid-2019.
At the national level, the lowest return migration rates from the United States of 
people formerly residing in south-southeast Mexico are recorded in Yucatán, Quintana 
Roo and Tabasco (see figure I.48).
Residents of south-southeast Mexico prefer to migrate to the country’s interior. Apart 
from Quintana Roo and Yucatán, all states have a negative migration balance. Top of 
the list is Guerrero (with a rate of -28.3 per 1,000 inhabitants) most of whose migrants 
head to the country’s central region (State of Mexico, Mexico City and Morelos), Baja 
California, Michoacán and Oaxaca. Second is Chiapas (-20.4 per 1,000 inhabitants) 
whose migrants head to the central region (Mexico City and State of Mexico) and 
other southern states. Third is Veracruz (-18.1 per 1,000 inhabitants) whose migrants 
head to the central region (Mexico City, Puebla and State of Mexico), Tamaulipas 
and Oaxaca.114
111 See International Organization for Migration (IOM), Towards an Integrated Approach to Reintegration in 
the Context of Return, Geneva, 2017.
112 See International Organization for Migration (IOM), Towards an Integrated Approach to Reintegration in 
the Context of Return, Geneva, 2017.
113 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants, 2018, 
Geneva, 2018.
114 Own estimate on the basis of National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), National Survey 
of Demographic Dynamics 2018, Aguascalientes, 2018.
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Figure I.48 
States of south-southeast Mexico: population that changed residence, in the past five years, from the United States 
to Mexico (return migration), 2018
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of National Institute of Statistics and Geography 
(INEGI), National Survey of Demographic Dynamics 2018, Aguascalientes, 2018.
According to the United States Census Bureau, most recent-entry migrants from the 
subregion are young people (86.8% are under 40 years of age). Men predominate (the 
masculinity ratio is 126) and are well educated (56.5% have completed secondary or 
higher education and 21.5% have completed primary education). Most are working, 
and the labour force participation rate of recent-entry migrants to the United States 
is 75%. However, there are gender differences: women’s labour force participation rate 
is 60.6%, while that of men is 86.4%, with both figures based on people who entered 
the United States after 2010.
Some of the main characteristics of northern Central American migrants deported by 
the United States authorities are as follows (see table I.13):
 • The majority are men (88.4% on average).
 • Levels of education among Guatemalans are low (53% have completed primary 
education or less) but are higher among Hondurans and Salvadorans (28.6% and 
25.5% respectively have completed primary education or less).
 • Among Hondurans, 38.9% have completed baccalaureate, technical or higher 
education, rising to 43.7% of Salvadorans.
 • Nearly one third of Guatemalan deported migrants belong to an indigenous 
community or people. No migrants from El Salvador and Honduras belong to an 
indigenous community or people.
 • Among migrants from Guatemala, 47.5% replied that they were the family’s main 
breadwinner, a figure that drops to 26.2% and 26.5% for migrants from Honduras 
and El Salvador, respectively.
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 • The largest proportion of unrelated accompanying children under the age of 15 is 
among migrants from El Salvador (11%) and Guatemala (8.5%).
Table I.13 
Northern Central America: characteristics of migrants deported by the United States 
authorities, 2018
(Percentages)
Characteristics Guatemala Honduras El Salvador
Place of birth 46.2 31.4 22.3
Sex
Man 88.9 91.0 85.3
Woman 11.1 9.0 14.7
Level of education (highest level of education completed)
None 5.9 0.6 3.3
Primary 47.1 28.0 22.2
Basic or secondary 24.7 32.5 30.8
Baccalaureate, technical, etc. 19.9 36.0 39.1
University or higher 2.4 2.9 4.6
Member of an indigenous people or community
Yes 31.3 0.0 0.0
No 68.7 100.0 100.0
The main breadwinner in the family
Live alone 16.8 12.0 15.8
Yes 47.5 26.2 26.5
No 35.7 61.8 57.7
Place of residence
United States 52.2 6.2 30.6
Mexico 0.5 0.1 0.4
Non-urban 25.2 67.6 27.0
Urban 22.2 26.0 42.0
Accompanying persons
Yes, and none were under 15 years of age 69.7 8.8 30.0
No accompanying persons 21.0 89.7 57.8
Yes, and all were the migrant’s children 0.8 0.6 1.2
Yes, and some were the migrant’s children 0.1 0.1 0.0
Yes, and none were the migrant’s children 8.5 0.8 11.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Colegio 
de la Frontera Norte and others, Survey of Migration at the Southern Border of Mexico [online] 
www.colef.mx/emif.
The higher migration flows are caused not only by an increase in the number of people 
but also by a substantial change in their composition. The data show a significant 
increase in the proportion and number of migrant women and girls detained in Mexico 
since 2012. Whereas, in 2012, the Mexican authorities registered 11,336 detentions 
of women, who accounted for 13% of all adults, in 2017, the 30,541 detained women 
accounted for 25% of all adults. In the first few months of 2019, their share grew 
to 30%. The increase in female migration from northern Central America and major 
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changes in the application of Mexico’s immigration law appear to be driving the rise 
in detentions. Girls under the age of 18 from northern Central America account for 
an even higher proportion of detained children (32% in 2017).
Migration institutions agree that not only has female participation in migration flows 
increased, in 2019 there was also a significant rise in the number of family groups, 
with a greater presence of older adults.
3. Migrants face huge obstacles during transit and 
at their destination
Transit migration is a distinctive characteristic of the migration process in the subregion. 
Although there are no official figures for the number of northern Central American 
migrants who transit through Mexico to the United States, it has been estimated that 
they numbered around 417,000 in 2015, of whom only 19% completely their journey 
successfully and reached the United States.115 These migrants are at varying degrees 
of vulnerability and risk on their journey, including robbery, kidnapping, extortion, 
rape, forced labour and human trafficking, both in transit and in their destination 
countries. According to figures from the Network for Documentation of Migrant 
Defense Organizations (REDODEM), 10% of people in transit assisted by this network 
of shelters and organizations in 2018 reported having witnessed or been the victim 
of a crime. According to the Survey of Migration at the Southern Border of Mexico, 
nearly one third (30.9%) of migrants deported by the Mexican authorities had to 
endure extreme temperatures and one fifth (21.3%) faced hunger.
Just over half the migrants in transit through Mexico hired illegal guides (coyotes) to 
help them cross into the United States.116
Between 2016 and August 2019, an estimated 1,994 migrants went missing or 
died in Central America and at the border between Mexico and the United States 
(see figure I.49).117
The irregular migration of migrants from outside the region transiting through 
countries involved in the Comprehensive Development Plan has increased significantly 
since 2014. Nearly as many extraregional migrants were brought before the Mexican 
authorities in the first eight months of 2019 as in the whole of 2018. Prior to 2018, 
Asian migrants had been the largest group but, in the first few months of 2019, they 
were surpassed by migrants from Africa (see figure I.50).
115 See A. Canales and M. Rojas, “Panorama de la migración internacional en México y Centroamérica”, 
Population and Development series, No. 124 (LC/TS.2018/42), Santiago, Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2018.
116 A. Canales, J. A. Fuentes and C. R. de León Escribano, Desarrollo y migración: desafíos y oportunidades 
en los países del norte de Centroamérica (LC/MEX/TS.2019/7), Mexico City, Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2019, p. 62.
117 See International Organization for Migration (IOM), Missing Migrants Project [online] https://
missingmigrants.iom.int/.
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Figure I.49 
Migrants who have gone missing or died while in transit through Central America and the border between Mexico and the 
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Source: International Organization for Migration (IOM), Missing Migrants Project [online] https://missingmigrants.iom.int/.
Figure I.50 
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Source: Migration Policy Unit and Secretariat of the Interior.
Detentions on the southern border of the United States increased sharply over the 
period October-August 2019, to figures as high as those registered in fiscal year 2007. 
Approximately 95% of detentions were of migrants from Mexico and northern 
Central America (see figure I.51).
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Figure I.51 
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Source: United States Customs and Border Protection.
The number of people from northern Central America detained in Mexico and the 
United States for not having the documentation required by the country’s authorities 
has increased significantly in the past two years, particularly in 2019 (see figure I.52). 
According to immigration authority figures, during fiscal year 2019 (October 2018 
to August 2019), 606,227 people from northern Central America were detained on 
the southern border of the United States (134% more than in the whole of fiscal 
year 2018). Of these migrants, 44% were from Guatemala, 42% from Honduras and 
15% from El Salvador. Up to August 2019, a total of 11,928 detentions of people from 
northern Central America had been registered in Mexico, 65% higher than the same 
period in 2018. Of these, 55% were Honduran, 31% Guatemalan and 13% Salvadoran.
Women and girl migrants face both structural risks and circumstantial risks related 
to extreme difficulties on their journey north. They experience disproportionately 
high rates of sexual violence and may become victims of coyotes, gangs, cartels or 
the police. Of the female migrants and refugees entering Mexico, 68.3% reported 
having been victims of violence during their transit to the United States. Nearly one 
third of the women surveyed had suffered sexual abuse during their journey (31.4%). 
Considering only rape and other forms of direct sexual violence, 10.7% of women 
were affected during their transit through Mexico. Of all those surveyed, 47.1% said 
that the violence they had suffered had affected them emotionally, with enormous 
consequences for their psychological well-being and ability to reach out for help.118 
In recent years, the profile of migrants and refugees from northern Central America in 
transit to Mexico and the United States has changed from one of single men to one of 
families, women and unaccompanied minors and adolescents. In fiscal year 2019, of 
all those detained in the United States, 71% were travelling in family units, compared 
with 11% in 2015.
118 See Doctors without Borders (MSF), Forced to flee Central America’s Northern Triangle: A Neglected 
Humanitarian Crisis, Geneva, 2017.
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Figure I.52 
Northern Central America: people detained in the United States (by fiscal year) and Mexico (by calendar year), 2015–2019
(Number of people)











Source: United States Customs and Border Protection, “Southwest Border Migration” [online] https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-
border-migration; Secretariat of the Interior, “Boletines estadísticos” [online] http://portales.segob.gob.mx/es/PoliticaMigratoria/
Boletines_Estadisticos.
Unaccompanied migration and the detention of children and adolescents raise another 
of the most crucial issues that migration in the subregion has been highlighting and 
amplifying because they reflect not only a failure to protect minors but also severe 
infringements of the best interests of the child. According to immigration authority 
figures, between 2015 and 2019, a total of 229,600 unaccompanied or separated 
children were detained on the southern border of the United States, in addition to 
the 62,200 unaccompanied children detained in Mexico.
The number of families and children involved in migration flows and displacements 
in northern Central America and Mexico has increased significantly in recent years. In 
United States fiscal year 2019, out of a total of 811,106 detentions on the south-western 
border of the United States, 530,444 were of unaccompanied children and family 
units. In fiscal year 2018, the United States registered 396,579 detentions, 157,248 of 
which were of unaccompanied children and family units (see figure I.53). 
Migrant women and girls have different needs than men and boys. Despite the fact 
that migration flows currently comprise a large number of families, along the migration 
routes there is a wide gap in the provision of care services for children and older 
adults. Owing to a traditional distribution of gender roles, it is women and girls who 
assume caregiving responsibilities. This has a major impact on their ability to access 
opportunities for study, training, job-seeking, completing administrative formalities 
to regularize their migration status, or using legal aid and health services. This gap in 
care services is particularly pertinent to women claiming asylum who are travelling 
with family, as they are required to stay for long periods in the border cities where 
they are claiming protection (90–120 days).
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Figure I.53 
Family composition of detentions on the southern border of the United States, fiscal years 2013–2019 (October-August)




































2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 (October-August)
Source: United States Customs and Border Protection.
The care services provided by shelters and migrant holding stations, as well as by some 
entities delivering services to migrant women and girls, lack a gender perspective.119 
Major gaps have been identified in the provision of health services, access to medicine, 
sexual and reproductive health services, and in psychosocial support, which is essential 
given the high rate of women and girls who suffer various forms of violence during 
the migration process, particularly for those who have been victims of sexual violence.
In recent years, the northern countries of Central America have registered around 
200,000 returnees or deported migrants from the United States and Mexico every 
year (see figure I.53). In the first nine months of 2019, a total of 191,400 returnees 
were registered, 34% more than the same period in 2018. Return and deportation also 
create vulnerabilities and risks for this population. Many returnees face discrimination, 
as well as major difficulties in reintegrating sustainably into their places of origin, 
especially when they have lost their property or when they have no family networks 
upon their return. According to data presented earlier, a significant proportion of 
returnees were obliged to migrate because of violence in their country of origin and 
face protection risks when they return, in many instances making it impossible for 
them to go back to their communities of origin.
According to the IOM Assisted Voluntary Return Programme, between 4 November 
2018 and 26 July 2019, a total of 1,791 migrants availed themselves of assisted 
voluntary return. Most were returning from Mexico; 22% were heading to Honduras, 
20% to El Salvador and 8% to Guatemala.
119 Gender-sensitive, open-door shelters for women/mothers with children/teenage girls offering 
care services.
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Figure I.54 
Northern Central America: returnees from the United States and Mexico, 2015–2019
(Number of people)
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Source: International Organization for Migration (IOM), on the basis of data from the immigration authorities of the northern countries 
of Central America.
4.  Forced internal displacement stems from the insecurity 
and violence facing residents of northern Central America 
and Mexico
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, presented to the United Nations 
Human Rights Commission in 1998, are a key document for the development of 
international standards to protect and assist internally displaced persons. According 
to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, internally displaced persons are 
people who have been forced to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence 
as a result of conflict, violence, human rights violations and natural or human-made 
disasters and who have not crossed an internationally recognized border. The Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement also describe the rights of this group and the 
corresponding obligations of the authorities. Honduras has prepared draft legislation 
on internal displacement based on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
and El Salvador and Mexico are working on federal laws on the same issue.120
Internal displacement due to natural or human-made disasters, unresolved conflict, 
criminal violence and social and economic crises affect many countries in the 
Americas. In 2018, disasters triggered most of the new displacements in the region, 
with an increase of 1.7 million, while some 404,000 new displacements related to 
conflict and violence were also recorded. Of even more numerical significance than 
new displacements is the fact that various Latin American countries have a large 
120 Mexico already has a law for the state of Chiapas. See Government of the State of Chiapas/General 
Secretariat of Government, Ley para la Prevención y Atención del Desplazamiento Interno en el Estado de 
Chiapas, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, 2012 [online] http://forodfi.cndh.org.mx/Content/doc/Normativo/Ley-DPI-
Chiapas.pdf.
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number of internally displaced persons as a result of conflict and violence for which 
no lasting solutions have been found.
In Honduras, the Inter-Institutional Commission for the Protection of Persons Displaced 
by Violence (CIPPDV), with UNHCR support, has conducted two characterization studies 
of persons displaced by violence. The most recent study estimates that Honduras had 
around 58,500 internally displaced households between 2004 and 2018, comprising 
247,090 people (or 2.7% of the country’s total population).121
In El Salvador, a study by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, with UNHCR 
support, estimated that, between 2006 and 2016, one of the members of at least 
1.1% of families was forced to change their place of residence within the country as 
a result of acts of violence (around 71,500 people).122
These studies have revealed that the main reasons for population displacement are 
threats, homicides, extortion and restrictions on movement by criminal groups, mainly 
youth gangs (maras or pandillas). 
While the proportion of internally displaced persons in Mexico is smaller, in Guerrero 
and Quintana Roo the proportion is above the national and regional averages (see 
figure I.55).
121 See Human Rights Secretariat/Inter-Institutional Commission for the Protection of Persons Displaced 
by Violence, Estudio de caracterización del desplazamiento interno por violencia en Honduras, 2004–2018, 
Tegucigalpa, 2019.
122 See Ministry of Justice and Public Security, Caracterización de la movilidad interna a causa de la violencia 
en El Salvador: informe final, San Salvador, 2018, p. 7.
Figure I.55 
States of south-southeast Mexico: population that changed residence, in the past five years, for reasons of violence 
and insecurity, 2018
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of National Institute of Statistics and Geography 
(INEGI), National Survey of Demographic Dynamics 2018, Aguascalientes, 2018.
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Forced internal displacement undermines the human rights of individuals, families 
and communities. It causes loss of assets (land, housing, personal property and other 
possessions), and loss of employment and income. Children and adolescents interrupt 
their studies and are even more vulnerable when they migrate without their families.
5. Remittances account for a large and growing share 
of gross domestic product but pose major challenges 
for economic and social policies
Family remittance flows are a direct consequence of migration. Although they have a 
huge impact in northern countries of Central America and, to a lesser extent, in Mexico, 
it is also important to consider the public policy challenges they pose.
Taken together, remittances have an important role to play in achieving family goals, 
community and national development priorities and the SDGs in general. However, 
further work is needed to reap the true development benefits of remittances.
Governments can create an enabling environment to encourage remittance flows into 
productive sectors of the economy. Diaspora communities have contributed routinely 
to development in their countries of origin through financial flows, such as remittances, 
investment and trade and the transfer of skills and social, cultural and technological 
capital. Governments can create stable environments that foster diaspora members’ 
financial and social commitment to their countries of origin through incentives and 
policies such as: tax breaks, financial education and inclusion, entrepreneurship 
opportunities and simplified entry and residence schemes.
In 2018, combined remittances to northern Central America totalled US$ 19 billion, 
while in Mexico they totalled S$ 33 billion, by far the largest amounts received anywhere 
in Latin America and the Caribbean (see figure I.56).
Figure I.56 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
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Over the past 10 years, remittances have grown steadily to an average annual rate of 
between 3% (Mexico) and 8% (Guatemala), with just one period of contraction during 
the global financial crisis of 2008–2009.
Remittances make the biggest contribution to GDP in El Salvador (20.7%) and Honduras 
(20%), while in Guatemala they contribute 11.8% of GDP and, in Mexico, just 2.7% (see 
figure I.57). 
Figure I.57 
Northern Central America and Mexico: family remittance flows, 2008 and 2018 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
The highest family remittance flows between the states of south-southeast Mexico 
are in Oaxaca, Puebla, Guerrero and Veracruz, while in Campeche and Quintana Roo 
they are very modest. Between 2008 and 2018, the combined remittances received 
in these nine states, as a proportion of the national total, fell from 29.7% to 23.5% 
(see table I.14).
Table I.14 
States of south-southeast Mexico: remittances received, 2008 and 2018 
(Millions of dollars) 
2008 2018 Percentage of state GDP, 2017
Campeche 72.8 79.3 0.3%
Chiapas 811.1 820.5 3.7%
Guerrero 1 435.5 1 620.3 9.8%
Oaxaca 1 522.2 1 736.8 9.5%
Puebla 1 615.7 1 705.5 4.3%
Quintana Roo 97.3 166.5 0.8%
Tabasco 156.0 208.2 0.6%
Veracruz 1 618.3 1 383.7 2.6%
Yucatán 136.1 205.5 1.1%
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Bank of 
Mexico figures. 
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Remittances make the biggest contribution to state GDP in Guerrero and Oaxaca 
(9.8% and 9.5%, respectively) and the smallest contribution in Campeche (0.3%) 
(see table I.14).
The average transaction per operation varies from country to country. In 2018, it 
was US$ 275 in El Salvador, compared with US$ 350 in Guatemala and US$ 343 in 
Honduras: In the latter two countries, the trend was up from 2008. In Mexico it was 
US$ 322, with a downward trend in recent years.
Some of the factors impacting on remittance levels and dynamics are the age 
composition (age) of the migrant population, their type of employment (sectors of 
activity and occupations), their educational level, the gender structure and their length 
of residence in the destination country.
In Guatemala, 10% of households receive remittances, which account for around 46% 
of these households’ income. In El Salvador, 20% of households receive remittances, 
accounting for 50% of their income. In Honduras, the shares are 16% and 38% and, 
Mexico, they are 5% and 20%, respectively.
Although remittances do not provide a way out of poverty, they do represent an 
important survival strategy for recipient families in northern Central America, which 
use them to meet basic household needs.123 For example, 94.8% of all Salvadoran 
recipient families use remittances for consumption (food and clothing), 47.5% to 
pay for services and 27.5% to pay for medical consultations.124 Guatemalan families 
use remittances for house construction, purchase or repair and savings (49.8%), 
consumption (35%), economic activities that generate value added and income (7.2%) 
and health and education (8%).125 Hondurans use remittances for consumption (70.1%), 
health and medicine (20.1%), debt payment (14.1%), payment of services (9.7%) and 
study (8.2%).126
However, a number of studies also report negative economic effects of remittances, 
by discouraging entrepreneurship and labour force participation, for instance. Other 
studies have stressed the negative effect of remittances in putting pressure on the 
exchange rate, commonly known as Dutch disease.127
123 The following percentages add up to more than 100% because they are the result of surveys with 
multiple-choice questions.
124 See International Organization for Migration (IOM), Encuesta Nacional de Migración y Remesas, 
El Salvador 2017: resultados preliminares, San Salvador, 2017 [online] https://mic.iom.int/webntmi/
descargas/informes2017/EmiRem2017.pdf.
125 See International Organization for Migration (IOM), Encuesta sobre Migración Internacional De Personas 
Guatemaltecas y Remesas 2016, Guatemala City, 2016 [online] https://mic.iom.int/webntmi/descargas/
informes/rencuestaremesasgt.pdf.
126 See International Organization for Migration (IOM) and others, Flujos migratorios laborales intrarregionales: 
situación actual, retos y oportunidades en Centroamérica y República Dominicana: informe de Honduras, 
San José, 2012 [online] https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---americas/---ro-lima/---sro-
san_jose/documents/publication/wcms_205970.pdf.
127 See C. Ball, C. López and J. Reyes, “Remittances, inflation and exchange rate regimes in small open 
economies”, MPRA Paper, No. 39852, July 2012, and D. A. Singer, “Migrant remittances and exchange 
rate regimes in the developing world”, American Political Science Review, vol. 104, No. 2, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2010.
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An increasing number of countries (more than 30 in 2016) with a high proportion 
of remittances (equivalent to 5% of GDP or more) are subject to pressure on their 
exchange rate and face major challenges in the management and effectiveness 
of their monetary policy, owing to the constant inflow of huge amounts of foreign 
currency to the country.128
In northern Central America and Mexico and worldwide, formal channels for sending 
remittances predominate: money transfer operators, banking system, money orders 
and, more recently, digital applications where national regulations so allow. Although 
transaction costs are declining, reducing them has been a specific and measurable 
goal for several decades, in pursuit of greater efficiency, equity and benefit for both 
remittance senders and recipients. This goal was enshrined formally in the SDGs in an 
indicator entitled “Remittance costs as a proportion of the amount remitted”, aimed 
at reducing the transaction costs of remittances to less than 3% (SDG indicator 10.c.1). 
In the main remittance corridor from the United States to northern Central America 
and Mexico, the average cost of sending remittances was 4.3% in 2018, still above 
the SDG 10 target (see table I.15).
Table I.15 




El Salvador 4.2 4.0 3.9
Guatemala 5.3 4.6 4.4
Honduras 4.0 4.2 4.0
Mexico 4.7 4.5 4.6
Averageb 4.5 4.5 4.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank, 
Remittance Prices Worldwide [online database] http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/.
a Simple average. 
b Second quarter of 2019.
According to an estimate of the potential resources that could be released by reducing 
the gap between actual (applied) transaction costs and the 3% SDG target, the four 
countries combined could release additional resources of around US$ 750 million 
(US$ 492 million for Mexico, US$ 146.7 million for Guatemala, US$ 56.2 million for 
Honduras and US$ 55.5 million for El Salvador).
128 See R. Sahay and others, “Financial inclusion: can it meet multiple macroeconomic goals?”, Staff 
Discussion Notes, No. 15/17, Washington, D. C., International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2015; J.A. Fuentes, 
“Estrategias de desarrollo necesarias para impulsar una migración regular, segura y ordenada en los 
países del norte de Centroamérica (NCA)”, Desarrollo y migración: desafíos y oportunidades en los países 
del norte de Centroamérica (LC/MEX/TS.2019/7), A. Canales, J. A. Fuentes and C. R. de León Escribano, 
Mexico City, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2019, pp. 121-212.
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II .  A COMMITMENT TO DEVELOPMENT
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A commitment to development
The United Nations system has developed an analytical framework that includes 
the fundamental concepts of the development approach which has informed and 
guided preparation of the Comprehensive Development Plan. These concepts are 
detailed below.
A. The importance of structural change 
in development
All development success stories entail an intensive process of structural change, 
understood as restructuring value added and employment. In order to sustain strong 
economic growth and improve income distribution, overcoming external constraints, 
cycles of indebtedness and balance of payments crises, it is necessary to build a new 
production structure and a pattern of specialization oriented towards activities that 
are: more dynamic in terms of supply and demand; more knowledge-intensive; and 
more sustainable. This has driven the need to promote progressive structural change, 
that is to say, a transformational shift towards learning- and innovation-intensive 
activities and production processes that increase production and foster environmental 
protection, employment with rights, better social conditions for the population and 
the development of universal social protection systems1 (see diagram II.1).
1 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Horizons 2030: equality at the 
centre of sustainable development (LC/G.2660/Rev.1), Santiago, 2016.
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Diagram II.1 
Progressive structural change
Schumpeterian eciency: learning- and innovation-intensive sectors
Progressive structural development
Keynesian eciency: expansion of aggregate demand and
an active fiscal policy
Environmental eciency: economic growth and enhanced well-being,
with decreasing carbon dioxide generation
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Dynamic supply depends on knowledge-intensive sectors, which may have higher 
rates of productivity, innovation and dissemination of technology, accounting for 
an increasing share in the production structure. This strengthens multipliers and 
linkages in the economy. Dynamism depends on stimulating external and internal 
demand: specialization in sectors in which there is rapidly growing global demand and 
production of what the domestic market demands. Without a favourable orientation 
towards dynamic sectors, exports will tend to grow at a slower rate than imports, 
meaning that economies will have to reduce the growth rate to avoid increasing the 
current account deficit.
The economies with the greatest potential for sustained growth and quality job 
creation are those that successfully transform their patterns of specialization in 
favour of dynamic sectors. Structure matters, as these activities are key to absorbing 
workers engaged in low-productivity or informal activities, or who are unemployed 
or underemployed.
B. Progressive structural change requires 
production development policies
The desired transformation of the production structure does not spring naturally from 
capital accumulation or market signals. A country specialized in non-dynamic sectors 
usually remains that way because of strong inertia in technological learning and the 
fact that productive capacity tends to follow the same patterns as in the past. This 
creates a trap of low innovation and slow (or zero) productivity growth, which lead 
to an equilibrium from which companies and countries are unable to escape without 
public policy intervention. 
To overcome the low-growth trap, public policies in different areas need to be 
coordinated and integrated. Efforts are required to: increase growth and economic 
stability; diversify the production structure; promote investment, exports and innovation; 
guarantee social protection; combat inequality; and protect the environment. It is also 
imperative to combat money laundering and recover the proceeds from the corruption 
and organized crime that undermine development, destabilize the economic and 
financial system and increase inequality (see diagram II.2).
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Diagram II.2 

































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Production (or industrial) development policy is defined as a dynamic process in which 
the State deploys a series of instruments designed to promote and strengthen specific 
economic sectors, activities or agents, based on national development priorities.
At present, production development policies operate in a context dominated by 
open trade and financial strategies, the attraction of foreign direct investment and 
a proliferation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, all of which constrain 
available development instruments. However, it is also true that the challenges of rapid 
technological change have led to a reappraisal of the role of this type of action, not only 
among the leaders of the world economy but also in a number of developing countries.
Macroeconomic policies for development must be aligned with the objectives of 
production development policy. In particular, macroprudential, monetary and exchange 
rate policies should be used to avoid creating asset bubbles and real exchange rate 
appreciation, which can lead to unsustainable processes of indebtedness or to a loss 
of international competitiveness that jeopardizes production diversification.2
It is also important for macroeconomic policy to provide the necessary fiscal space 
to establish countercyclical policies and sustain public investment, as well as to 
implement social and environmental policies. Without adequate fiscal space, policies 
to incentivize structural change will lack the necessary resources and public investment 
will play no role in promoting and guiding private investment.
Macroeconomic policies for development must also provide a stable framework 
for production development policies. All the success stories of closing gaps in the 
post-war global economy have involved the implementation of active vertical and 
2 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Horizons 2030: equality at the 
centre of sustainable development (LC/G.2660/Rev.1), Santiago, 2016.




Equality encompasses equality of means, opportunities, capacities and recognition. 
Equality of means translates into a fairer distribution of income and wealth and a 
wage bill that accounts for a greater share of domestic output, coupled with universal 
access to social protection. Equality of opportunities entails the absence of all forms 
of discrimination in or barriers to access to social, economic and political positions. 
horizontal industrial policies that made it possible to escape from low-growth 
traps. These policies had a macroeconomic framework conducive to investment and 
international competitiveness.
Proper coordination and linkages between macroeconomic and production development 
policies are central to redefining sectoral incentives and investment in research and 
development. These policies are intended to promote progressive structural change 
and genuine competitiveness, that is to say, competitiveness based on technical 
progress rather than on abundant natural resources or cheap labour.3
C. Equality: objective and instrument 
of development
Social policies and the pursuit of equality are crucial to creating a virtuous circle 
where innovation, employment, income distribution and growth complement one 
another. Equality is key to development for three reasons: (i) it is an ethical foundation 
underpinning the concept of development; (ii) it is an instrument for furthering an 
innovation- and learning-centred development model, with a positive impact on 
employment, productivity, economic sustainability, the environment, knowledge 
dissemination and democracy and full citizenship; and (iii) inequality is inefficient. So, 
while equality requires growth, growth also requires equality.4 These considerations 
are fully incorporated into the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 
Sustainable Development Goals, as summarized in the pledge that no one will be 
left behind5 (see diagram II.3). 
3 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), La transformación productiva 
20 años después: viejos problemas, nuevas oportunidades (LC/G.2367(SES.32/3)), Santiago, 2008.
4 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),The Inefficiency of Inequality 
(LC/SES.37/3-P), Santiago, 2018.
5 United Nations, The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2020, New York, 2020.
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Equality of access to capacities covers the skills, knowledge and capabilities that 
individuals and communities acquire and that enable them to embark on life plans 
they consider worthwhile. Equality as mutual recognition is expressed in different 
actors’ shares of caregiving, work and power, in the distribution of costs and benefits 
among present and future generations and in the visibility and affirmation of collective 
identities, solidarity and reciprocity.6
Various interactions exist between policies and economic performance in terms of 
growth and distribution. There is causality between competitiveness, growth and 
employment, on the one hand, and equality, on the other. This is associated with 
labour market formalization and wage increases, both of which are brought about by 
structural change. There is also causality between social policies and competitiveness 
and production development. Equality is a prerequisite for the system’s dynamic 
efficiency and its impacts on education and health are the clearest link between 
equality and productivity. Equality also contributes to creating an institutional, 
policy and labour environment that prioritizes innovation and capacity-building. The 
role of equality in capacity-building is more relevant today than ever, owing to the 
impact of the technological revolution, making it more urgent to close gaps. From 
this perspective, social and welfare policies are, at the same time, instruments for 
building capacity and productivity.
D. A big push for sustainability
The countries of northern Central America and south-southeast Mexico need to deepen 
the transformation of their production structure to redefine their integration into global 
markets and strengthen their national, regional and subregional markets, absorb 
underemployment and overcome their peripheral status. Although closing gaps is still 
a prerequisite for development, changes in the production structure are intrinsically 
different in the twenty-first century. The change in the paradigm of convergence, by 
incorporating the dimensions of equality and environmental stewardship, has as its 
counterpart a technological, productive and institutional leap forward to a new style 
of development. In the context of the content and aspirations of the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development, this new approach could be dubbed a “big push 
for sustainability” (see diagram II.4). It is a coordinated effort of complementary 
investments to redefine the path of growth, production and consumption patterns and 
capacity-building, in a political and institutional context where rights are respected 
and constitutional democracy is strengthened.7
The need for coordination is at the core of the big push for development strategy. 
Coordination is needed because the return on each investment depends on other 
investments being made simultaneously. Complementarity between investments 
has two possible outcomes: one is where everyone invests and obtains a high return, 
while the other is where no one has an incentive to invest. The desired equilibrium 
is the first outcome, while the second represents a trap in a slow growth situation 
created by lack of coordination and other factors.
6 See Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), The Inefficiency of Inequality 
(LC/SES.37/3-P), Santiago, 2018.
7 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Compacts for Equality: Towards 
a Sustainable Future (LC/G.2586(SES.35/3)), Santiago, 2014.
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Diagram II.4 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
At present, the idea of a big push for sustainable development is based on a combination 
of public policies, economic and social agents and human and financial resources, 
with a leading role for research, development and innovation and for moving closer 
to the technological frontier. In this dimension, transformation of the energy mix is 
seen as crucial.
Coordination means that public policies have a key role in ensuring that public and 
private actors act in concert and that the economy begins a transition towards 
sustainable development with equality. Public policies play an even bigger role in social 
and environmental sustainability investment than in other types of investment. This 
is because complementarities and scale are especially important when it comes to 
reconfiguring a style of development. For instance, transforming the energy mix and 
shifting to renewable energies requires not only investment in energy production but 
also changes in distribution systems, infrastructure and the production equipment and 
processes that use renewables. Changes in mobility patterns call for city infrastructure 
to be redesigned, as well as for educating consumers and modifying deeply ingrained 
forms of behavior. Taxation and regulation for sustainability requires a policy design 
which avoids initial redistributive impacts that harm the poorest, where social and 
skills investment require the sectors demanding them to be already present, or in 
the process of being established, in the production structure.
Increasing application of the technological revolution to sustainability creates 
uncertainty about its impact on developing economies’ competitiveness and balance 
of payments. While an economy can become more environmentally sustainable by 
importing environmental technologies, this could have negative consequences for 
growth and employment. The way out of this conundrum is to build technological 
capabilities in developing economies, coupled with production and skills diversification. 
These capabilities are necessary not only from a competitiveness standpoint but also 
to tackle countries’ specific environmental problems. This might be to mitigate and, 
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most important, adapt to the impact of climate change, as well as to halt degradation 
of the natural heritage (including natural soil productivity, water quality and access 
and biodiversity richness), in line with relevant international standards.
E. Territorial and regional dimension 
of structural change
The wide diversity in the economies and societies of northern Central America and 
south-southeast Mexico subregion is most apparent in the territorial dimension. 
The differences created and sustained by a culture of privilege translate into wide 
multidimensional gaps between territories and individuals, where territories home 
to indigenous and Afrodescendent populations tend to be more disadvantaged.8 The 
territorial, multicultural and multi-ethnic dimension of development, with its multilevel 
characteristics, must therefore be made central to all strategies designed to achieve 
progressive structural change. Local networks play a key role in these processes, as 
they are the main sphere of action for civil society.
The extension of the national vision to include subnational territories has its counterpart 
in the application of that vision to a multinational or regional space. Although regional 
integration is a multidimensional process that encompasses historical, social, 
cultural, economic, commercial, political and environmental issues, strengthening 
the production dimension of integration can stimulate structural change, especially 
in view of ongoing changes in the global economy (see diagram II.5).
Diagram II.5 














Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
8 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), The Inefficiency of Inequality 
(LC/SES.37/3-P), Santiago, 2018.
126 C O M P R E H E N S I V E  D E V E L O P M E N T  P L A N
Inequality is a systemic problem that is impossible to tackle solely by means of social 
policies. Indeed, “social issues are not played out in the social sphere alone, nor are 
economic issues resolved only in the economic sphere”.9 There is a direct link between 
a strategy of growth with equality and strengthening the regional economic space. 
For further changes in the production structure to help to reduce inequalities, more 
and better productive employment is needed, coupled with a greater presence of 
micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises in exports of manufactures and services. 
These characteristics are better represented in intraregional trade than in any other 
kind of trade. Renewing the impetus of industrialization by diversifying exports and 
increasing the knowledge and value added embedded in them also leads to a greater 
commitment to regional integration.
To implement national strategies of growth with equality, it is essential to complement 
this process with improved effectiveness and regional coverage of infrastructure, 
production chain integration, regulatory policy convergence and support for intraregional 
trade. Pooling national and regional efforts is likely to improve the subregion’s 
attractiveness to investors and hence the economic outlook.10
F. Migration as a human rights and humanitarian 
development challenge rather than a 
security problem
Migration is a historical feature of human mobility associated with structural changes 
in socioeconomic development and population dynamics, prompting people to 
move from one sector of the economy to another, from rural to urban areas or 
from one country to another. However, not all kinds of migration are linked to such 
structural changes. Increasingly, migration is the result of forced displacement by 
extreme natural events, violence, human rights violations, climate change, conflict 
over land, sociopolitical crises and an accelerated economic downturn in some 
countries, as well as lack of access to fundamental rights such as education, health 
and work.
The official dominant narrative on migration, which explains its causes and consequences 
and guides governance and public policies, is based on a national security paradigm 
that focuses on security and border controls. This masks or underestimates the 
structural causes of migration, disregards its contribution to the economy, society 
and culture, infringes migrants’ human rights, creates protection gaps for displaced 
people, undermines the importance of establishing systems to identify international 
protection needs, criminalizes irregular migration and simplifies and politicizes a 
complex and multicausal phenomenon.
9 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), The Inefficiency of Inequality 
(LC/SES.37/3-P), Santiago, 2018.
10 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Regional integration: towards an 
inclusive value chain strategy (LC/G.2594(SES.35/11)), Santiago, 2014.
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El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico have signed the Convention and Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees, which provides that no refugee should be returned 
to a country where they fear being persecuted and that a country is legally obliged to 
ensure access to its territory and to the procedures and rights of refugees to asylum.
It should be possible to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly in September 2015, and the objectives of the 
Global Compact on Refugees, affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly in 
December 2018, as well as to comply with the principles of the Global Compact 
for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (signed by representatives of more than 
150 countries in Marrakech, Morocco, in December 2018), if a more comprehensive 
approach were to be adopted, which incorporates a human rights perspective and 
the human security paradigm into migration and development policies, assessing 
the structural causes of migration and putting people at the centre.
Migration is not a process with a defined or predetermined outcome. To a large extent, 
the start and continuation of this process depend on multiple factors and rationales 
subject to great uncertainty in all phases of the migration cycle. They include: the 
inability to find protection in the country of origin; the possibility (or impossibility) of 
securing regular social and economic inclusion in the destination country; subjective 
reasons and individual life strategies; migrants’ accumulation of assets and human 
capital; and migration policies.11
Human mobility as a social process begins at the place of origin (with the reasons 
leading people to migrate or be forcibly displaced), choosing a destination and 
considering financing alternatives and family arrangements to bring this process 
to fruition (including seeking greater social protection through formal and informal 
channels). There are some circumstances where people have no other option but 
to flee and have no time to choose their destination, or to organize the journey or 
consider different alternatives.
Once the process has begun, there is an intermediate transit phase with different 
timescales and risks, depending on the destination, route and means of transport used. 
The duration of this phase can vary greatly, particularly when legal and geographical 
obstacles, as well as hostile (or even criminal) environments need to be overcome 
to reach the destination. Upon arrival at the destination, a new phase unfolds, with 
multiple possible outcomes for migrants’ inclusion. The most desirable outcome is 
social and economic inclusion, a process whose duration and feasibility are determined 
by individual, community, social, economic, political, institutional and cultural factors. 
Lastly, the possibility of returning to the place of origin, whether voluntarily or not, also 
poses risks because it entails social, economic, family and institutional reintegration, 
with variable possibilities and difficulties. In the case of people needing international 
protection, no form of return is possible (see diagram II.6).
11 A. I. Canales, J. A. Fuentes and C. R. de León Escribano, Desarrollo y migración: desafíos y oportunidades 
en los países del norte de Centroamérica (LC/MEX/TS.2019/7), Mexico City, Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2019.






Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
The United Nations postulates the human right to freedom of movement. To guarantee 
the human rights of all migrants, regardless of their country of origin, nationality, or 
legal, migration or other status, during all phases of the migration cycle, calls for a 
shift in approach from containment to one that guarantees the full enjoyment of 
human rights and builds conditions for development in the place of origin, to make 
migration a choice rather than an obligation. This approach also focuses on risks, 
vulnerabilities and the most pressing needs of migrants in different phases of the 
migration cycle. The United Nations would also have to uphold the right of people 
crossing borders to claim and receive asylum and international protection.12
12 L. Reboiras (comp.), “Migración y desarrollo sostenible: la centralidad de los derechos humanos. Textos 
seleccionados 2008–2019”, Select Pages of ECLAC (LC/M.2019/4), Santiago, Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2019.
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III .  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
130 C O M P R E H E N S I V E  D E V E L O P M E N T  P L A N
Policy recommendations
Based on the foregoing diagnosis and analytical framework, discussions with the 
Governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico and contributions from 
the various funds, programmes and specialized agencies of the United Nations Systems, 
this section adopts a historical and structural perspective of development to present 
the four countries with a set of indicative policy recommendations within the context of 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the various instruments concluded 
on such matters as migration, refugees and climate change. The recommendations 
provide a framework, with a strategic perspective, into which countries can embed 
their own implementation priorities and sequences. The implementation of the 
Comprehensive Development Plan could be based on a variable geometry approach 
that includes subregional, trilateral or bilateral agreements and is tailored to the 
national priorities and realities defined by each country’s planning institutions.
Recommendation 1. Align the set of public instruments and actions to implement a macroeconomic policy 
for inclusive development that leads to higher and more sustained economic growth, is intensive in decent 
job creation, is conducive to changing the production structure and enhances income distribution to improve 
implementation of the human rights obligations of countries of origin and transit.
A macroeconomic policy for development means transcending the rationale of 
nominal stability and aligning the set of monetary, fiscal and financial policies to 
achieve higher levels of sustained and sustainable growth and to produce a market 
effect on job creation and transformation of the fabric of production under a rationale 
of innovation, high productivity and high value added.
Recent experience has highlighted the need for sufficient space in which to implement 
countercyclical policies. This means accumulating resources during boom periods in 
132 C O M P R E H E N S I V E  D E V E L O P M E N T  P L A N
order to reduce episodes of volatility and to minimize the deterioration of well-being. 
As discussed below, this entails putting in place a wide-ranging fiscal policy, aimed at 
resolving the chronic shortage of tax revenues, as well as improving public spending 
adequacy, efficiency and effectiveness. Exchange rate policy in countries with large and 
sustained flows of remittances should take into account their impact on the production 
structure and their implications for a country’s long-term production development.
Recommendation 2. Promote policies for progressive structural change that centre on leveraging opportunities 
arising from the environmental big push and from the urgent need to move towards an environmentally 
sustainable economy.
Climate change mitigation and adaptation pose a great challenge for El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, which are particularly vulnerable to extreme 
weather events. However, the transition to a green economy provides an opportunity 
for public policy to make a decisive impact on changing the production structure, 
identifying complementarities and mobilizing resources. Achieving sustained growth 
over time calls for macroeconomic policies aimed at achieving growth with equality 
and sustainability, which not only make the economy resilient to such shocks but 
also leverage existing synergies with production convergence policies.
Recommendation 3. Carry out a wide-ranging fiscal policy that effectively combats tax evasion, avoidance 
and privileges, substantially increases collection capacity, mobilizes resources to boost growth based on 
progressive structural change and the requirements of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and 
improves the progressivity and quality of public spending.
One of the public finance challenges facing the northern countries of Central America 
(El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) and Mexico is that the level of public spending 
continues to be determined by limited tax revenues and various external shocks. It is 
important to consider the following elements for a wide-ranging fiscal policy.
 • The countries require a macroeconomic policy that contains greater fiscal policy 
support for growth, including public budgets with more room for social and 
infrastructure investment. This new fiscal policy should also expand universal social 
protection ambitiously, as it is a key element for social adaptation to technological 
and climate change.
 • Northern countries of Central America and Mexico tend to have limited fiscal space 
to accommodate higher public spending. However, they could increase levels of 
social and infrastructure investment temporarily, in line with the levels required to 
meet the Sustainable Development Objectives (SDGs) by 2030. In the medium 
term, higher levels of public investment in the SDGs should be financed through 
a combination of increased tax collection efficiency, fewer tax privileges, fighting 
corruption, public spending transparency and efficiency and, where appropriate, 
comprehensive tax reform that reflects new fiscal covenants in each country.
 • For this initiative, it is essential to strengthen tax administrations in terms of 
auditing capacity, cross-functional information systems, monitoring of large 
taxpayers and customs inspections and controls.
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 • Assessing the relevance of numerous tax incentives, preferential tax treatment 
and other tax privileges in the four countries. Tax waivers not only constrain public 
capacity to undertake development but also undermine taxation equity and create 
opportunities for tax evasion.
 • Greater flexibility is also needed in the execution of public spending and the 
initiation of strategic projects for implementing the Comprehensive Development 
Plan and meeting the SDGs. Legal and administrative provisions define as ex ante 
around 90% of public spending in northern countries of Central America and Mexico. 
Greater budgetary flexibility will make it easier to comply with the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, respond to external shocks and implement multi-year 
plans and strategic projects, such as those in the Comprehensive Development Plan.
 • Private sector participation through public-private partnerships can raise significant 
resources if the projects result in costs lower than those of traditional infrastructure 
construction and management systems and if the tax contingencies they generate 
are taken into proper consideration in public finances. 
 • Close monitoring by civil society and control over public spending are essential 
to ensure higher public spending efficiency and less corruption.
It is also recommended to use fiscal policy as an instrument to strengthen public 
investment systems, in order to meet the challenges of climate change and accelerate 
the transition to sustainable and inclusive economies, by means of:
 • Building the capacity of ministry of finance staff to design fiscal sustainability policies 
that reduce climate risks and encourage production and resilient infrastructure.
 • Enhancing the design and evaluation capability of national public investment 
systems to build climate resilience with the ministries in charge of health and 
education infrastructure, transport and roads and energy (especially hydroelectric 
power), including an economic valuation of climate risk from the design phase.
 • Options for the formulation of sector budgets to build climate resilience (integrated 
into results-based budgeting initiatives, where applicable).
 • Risk insurance and management programmes at public sector level and in economic 
sectors, such as agriculture.
Recommendation 4. Broaden monetary policy objectives beyond nominal stabilization to encourage a change 
in the production structure that allows fairer distribution of resources and income, as well as improving and 
consolidating mechanisms for coordinating monetary policy with other macroeconomic policies.
In a context of capital account liberalization by El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Mexico, the diversity of their exchange rate regimes leads to varying degrees of monetary 
policy independence in each country. As a result, the main policy challenges differ. 
In all four countries, it is necessary to continue reinforcing the strategy of financial 
inclusion to ensure greater access to and effective use of the various instruments, 
such as savings, credit and insurance. In Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, the 
challenge for monetary policy is to keep expectations anchored with respect to the 
medium-term evolution of prices.
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This makes it necessary to consolidate mechanisms for coordinating monetary 
policy with other macroeconomic policies, as well as to strengthen the mechanism 
for monetary policy transmission. Considering the typically high levels of income 
and wealth inequality in countries of the region and the impact of such inequality on 
monetary policy effectiveness, one of the most important measures for strengthening 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the context of macroeconomic 
policies for development is to build households’ capacity to manage risk. This is true 
of mechanisms for unemployment insurance, financial inclusion, universal access to 
social security and labour market formalization.
Recommendation 5. Build capacity and carry out the necessary actions to implement policies that stimulate 
public and private investment, incorporate innovation and technological change into the fabric of production, 
promote financial inclusion and develop national and regional value chains.
Over and above its stabilization role, macroeconomic policy should consider the 
following measures to increase productivity and improve the distribution of resources 
and income.
 • The first measure should be to boost both public and private investment. It is not 
enough simply to increase the level of public investment, as effective investments 
are required to support higher economic growth and to achieve equality and 
environmental sustainability. Public infrastructure is a key element of this, in order 
to promote higher productivity levels.
 • It is also necessary to take into account the role of bank credit and, more generally, 
financial intermediation (including development banking), as constraints on or 
drivers of the process of investment, as well as production development policies 
as determinants of the processes of industrialization and building a climate of 
trust that stimulates private investment.
 • The gradual incorporation of more knowledge-intensive activities and processes is 
essential for structural change. It is vital to incorporate technological change into 
the various productive activities. In all sectors, there is ample room for a gradual 
transition to activities that require greater knowledge and specialization and help 
to increase the growth rate and improve working conditions.
 • It is also important to create denser networks and value chains within and between 
the four countries in the subregion. By incorporating micro, small and medium 
enterprises (MSMEs) into global value chains, export growth will have a greater 
impact on expanding gross domestic product (GDP) growth. The incorporation of 
small-scale rural producers into local and regional chains will also enable them 
to increase their production and efficiency, as well as spaces for value capture. A 
highly promising concept for achieving this is to link migrant remittances to value 
chains and industrial policy instruments.
Recommendation 6. Carry out public actions to promote greater productive use of remittances, in cases where 
families are able to do so, to ensure that they become platforms for entrepreneurship and productive use.
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Family remittances are extremely important to the economies of El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Mexico, and opportunities exist to boost their impact in terms of 
economic and social development.
 • First, it is recommended to implement initiatives to promote greater productive 
use of remittances. While the vast majority of remittances are allocated to 
current expenditure, experience in other regions has shown that, with appropriate 
instruments and incentives, there are great opportunities for families to use them 
as a platform for entrepreneurship and strengthening ongoing productive activities 
and, in so doing, to increase their income. 
 • Second (closely related to the first point), it is recommended to work with the 
financial system to ensure that remittances act as an entry point for greater 
financial inclusion in the broad sense, that is to say, they facilitate not only access 
to savings accounts but also a gradual scaling up to more complex instruments, 
such as insurance and credit.
 • Third, it is recommended to work with the financial system to improve efficiency 
in the payment of remittances, to reduce costs and extend access to the entire 
recipient population, while keeping in mind that remittances are private resources 
that households are free to dispose of as they see fit.
 • A fourth point to be borne in mind is that remittances have been substituting for 
social policy, in that they have provided an income stream to families with little 
or no social protection: the social policy created by families themselves should 
be used positively for implementing social programmes targeted at vulnerable 
households, such as those headed by women living in rural areas with dependent 
children and older adults.
Along with the significant contribution of remittances, their adverse economic effects 
should also be analysed, including exchange rate appreciation, an import-intensive 
structure of consumption and reduced labour supply. It is important to consider the 
macroeconomic management of economies with huge, long-standing flows of foreign 
currency, like the northern countries of Central America and, to a lesser extent, Mexico.
Recommendation 7. Implement a common policy for trade facilitation between Mexico and northern 
Central America, with a view to increasing trade links, improving the balance of trade and substantially 
reducing non-tariff barriers to trade between the four countries involved in this initiative.
As trade tariffs among Central American countries and between them and Mexico 
are very low, they do not pose a serious problem for increased trade. However, the 
various non-tariff barriers and costs associated with customs procedures are indeed 
a problem to be considered. The costs of customs procedures are the main barrier to 
Central American intraregional trade and can even be quantified as ad valorem equivalents.
The regional space is key for production and export diversification, as it is the most 
important space for trade in manufactures, which absorbs the highest number of 
export products and is supplied by the highest number of export companies, especially 
small and medium-sized enterprises (the companies with the greatest impact on 
formal employment).
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The ability to exploit the full potential of the regional market in terms of scale and 
the creation of production linkages is linked directly to the rules applicable to trade 
and investment in the regional space. The greater the regulatory fragmentation, 
the higher the transaction costs companies will have to pay. Furthering gradual 
harmonization or mutual recognition, in terms of transparency, formalities, institutional 
arrangements, cooperation, paperless trade and transit facilitation, would be an 
important contribution to trade and production integration between El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico.
According to estimates, full implementation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Trade Facilitation Agreement, including voluntary commitments, could cut the costs 
associated with trade by between 12% and 17%, depending on a country’s income 
level. In order to reduce these costs, it is recommended to further the harmonization 
and simplification of documents, as well as the automation of customs procedures.
Central America is moving on two fronts to facilitate trade. On the one hand, it is taking 
forward the Central American Strategy for Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness with 
Emphasis on Coordinated Border Management and, on the other hand, it is implementing 
a Customs Union between El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. It is very important 
to address El Salvador’s concerns to make the Customs Union operational in the three 
countries in the near future. Mexico could also build on Central America’s ongoing 
actions and coordinate trade facilitation measures with that subregion, not only 
within the framework of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement but also in alignment 
with the Central American Strategy for Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness with 
Emphasis on Coordinated Border Management. Trade facilitation and the closure of 
trade gaps between Mexico and neighbouring countries in northern Central America are 
two of the ways to foster stability and interdependence between the four countries.
It is important to avoid the mistake of thinking that overcoming technical obstacles 
means eliminating or reducing sanitary controls or measures. Rather, it is about 
harmonizing, standardizing and recognizing peer-to-peer processes and certification 
to reduce transaction costs and times.
Recommendation 8. Design regional industrial policies and strategies that lead to the promotion and 
establishment of increasingly complex and high-productivity sectors.
 
The region can initiate this process by identifying leading sectors that have value 
addition potential, with a view to developing regional value chains. In regional value 
chains, value is added in a number of countries with common economic features 
and geographic proximity, through activities characterized by the dispersal of their 
parts, processes or components. The different countries provide inputs, collaborate 
and compete and address regional production aspects jointly.
Two types of linkage effect can be identified in this regional approach to value 
chains. First is a local or intraregional linkage of the sector, which has an impact on 
the economy of the region itself. The second is an interregional linkage, which refers 
to economic interdependence between sectors in different regions. The process of 
Central American integration has facilitated the creation of regional value chains and 
some sectors have already achieved production integration, which has created a space 
conducive to the design of regional production policies. This can be broadened and 
deepened still further.
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Recommendation 9. Develop a regional research, development and innovation agenda, especially with a 
view to meeting the challenges and opportunities of the new technological revolution for sustained growth 
that aspires to greater social inclusion and a fairer distribution of income.
New products, new processes and new ways or organizing production change the 
structure of the economy and society and can contribute to a fairer distribution of 
income. Despite the obvious benefits, the northern countries of Central America and 
Mexico face persistent challenges that hinder cross-industry innovation.
There continue to be difficulties in integrating innovation system components, missed 
opportunities to forge linkages with strategic sectors, limited use of local and regional 
research capacity, a disconnect between academic and production agendas and 
difficulties in accessing finance, all compounded by gender, ethnic and territorial gaps.
Regional coordination offers great opportunities to develop joint regional agendas 
for research, development and innovation, especially with a view to meeting the 
challenges of the new technological revolution, many of which transcend borders, such 
as cybersecurity, intellectual property protection, the use of big data for decision-making 
and job automation.
Such coordination would also help to achieve economies of scale and to promote 
regional and global production linkages based on the intensive use of knowledge 
and technology. The generation and dissemination of endogenous knowledge and 
technological capabilities are key to sustained growth designed to increase social 
inclusion and ensure a fairer distribution of income. The production, innovation and 
regional integration agenda should include innovation as one of the linchpins of 
regional collaboration.
Recommendation 10. Develop policies to promote innovation and improve the productivity of micro, small 
and medium-sized enterprises.
As MSMEs account for up to 99% of the fabric of production in countries of the 
subregion, it is a prerequisite for innovation promotion policies to consider the needs 
and opportunities of MSMEs. In addition, targeted policies would help to address 
the heterogeneous development of local companies, export-oriented companies 
and multinationals.
It is necessary to promote the creation and growth of high-tech MSMEs, while recognizing 
the innovation opportunities of traditional, subsistence and family businesses. It is 
also important to assess the innovation potential of sectors linked to rural territories 
and to support their efforts to scale up productivity and the value of their products.
Recommendation 11. Promote the perspective of inclusive territorial development in public policy actions 
designed to promote and strengthen local capacity, close gaps, create denser public service provision and 
link the economic, social and environmental dimensions.
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The territory is both a strategic area for development and a space for structuring 
inequalities: inequalities of opportunity, access, full enjoyment of rights and prospects 
for progress and social mobility. With regard to migration, the goal is to make it a 
choice rather than an obligation. Important factors in tackling the causes of migration 
are investing in food and nutrition security, achieving sustainable rural development 
and climate change adaptation and building the resilience of rural livelihoods, and 
all these actions need to be implemented with a territorial approach. Programmes, 
projects and investments should therefore be organized and implemented on the 
basis of a rural-urban territorial development approach with an emphasis on local 
development rather than as independent sector initiatives.
In prioritized territories, a comprehensive territorial development strategy could be 
formulated, combining and coordinating the most pertinent and highest-priority 
policies, programmes and measures for each particular territory’s circumstances. A 
territorial approach has the additional advantage of allowing projects, programmes and 
investments already being developed in each territory to be combined and leveraged. 
This would enhance, develop and expand on what already exists.
The territory matters and strategies should have a solid foundation of territorial 
specificity. A key element for the creation of a common economic space among 
the four countries is to link the territorial dynamics of the northern countries of 
Central America with the territorial dynamics of the area of influence of investments 
in south-southeast Mexico.
With respect to actions to promote development, it is important to consider 
implementing programmes for the substitution of illicit crops (poppy and coca). In 
the states of south-southeast Mexico and in the northern countries of Central America, 
this impacts on security conditions and undermines economic growth.
One area of opportunity is to implement alternative development programmes aimed 
at reducing the supply of drugs through a social component of economic incentives 
to rural communities, with technical, social and environmental support that enables 
policies and programmes for productive inclusion and the regulation of land tenure 
to be designed, formulated and implemented in order to reduce the incidence of illicit 
drug trafficking. Alternative development actions should be carried out in conjunction 
with State policies and programmes, using a comprehensive approach to provide 
sustainable employment options to farmers reliant on income from growing drugs. It 
is necessary to strengthen government institutions at different levels and for States to 
establish agreements with agricultural producers, as well as to ensure the participation 
of local communities and civil society in designing, implementing, monitoring and 
evaluating the impact of alternative development programmes. 
This makes it crucial to promote the exchange of best practice and foster international 
coordination, as well as to have the support of international organizations in developing 
data collection and analysis methodologies for monitoring illicit crops in the territories, 
building technical capacity to generate evidence-based information and supporting 
national, local and regional leaders in preparing diagnoses and building partnerships 
in the territories.
Recommendation 12. Support the consolidation of the Electricity Interconnection System for the Countries 
of Central America (SIEPAC) and promote Mexico’s electricity interconnection to SIEPAC.
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The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the 
Central American Integration System (SICA) have promoted the electricity interconnection 
of the Central American countries (through SIEPAC) and the creation of a regional 
electricity market as one of the means for achieving the optimal, rational and efficient 
use of the energy resources of countries in the subregion. Its benefits derive from the 
development and coordinated operation of an interconnected power grid that leads 
to savings and a more secure electricity supply, although there are still obstacles to 
consolidating the system, which must be overcome through dialogue and cooperation.
The roadmap discussed by the countries to obtain all the expected benefits from the 
gradual integration of their power grids includes: 
 • Strengthening the institutional framework and regional strategic alignment.
 • Developing and fully implementing regional regulation.
 • Promoting the expansion of regional generation and transmission, including the 
construction of a second SIEPAC circuit.
 • Promoting Mexico’s regional interconnection to SIEPAC.
Recommendation 13. Boost regional infrastructure projects that promote natural gas penetration and 
logistics integration.
Natural gas is a cleaner fuel than oil derivatives. Abundant reserves and technological 
advances (allowing far higher efficiencies) have led to the development of this 
hydrocarbon. Natural gas is an option that improves the competitiveness of the 
manufacturing industry, especially energy-intensive manufacturing. It also provides 
great benefits to the transport sector.
For the past two decades or so, Central American countries have been promoting 
natural gas supply projects, which have begun to come to fruition with the inauguration 
of the first natural gas combined cycle power plant in Panama in 2018. In El Salvador, 
construction on the first natural gas-powered thermal power plant began in 2019.
A gas pipeline connecting Mexico with northern Central America will not only diversify 
energy supply but will also lead to the development of thermal power generation 
to facilitate the implementation of larger-scale projects for the regional electricity 
market. The project will require the gas pipeline system in south-southeast Mexico 
to be expanded.
Another project that would increase natural gas penetration in the subregion is a natural 
gas-powered combined cycle power plant at Puerto Cortés on the Caribbean coast 
of Honduras, close to the San Pedro Sula industrial zone. This project also requires 
infrastructure for liquefied natural gas carriers, a regasification terminal, the respective 
storage facilities and electric power infrastructure, including a 75-kilometre-long 
230 kilovolt double-circuit transmission line. The thermal power plant will be connected 
to the Honduran grid and to SIEPAC, probably at the San Buenaventura substation.
A vigorous national highway investment scheme should end the centrality of large 
cities, connect essential public services and promote new routes for trade integration. 
Adequate rural road provision is essential to boost domestic markets, promote local 
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development and reduce inequality. The four countries could harmonize and consolidate 
the multitude of regulations for the road sector to promote regional mechanisms for 
planning, developing, maintaining and financing roads. A harmonized subregional 
system would enhance competitive private sector participation in road development 
in the subregion.
It is also recommended to provide a strong boost to the SICA logistics and mobility 
policy and the Mesoamerica Project by: (i) building the capacity of coordination 
bodies for infrastructure evaluation and financing; (ii) incorporating the private sector 
into the organization of regional markets; and (iii) promoting regional regulations, 
the formulation of methodologies and the adoption of harmonized procedures to 
facilitate subregional infrastructure prioritization and financing, with an approach 
that fosters complementarity between the different economies. It is important to 
agree with the countries a regional logistics integration strategy that can coordinate 
the different technical and economic standards and regulations and that fosters 
production integration among the northern countries of Central America and Mexico.
Recommendation 14. Deepen cooperation between Mexico and northern Central America on energy 
efficiency programmes and standards.
Energy efficiency and conservation are seen as key factors in reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions and achieving other energy policy goals, including better positioning 
to meet the challenges of high energy input costs. Mexico’s support in these matters 
has been very important. It is recommended to maintain it, especially with regard to 
energy efficiency standards, building learning networks, forming funds to improve 
efficiency and horizontal cooperation in the field of sustainable mobility in urban centres.
Recommendation 15. Diversify the energy mix of the electricity subsector through strategic regional 
investments in infrastructure and technology using indigenous renewable energy sources.
The renewables share of electricity production in Mexico is very low but is substantially 
higher in northern Central America (23.2% and 68.4% in 2018, respectively). Although 
hydropower continues to be the most widely used renewable resource, all countries 
show a marked increase in the use of non-conventional renewable energy sources 
(solar and wind and, to a lesser extent, biogas) and biomass as an input for industrial 
cogeneration. While geothermal energy makes a significant contribution to all four 
countries, especially El Salvador, it is not growing as fast because, despite being an 
abundant resource, its high pre-investment and investment costs make it uncompetitive, 
especially in free market environments.
Mexico has a well-defined roadmap for developing renewable resources, built on the 
mandates established in its climate change and energy transition laws. The northern 
countries of Central America also have policies, plans and roadmaps for developing 
renewables. Despite the acknowledged major obstacles to the development of some 
technologies (the abovementioned investment costs in the case of geothermal 
power plants, conflicts over the use of water resources in the case of hydropower 
plants and environmental impacts), there is great potential to continue developing 
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renewable energy. The development of renewables could serve as the basis for a 
viable subregional clean energy corridor between Mexico and northern Central America, 
which, in turn, would be the coordinating mechanism for an environmental big push 
in the four countries’ economies.
In addition to the abovementioned renewable energy sources (hydropower, modern 
biomass, solar, wind and geothermal energy), it will be necessary to encourage the use 
of cleaner fuels, such as natural gas, biogas and biofuels, and to promote distributed 
power generation. All this will support the goal of universal access to modern energy 
services for the people of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico.
Recommendation 16. Provide universal effective access to modern energy services.
In the northern countries of Central America, an estimated 3.5 million people have no 
electric power supply and 14 million depend on fuelwood for cooking, which affects 
mainly women and girls. Universal access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and 
modern energy services is a great challenge that was included in the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development.
In the case of Mexico, according to the latest inter-census survey (2015), 45% of the 
rural population and 7% of the urban population used mainly fuelwood for cooking, often 
in combination with liquefied petroleum gas. On that basis, an estimated 18 million 
people rely exclusively on fuelwood and other organic waste for cooking. Air pollution 
inside homes from the use of fuelwood is one of the environmental risks with the 
heaviest impact on health, particularly that of women, children and older persons.
An estimated 1.7 million people in Mexico have no electric power supply. 
As most of the homes without electricity are located in rural areas where electrification 
is more difficult owing to the costs associated with access problems, low population 
density, remote power grids and low household consumption, energization will require 
the development of off-grid solutions or mini-grids, through the use of renewable 
and sustainable energy technologies, such as photovoltaic solar panels, biogas, 
wind turbines and mini-hydroelectric plants. Improved communication, health and 
education services, as well as the impetus that electricity provides to change the 
production structure, makes it a key element of this initiative.
Providing universal access to modern energy services calls for heavy investment in 
such areas as: 
 • Extending power grids or developing microgrids and stand-alone power systems. 
 • Improved logistics for clean fuel distribution. 
 • Social financing mechanisms to improve home equipment (liquefied petroleum 
gas stoves and clean biomass stoves). 
 • Subsidies or transfers to low-income families, for both clean fuel use and 
electricity consumption.
Providing universal access to modern energy services will help to reduce poverty and 
increase social well-being and hence to lessen distress migration (both from rural 
areas to cities and international migration generally).
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Recommendation 17. Prioritize and align policies for sustainable and inclusive adaptation to climate change, 
reduce vulnerabilities and, as part of the environmental big push, redouble efforts to achieve a transition to 
sustainable economies with low greenhouse gas emissions and full compliance with the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development.
Owing to the anticipated impacts of climate change on multiple migration-related 
sectors, the agenda for sustainable and inclusive adaptation and the transition to 
sustainable economies are key elements in improving people’s quality of life and 
reducing the factors driving migration. To implement this agenda, the climate factor 
must be included in any analysis of migration, as well as in response policies and 
in the implementation of national and sector policies. An extra effort must also be 
made to build technical capacity, which is a strategic area for South-South cooperation.
Furthering forest protection and restoration, along with energy access and efficiency 
that reduces energy poverty, are part of a sustainable development agenda that could 
generate simultaneous benefits for all areas and actors, including indigenous and 
Afrodescendent populations.
There is a need to integrate climate change adaptation strategies with strategies for 
reducing poverty and inequality. Linking climate change responses with programmes to 
reduce and eradicate poverty, improve quality of life and expand people’s opportunities 
would be a major challenge for the four countries. While ecosystems that provide 
multiple services can serve as a source of income for the poorest people, there is 
a risk that these ecosystems will be lost before there is a chance to leverage their 
benefits sustainably.
An environmental big push for equality and sustainability is required, supported by 
coordinated public policies that decouple economic development from environmental 
externalities and improve people’s lives with quality public goods and services and 
wider coverage.
Recommendation 18. Strengthen interregional cooperation on comprehensive disaster risk management 
with a full-cycle approach that includes, as a minimum, prevention, reduction, financial protection, response, 
reconstruction and comprehensive services, as well as comprehensive insurance and agricultural insurance.
Given the region’s high degree of exposure and vulnerability to disaster risk, it is 
necessary to build capacity for sustainable and inclusive adaptation, the adoption of 
comprehensive services to address the interests and needs of small-scale rural producers, 
and cooperation and capacity for comprehensive disaster risk management, including 
risk transfer mechanisms at general and sector levels, as well as in agriculture. This 
means continuing to deepen support for ongoing strategic activities, like the Regional 
Action Plan for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
2015–2030 in the Americas and the Strategy for Disaster Risk Management in the 
Agriculture Sector and Food and Nutrition Security in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(2018–2030) of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).
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ECLAC experience also allows other priority areas to be identified, an analysis of which 
would allow wide-ranging strategies for comprehensive disaster risk management 
to be developed, providing sound data on which to base disaster risk management 
and its systematic evaluation.
Recommendation 19. Substantially improve health services and people’s effective access from a comprehensive, 
universal and decommodified perspective that includes actions for the promotion, prevention, care, recovery 
and rehabilitation of people’s health, with an emphasis on municipalities and territories that are more 
predisposed to migration. This will ensure that these services are sufficient, timely, high quality, relevant and 
near at hand, with a rights approach and a gender and intercultural perspective. All this in a context where 
the social determinants of health are addressed simultaneously and holistically and where the primary care 
dimension is strengthened.
Effective access to enjoyment of the right to health is one of the biggest social deficits 
in northern Central America and in the nine federal entities of south-southeast Mexico. 
It is also one of the reasons for forced migration. However, experience shows that 
the existence of nearby, timely and relevant health services is one of the factors that 
encourage people to put down roots in territories.
The subregion has a shortfall of doctors per inhabitant and beds per hospital. There are 
frequent complaints and expressions of discontent concerning the lack of timely and 
adequate service provision, as well as the inadequate supply of medicines. This is also 
a consequence of low per capita health spending in these countries (some US$ 120 in 
2010), which is around 10 times lower than that of more developed countries.
An indication of existing health lags in northern countries of Central America is life 
expectancy at birth. While it was 73.9 years in Guatemala, 74.2 years in El Salvador 
and 73.8 years in Honduras in the period 2015–2020, this is still nearly two years 
shorter than average life expectancy in Latin America and the Caribbean (75.7 years), 
and the gap is even wider if life expectancy is disaggregated by territory.
In Mexico, average life expectancy is 77.3 years, with sharp differences between 
states. According to data from the National Population Council (CONAPO), in 2017 
life expectancy in the eight states of southern Mexico was shorter than average life 
expectancy in Latin America. With a life expectancy of 72.9 years, the state of Guerrero 
is below the northern Central American average, while the state of Chiapas has the 
same years of life expectancy as Guatemala and the state of Oaxaca has the same 
years of life expectancy as Honduras.
Guatemala and Honduras are in the worst situation in terms of under-five mortality, 
with rates higher than those of El Salvador and Mexico and the regional average. In 
the states of south-southeast Mexico, mortality is above the national average and 
Chiapas and Oaxaca are the states with the highest infant mortality, with 18.9 and 
17.2 infant deaths per 1,000 live births, respectively.
Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, a substantial improvement in health services was 
seen as one of the highest government priorities in the four countries’ development 
plans. The lessons learned from the pandemic drive home the urgent need to strengthen 
and significantly expand health services as one of the linchpins of a new welfare and 
social protection regime.
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Recommendation 20. Build robust systems of universal social protection and promote high-impact decent 
employment policies to successfully eradicate poverty and significantly reduce inequalities.
While Governments’ efforts and achievements in terms of employment and social 
protection are recognized, there is still a long way to go to make them adequate and 
robust. It is therefore necessary to reinforce the process and speed up the creation of 
a human rights-based social policy that provides lifelong protection against risk. This 
includes such measures as: guaranteeing decent work (namely a job that respects 
labour rights and pays a high enough wage to allow a decent standard of living); 
strengthening the pillar of care for children and older persons; ensuring protection 
against accidents at work, disability and death, as well as unemployment insurance; 
and implementing policies to guarantee a basic income and reduce catastrophic 
personal health spending.
It is important to ensure access to social protection for the migrant population that has 
been forced to return, and to distinguish it from the population that returns voluntarily. 
People in transit and returnees, as well as migrant minors, are part of a wide array 
of target populations. The portability of social security and health contributions and 
benefits is especially important in the case of the northern countries of Central America 
and Mexico. Priority should be given to implementing a strategy to guarantee the 
pensions of older persons through at least the following actions:
 • Implementing a programme for the portability of social contributions among 
countries in the region, starting with Mexico and moving on to the United States. 
To this end, the existing Ibero-American Multilateral Agreement on Social Security 
should be taken into account.
 • Promoting a regional agreement on the repatriation of contributions made to 
social security and to Medicare in the United States by irregular migrants who have 
returned to their countries of origin, to allow these individuals and their families 
to be incorporated into national social security systems.
 • Strengthening and guaranteeing universal transfers for older persons and gradually 
extending them to the rest of the population with a life cycle approach (infancy) 
or in territories devastated by disasters, as several countries are already doing.
It is crucial to make progress on guaranteeing the right to health, in order to build 
universal access systems to overcome the current hierarchical and fragmented 
provision of services and so fulfil the mandate of guaranteeing the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health, as established in 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The reform of 
health systems from a perspective of rights, universality, adequacy, relevance and 
standardization around more comprehensive services and benefits is one of the most 
important transformations in social institutions in countries of the region. Moreover, a 
strategy to reduce morbidity and mortality from non-communicable diseases needs 
to be implemented immediately.
Recommendation 21. Implement policies to achieve substantive equality between women and men, close 
inequality gaps and move forward with guaranteeing women’s physical, economic and political autonomy.
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Without substantive equality between women and men there will be no development. The 
gender dimension is that relevant and decisive in the formulation and implementation 
of all policies. Policies geared towards gender equality should be mainstreamed and 
progressive. Among other things, they must: close the gaps between women and 
men in economic and political participation; secure recognition for unpaid work, as 
well as reconciling productive and reproductive work, and personal, work and family 
life; guarantee sexual and reproductive rights; create opportunities for education and 
training and better employment conditions; and improve contributory coverage for 
women of reproductive age. The priority must be to guarantee all women and girls the 
right to a life free from violence, to combat femicide comprehensively and effectively, 
and to substantially improve their right to effective access to justice.
Recommendation 22. Prioritize long-term youth and early childhood policies. 
In view of the demographic context of northern Central America and Mexico, it is 
important to meet the demands, needs and aspirations of the youth population and 
broad-based, wide-ranging comprehensive policies for early childhood are needed 
urgently. The first requirement is to strengthen social protection systems for socially 
and economically vulnerable families with children and adolescents.
There should also be a regional strategy for the prevention of violence against children 
and adolescents, in accordance with the Global Partnership to End Violence against 
Children. In destination countries, it is important to support family tracing and 
reunification. It is also a priority to promote the care of child and adolescent refugee 
claimants, offering them consular protection, as well as to advocate for increased 
access to early childhood education and care services. During the return stage, it 
is imperative to ensure proper reintegration of children and adolescents into their 
communities by designing education transition programmes.
Early childhood investment should be seen as vital for improving the opportunities of 
adolescents and young people in adult life, which is why it is essential for social policies 
to adopt a life-cycle approach, especially at the early childhood stage. What is or is not 
done in early childhood has lifelong repercussions, and gaps in care and coverage at 
this stage turn into inequality gaps that continue and amplify throughout people’s lives.
It is also necessary to promote policies to facilitate the transition from youth to adulthood, 
including: a humanistic and civic education; preparation for work; mechanisms to link 
education provision with labour market demand; and the acquisition of experience. 
Public secondary education coverage in the northern countries of Central America is 
still low and there are wide quality gaps, especially in rural territories with a large 
indigenous youth population. 
Significant investment in education is needed to empower the next generation in 
the subregion and to tackle the root causes of migration. Higher levels and quality 
of education are linked to economic growth and individual income: one additional 
year of schooling is estimated to increase a person’s income by up to 10%1 and to 
increase average annual GDP growth by 0.4%.2
1 C. Montenegro and H. Patrinos, “Returns to Schooling around the World”, background paper for the 
World Development Report 2013, World Bank, 2013.
2 E.L. Glaeser, “Why does schooling generate economic growth?”, Economics Letters, vol. 44, No. 3, 1994.
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To this end, a strategy could be implemented to enhance secondary and technical 
education in countries of origin, in order to build young people’s capacity and promote 
their increased social and labour force participation.
It must also be a priority for young people to be able to function in a global, interconnected 
and diverse world, as this type of education is an antidote to xenophobia and the 
rejection of others for being different. Efforts should be made to ensure that the 
whole of society learns to live in a democracy and to be aware of and participate in 
the fundamental decisions affecting collective life.
This calls for a care strategy that incorporates the vision of early childhood development 
to improve children’s learning skills and that, in turn, facilitates the labour force 
participation of mothers and fathers. All this should be complemented by a strategy 
to reduce maternal, newborn and infant mortality.
Recommendation 23. Guarantee the individual and collective rights of indigenous peoples and ensure they 
achieve an equal level of well-being, prioritizing the closure of inequality gaps that affect indigenous peoples 
and rural populations in general in each of the countries. This includes making sure that indigenous peoples 
are consulted on all decisions affecting them, with a culturally appropriate approach and in good faith, in 
order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent.
For decades, a recurring finding in social diagnoses of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 
and Mexico has been that indigenous peoples (including those living in cities) and rural 
populations in general have the worst indicators of poverty and extreme poverty, life 
expectancy and access to rights. They also experience basic deprivations and higher 
levels of inequality. This is a structural reality, with strong elements of chronicity. 
The situation of indigenous and rural populations is the main challenge for meeting 
Goal 1 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (to end poverty in all its 
forms everywhere).
It is seen as essential to implement a new cycle of policies targeted at indigenous 
and rural populations, with a focus on rights, including collective rights. In support 
of this, all countries have made legislative progress on the matter and a range of 
international law instruments exists, including the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the recently adopted United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas.
Recommendation 24. Guarantee food and nutrition security through efficient and effective food chains that 
provide good nutrition, reduce food loss and waste, break the vicious circle between poverty and environmental 
degradation and make efficient use of water and resources used in the food system.
Over the past six years, the Central American Dry Corridor has endured repeated pest 
attacks and periods of drought that have had a heavy impact on the rural population 
of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.
During the months of July and August 2018, an extreme rainfall deficit caused severe 
losses in the main (first) harvest, which affected some 282,000 hectares of maize and 
beans. An estimated 2.2 million people were adversely affected, mainly subsistence 
farmers and agricultural wage workers. Crop losses led to lost income, decreased 
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food consumption and depletion of assets and left many households with few or no 
food reserves. The combination of drought and excessive rainfall during the second 
crop cycle left large numbers of people food insecure.
Central America has a regional food and nutrition security policy that seeks to ensure 
that people have food availability and can access, consume and use food constantly 
and in a timely manner, in sufficient quantity and with the variety, quality and safety 
necessary to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy 
life. The policy implementation period is from 2012 to 2032.
The agriculture sector has established the Climate-Adapted Sustainable Agriculture 
Strategy for the Central American Integration System (2018–2030) (EASAC), which 
links agricultural development directly to food and nutrition security and climate 
change. There is also Mesoamerica Hunger Free, a Mexican cooperation initiative 
to strengthen food and nutrition security actions across the seven SICA countries. 
The actions under this initiative are based on a Cooperation Framework Agreement 
signed by the Government of Mexico and the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO).
It is deemed prudent to reassess acceptable levels of import dependence and food 
security, to consider the application of measures to stimulate national production and 
healthy diets based on diversified local production and to establish trade mechanisms 
and other mutual support agreements to provide for food contingencies. To implement 
a sustainable food system, it is necessary not only to increase production but also 
to avoid post-harvest losses and waste. Measures should include stabilizing food 
and nutrition security in the region, implementing strategies to address climate 
vulnerability in key sectors (coffee, maize and beans) and boosting sustained income 
generation for rural families.
Recommendation 25. Ensure that States adhere fully to international standards and guarantee the dignity 
of people and the fulfilment of their rights; and formulate comprehensive human mobility policies based on 
empirical data and on an integrated governance approach, which focus on rights and the dignity of people 
and adopt the human security approach in its various dimensions.
Under international human rights law, countries in the subregion have an obligation 
to respect, protect and guarantee the human rights of all persons within their territory 
or subject to their jurisdiction, including all migrants, and to establish national laws, 
policies and programmes in accordance with international law. These obligations are 
based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and core human rights treaties, 
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. 
Further obligations arise from international law in general, such as international refugee 
law, humanitarian law, employment law, law of the sea and international criminal 
law. Regional human rights instruments and mechanisms are also relevant in this 
context, including the American Convention on Human Rights.
For migration to take place in conditions that respect human dignity and in a safe, 
orderly and regular manner, it is essential to comply with international standards 
on human rights and migration. This translates into two key obligations: on the one 
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hand, it means respecting, protecting and fulfilling the rights of migrants, irrespective 
of nationality or migration status and without any form of discrimination, in order 
to preserve their safety, physical integrity, well-being and dignity; on the other hand, 
it means taking action against racism, xenophobia and discrimination. In addition, 
good migration governance with a human rights approach obliges States to strive 
to identify migrants in vulnerable situations or at risk of having their rights violated 
and to apply approaches that take into account age group and gender issues and 
are culturally appropriate.
It is vital for migration policies to be based on an analysis of the opportunities and 
challenges that human mobility poses for States. This entails collecting, analysing 
and systematizing reliable information on demographics, transboundary movements, 
internal displacement, diasporas, labour markets and seasonal trends, as well as the 
education and health of migrants and their families. Consideration of these aspects 
not only highlights each State’s specific circumstances in relation to migration, it also 
ensures that migration policymaking is based on empirical data.
This makes it possible to formulate migration policies that are based on an assessment 
of the different stages in the migration cycle and that incorporate the link between 
migration and other related areas, such as nationality, labour markets, economic and 
social development, gender, local service availability, health and education. In order 
to link migration policies with these aspects, it is necessary to apply an integrated 
governance approach, which includes all State entities whose responsibilities relate 
in some way to migration. At the same time, efforts should be made to link migration 
policies with cross-cutting issues such as environmental degradation, climate 
change and crisis situations. Measures that could be implemented include: improving 
migration policies, regulations and programmes in accordance with the Migration 
Governance Framework approved by the countries; preparing studies on cross-border 
labour dynamics; continuing to develop the interactive health and migration map in 
order to improve public health policies and actions based on empirical data and with 
a gender perspective; and identifying best practice and lessons learned in order to 
improve migration governance.
Recommendation 26. Develop specific policies and actions to cater specifically for each stage in the migration 
cycle (origin, transit, destination and return), in order to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration and due 
respect for the rights of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers.
The countries in the subregion have been active members of the Regional Conference 
on Migration since it was established in 1996. This space for intergovernmental 
consultation is best suited to reinforcing actions already carried out, based on 
cooperation and dialogue, ranging from the creation of anti-trafficking networks to 
the proposal of care protocols for migrant women and minors. It is important to 
strengthen this forum and others like it.
It is essential to ensure respect for the human rights of migrants and those needing 
protection, taking into account the principles established in key instruments of the 
United Nations, especially the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976), as well as 
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families (1990), the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and 
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Regular Migration, adopted in Marrakech (Morocco) (2018), the Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees (1951) and its Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 
(1967), the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998) and the Global compact 
on refugees (2016 and 2018).3 Governments in the region must bear in mind the 
principles of the primacy of human rights and of differential treatment of migrants 
according to their vulnerability.
In particular, as established in the two aforementioned global compacts, they must 
guarantee that the human rights of all people are respected during the different stages 
of human mobility, that their specific needs are understood and met appropriately 
and that they are empowered as agents of change. It is necessary to mainstream 
the gender perspective, promote gender equality and empower all women and girls, 
recognizing their independence and leadership, in order to move beyond a vision of 
migrant women as victims. It is also necessary to ensure that the rights of displaced 
persons, asylum seekers and refugees are respected and that internal or international 
protection is available, accessible and effective in accordance with international, 
regional and national standards.
A. Origin 
With respect to policies in the place of origin, and in line with the recommendations 
on inclusive economic development and significant expansion of social protection, 
it is vital to incorporate the criterion of territorial development as a central tool for 
substantially and comprehensively improving the living and production conditions of 
individuals and families in municipalities and regions more predisposed to migration. 
This will lead to significant improvements in people’s standard of living in the territories 
and offers the prospect of social progress to reinforce their attachment and sense 
of belonging to the territory and community, which would reduce the recurrence of 
violence and participation in criminal activities as an alternative to lack of opportunities.
Gender equality and women’s empowerment must be mainstreamed from analysis 
to the formulation of solutions in countries of origin because the factors motivating 
the mobility of women and girls may not be the same as those motivating men and 
boys, so proposals tailored to these different realities are needed in each case.
Corruption is a cross-cutting factor that drives migration in two ways: (i) through 
events that inhibit people’s well-being; and (ii) through acts that encourage irregular 
migration. With the first driver, corrupt practices, such as embezzlement, influence 
peddling, fraud, money laundering, nepotism and cronyism, divert public resources, 
which results in the State failing to comply with its obligation to guarantee citizens’ 
economic and social rights, in turn promoting the formation of criminal cells and, 
hence, scenarios of instability that influence distress migration. 
With the second driver, corruption as a cause of migration is present in countries of 
origin, transit and destination, in the form of bribery, influence peddling and abuse 
of office, which weakens the border control system and undermines effective law 
3 On 17 December 2018, the General Assembly of the United Nations agreed a new Global compact on 
refugees, which seeks to guarantee that refugees and the people hosting them receive the support 
they need. The Global compact on refugees sprang from the New York Declaration for Refugees and 
Migrants of 2016.
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enforcement.4 To this end, and in accordance with the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption and the targets of SDG 16, it is necessary to promote policies 
to ensure strong institutions and preventive actions in the form of zero tolerance 
measures for acts of corruption, accountability, document protection, policies for 
managing and supervising human resources assigned to migration offices, as well 
as response measures for the detection, investigation and prosecution of such acts, 
to which international cooperation contributes by developing methodological tools 
and providing technical assistance in prevention, investigation, public administration 
and legislative implementation.5
A further consideration is that violence in countries of origin and transit, coupled with 
a weakening of law enforcement institutions, has the effect of increasing migration 
flows. States must guarantee a life free from violence and promote conditions of human 
security by such means as implementing: public crime prevention policies; community 
security programmes, which also include a gender-based violence approach; crime 
prevention and detection actions; effective measures to combat organized crime 
and access to justice; and policies to ensure adequate care for victims. International 
organizations can assist with: the institutional strengthening of justice systems and 
law enforcement institutions; promoting the rule of law; developing tools for crime 
prevention and control standards; facilitating collaboration with various local and 
national actors to reduce the incidence of crime and criminal practices; and developing 
actions to promote a culture of peace and legality.
B. Transit
In the transit stage, it is vital to strengthen policy coordination and harmonization 
between the four countries, while respecting each country’s sovereignty and priorities 
but starting from the assumption that migration governance and an effective asylum 
and protection system are possible only by taking a multilateral approach and abiding 
by international law. Among the measures that could be implemented or reinforced 
is the establishment of increased migration and mobility facilities to order and 
regularize people’s mobility and ensure their safety. It is extremely important to 
improve and strengthen mechanisms for coordinating consular protection among the 
four countries. It is also necessary to build the institutional and financial capacity of 
national entities in the four countries in charge of migration, caring for refugees and 
combating discrimination.
During the transit stage, it is important to ensure that all migrants, particularly women 
and girls, benefit from optimum guarantees to undertake the migration route safely 
and to take advantage of this process to empower themselves and build their capacity 
as agents of change.
Establishing mechanisms to ensure migrants’ and refugees’ access to justice (at all 
levels) is key from a rights perspective. To this end, consideration should be given to 
creating a transitional mechanism that guarantees migrants and refugees full access to 
justice. It is also necessary to define expedited procedures to provide them with effective 
access to basic social services during transit, irrespective of their migration status.
4 Article 18 and Article 19 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption.
5 Article 43 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption.
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The prevention of violence and all types of crime against migrants and refugees should 
be one of the highest policy priorities. It is necessary to eliminate unsafe migration 
corridors and promote safe, orderly and regular migration, combat smuggling of 
migrants and human trafficking effectively and guarantee all migrants, particularly 
women and children, the right to a life free from violence.
There is ample experience and capacity for improving policies targeting the transit of 
migrants. For example, systems for the four countries to exchange data on fraud and 
vulnerabilities, best communication and logistics practice to mitigate the aggravation 
of potential conflict in border crisis situations, processes for harmonizing border 
management measures between the four countries and monitoring of migration 
flows in the region could all be strengthened and expanded.
The rights of migrants and their roots in their territories of origin must be respected and 
guaranteed and migration corridors, in which assistance is unregulated and organized 
crime groups operate using refugee centres and shelters to pinpoint potential victims, 
should not be promoted. Capacity should be built in institutions involved in the care 
and profiling of migrants who are vulnerable or at risk (including migrant women 
who have been subjected to gender-based violence, victims of human trafficking, 
unaccompanied minors, members of indigenous or Afrodescendent populations, 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people and persons with disabilities). 
Capacity should also be built on the rights and obligations of migrants (including 
labour rights in the destination country), the dissemination of information on risks 
and reporting systems.
States must guarantee the protection of migrants, during the transit stage, against 
violence, physical injury, human rights violations and intimidation.6 They must 
also implement policies to investigate and punish such acts, provide assistance to 
victims, ensure their access to justice and, in particular, order full redress measures. 
This calls for the effective implementation of regulatory frameworks to prevent and 
punish the crimes of human trafficking and smuggling of migrants in accordance 
with international instruments.
The health dimension is also extremely important in the transit stage. This makes it 
necessary to build States’ capacity to provide an intersectoral response to the health 
needs of migrant populations in transit, through: the Health, Border and Mobility 
Management (HBMM) framework of the International Organization for Migration (IOM); 
technical support for the development of health care and psychosocial assistance 
pathways for the migrant population in transit; and application of the Electronic 
Personal Health Record to facilitate the exchange of information and continuity of 
treatment of migrants across borders, in accordance with the right to privacy and 
the protection of personal data.
It is extremely important from a human rights perspective to make commitments, 
design policies and establish protocols for investigating and solving crimes against 
migrants, with the active participation of the State and the support of committees of 
relatives, non-governmental organizations and other entities. This makes it necessary 
to facilitate access to justice, improve techniques and strategies to search for missing 
migrants and reinforce policies for family reunification and psychosocial support 
6 Article 16 of the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families (1990).
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for reunited families. Countries’ experiences are often shared in forums such as 
the Regional Conference on Migration and they need to be followed up to establish 
measures in the region.
A point to be borne in mind is that, in accordance with international human rights 
standards, the Global compact on refugees and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly 
and Regular Migration, the detention of migrants should be an exceptional, last-resort 
measure and that, in the event of resorting to this measure, due process must be 
respected, detention must not be applied arbitrarily, it must be provided for in law, 
it must be the result of an individual analysis and it must be applied for only a short 
period of time. It should also be stressed that, in accordance with international 
human rights standards, children should never be detained for reasons relating to their 
immigration status, or that of their parents, and that States should halt or eradicate the 
immigration detention of children quickly and completely. The detention of any child 
as an immigrant should be prohibited by law and should be applied fully in practice.
C. Destination
In places of destination, active, high-impact policies are needed to protect the rights 
of migrants and refugees over and above their immigration status and to boost 
existing efforts to regularize migrants and provide access to international protection. 
Increasing the consular network’s attention and timely response capacity is a basic 
prerequisite for achieving these goals, as well as for identifying and referring cases 
in need of protection, as appropriate.
The main reason people decide to migrate is to find employment and earn enough 
income to provide for themselves in their place of destination and, where appropriate, 
to send funds to their place of origin. It should therefore be one of the dimensions that 
shapes employment and integration policies. This will make it necessary to: develop 
or improve labour market information systems in Mexico and northern countries of 
Central America to determine priorities, gaps and needs; support the development 
of labour policies for migrants and refugees in order to respond in a timely manner 
to labour market demand as determined by the labour market information system; 
promote and expand temporary migration programmes from a perspective of regional 
labour mobility; and scale up systems of migration information, labour intermediation 
and regularization of migrants through job offers, adopting a social inclusion rationale.
General recommendation 26 on women migrant workers of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) states that “to understand the 
specific ways in which women are impacted, female migration should be studied from 
the perspective of gender inequality, traditional female roles, a gendered labour market, 
the universal prevalence of gender-based violence and the worldwide feminization 
of poverty and labour migration.”
Special attention should be paid to policies, programmes and actions for achieving 
family reunification, one of the increasingly important reasons for people deciding 
to migrate. The societies of all four countries are becoming ever more cross-border in 
nature. This makes it necessary to strengthen the bond between people in the place of 
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origin and communities abroad, over and above migration conditions. Essentially this 
means recognizing the presence of transnational practices requiring deterritorialized 
policies, in such areas as citizenship, pensions and new forms of taxation.
There must also be a focus on encouraging active policies for receiving and hosting 
migrants and refugees in places of destination, in accordance with the principle of 
equality and non-discrimination, which help to prevent them from falling victim to 
racism, xenophobia, aporophobia (rejection of the poor) or any other manifestation 
of discrimination and, instead, promote a culture of diversity, appreciation and mutual 
respect between destination societies and migrant and refugee families.
D. Return
Return does not necessarily mean the end of human mobility but it is a stage of 
opportunities and demands for countries. Return must be free and voluntary and, when 
it is forced (as tends to be the case in the subregion), all the rights and guarantees 
of deportees should be ensured. One of the biggest public policy challenges in this 
area is to create the right conditions to ensure that returnees decide to reintegrate 
into their countries and to fulfil their life plans there. Particular attention should be 
paid to policies targeting returnee women and girls who are stigmatized upon their 
return. Improving individual registration mechanisms and enhancing due consideration 
of returnees’ needs and aspirations will be essential to bolster their decision to 
reintegrate. In the case of returnees who have contributed to social security in their 
destination country, alternatives for ensuring that their contributions are portable 
will be vital, as will access to their contributions and the rights deriving from them.
The set of public policies and actions targeted at returnees includes: improving data 
recording, in order to facilitate matching of supply with demand; enhancing reception 
centres for migrant returnees at central and local levels; designing or reinforcing 
comprehensive care protocols for migrant returnees, including health services, 
psychosocial assistance, protection and reintegration into work and education; active 
and empathetic support for the reintegration of returnees, tailored to their profile 
and specific needs; and designing programmes for equivalence of qualifications to 
facilitate returnees’ entry into the local labour market or the creation of new sources 
of employment.
Throughout the different stages of mobility (origin, transit, destination and return), 
it will be necessary to improve and expand institutional and community-based 
psychosocial assistance for both returnees and their families (especially women, 
children, adolescents and older persons) who remain in their places of origin. Due 
attention to health needs during the mobility cycle should include all the dimensions 
of mental health and emotional well-being.
Recommendation 27. Guarantee that all persons in need of international protection have effective access 
to the territory and to procedures for determining their refugee status; and include asylum seekers and 
refugees in public services and social programmes to enable them to meet their basic needs, in compliance 
with the Global compact on refugees.
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New development cooperation policies and their implications for migration should 
incorporate substantive mechanisms for protecting people fleeing violence, such 
as the asylum system, the issuance of permanent residence permits and long-term 
integration. The United Nations system and its specialized agencies can contribute 
by providing systematic information on the asylum-seeking population’s reasons for 
leaving, as well as good practice for the inclusion of this population in host countries.
It is essential to guarantee that all persons in need of international protection have 
effective access to the territory and to procedures for determining their refugee status, 
as well as to acknowledge unreservedly that, in countries in the region, violence 
has become an increasingly important reason for people moving or migrating. The 
necessary procedures should be established to include asylum seekers and refugees 
in public services and social programmes to enable them to meet their basic and 
immediate needs and to become integrated. To this end, the United Nations system 
works with federal, State and municipal authorities, as well as civil society and private 
sector organizations.
The objective of a Comprehensive Development Plan for El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and south-southeast Mexico to tackle the underlying causes of migration 
and internal and cross-border displacements is consistent with the approach of 
both the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Global 
compact on refugees. It also complements the comprehensive regional protection 
and solutions framework (MIRPS), which is the regional application of the Global 
compact on refugees. Its core focus is forced displacement in northern countries of 
Central America, which is linked closely with the broad approach of multidimensional 
population movements.
For all the above reasons, it is essential to have a regional strategy aligned with national 
priorities to comply with both the abovementioned international compacts and the 
MIRPS. It is urgent and pressing to build asylum systems commensurate with the 
scale of the challenges facing the four countries. In the specific case of Mexico, the 
MIRPS takes the form of a set of Government commitments to reinforce the asylum 
system and the protection of children and adolescents, meet the basic needs of 
asylum seekers and refugees and support both their socioeconomic integration and 
that of host communities. Rigorous mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating these 
commitments provide a vital tool for measuring progress, consolidating strengths 
and overcoming the shortcomings of these extremely important commitments. The 
commitments are to:
 • Provide full information to the population in need of international protection, by 
means of individual counselling, printed material and social networks.
 • Work with the Mexican Commission for Aid to Refugees and the National Institute 
of Migration to facilitate access to the territory and to procedures for determining 
the refugee status of people fleeing violence and persecution, through applications 
at border crossing points, airports and migrant holding centres.
 • Guarantee that branches of the National System for the Comprehensive Protection 
of Children and Adolescents (SIPINNA) ensure the best interests of the child and 
boost assistance to unaccompanied minors. 
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 • Build the capacity of shelters and civil society organizations to provide humanitarian 
and legal assistance, as well as support, to asylum seekers and refugees, giving 
differential treatment to women, unaccompanied minors and persons with 
specific needs.
 • Establish integration programmes that include the relocation of asylum seekers and 
refugees to connect them with employment opportunities and social security and 
so help to ease congestion in reception and protection spaces in southern Mexico.
 • Support host communities, through activities that promote peaceful coexistence 
and enhanced public services.
Recommendation 28. Mainstream the gender perspective and the principle of non-discrimination into the 
governance of the migration cycle and of internal and international protection; guarantee the best interests 
of the child; enhance assistance and protection for unaccompanied children and adolescents and for lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people; and recognize the rights and address the specific needs of 
indigenous and Afrodescendent migrants.
In population terms, migration in the region has become increasingly complex: 
the number of women, children, adolescents and members of indigenous and 
Afrodescendent populations involved in migration is increasing all the time. These 
are population groups at high risk of having their rights and dignity violated and of 
falling victim to physical, sexual or economic violence. As they also undertake the 
migration process under more difficult and disadvantageous conditions, it is extremely 
important for there to be actions, measures and action protocols aimed at tackling 
these particular situations.
As has been emphasized above, the gender perspective and substantive equality 
should be mainstreamed into migration cycle management under a rationale of 
empowering women and girls as rights holders and subjects of change.
Child policies and measures that should be implemented or reinforced (such as those 
already being implemented by virtue of the Regional Conference on Migration) include: 
improving the technical capacity of consular staff and other entities working in the 
field of consular protection of migrant children and adolescents, through training 
and protocol development; increasing the access of children, adolescents and their 
families to early childhood education and care services in transit countries, including 
non-formal education programmes; and designing and implementing communication 
for development strategies that foster the educational inclusion of migrant children 
and adolescents, as well preventing stigma, discrimination and xenophobia at school 
in transit and destination countries.
It is also necessary to develop and evaluate childcare protocols during emergencies 
(including protection of the rights of migrant women, children and adolescents) and 
in host communities during disasters and to promote the best interests of the child 
in the different stages of the migration process, including early childhood care and a 
guaranteed right to education. It is particularly important for response strategies in 
transit and destination countries to take into account educational and development 
needs in early childhood, childhood and adolescence, focusing on the most vulnerable 
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(including young or unaccompanied children). Existing protocols for the reception and 
reintegration of children and adolescents in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras 
should be implemented, expanded and disseminated, including programmes to prevent 
discrimination and stigmatization of returnee children and adolescents.
The management of the child protection system should be enhanced to ensure the 
proper reintegration of returnee children and adolescents into their communities, 
guaranteeing their reintegration into education, health and social protection services. 
Special attention should be paid to educational inclusion in both early childhood 
and adolescence, by such means as accelerated programmes, educational bridges 
and non-formal education programmes. Backing should also be given to the design 
and implementation of specialized psychosocial support and education transition 
programmes for returnee children and adolescents.
In the case of members of an indigenous people, ancestral and traditional patterns 
of mobility (many of which are circular and, in some cases, predate current-day 
States) should be understood, respected and harmonized with national legislation, 
and specific policies with a rights approach should be designed to address migration 
patterns based on family, community and compatriot networks. It is also essential to 
have flexible mechanisms for providing translation and interpretation services to all 
those who are not Spanish speakers or who prefer to use their indigenous language 
in administrative procedures or in access to justice.
Recommendation 29. Develop specific policies and actions for the care of persons internally displaced by 
violence and conflict or disasters.
In accordance with the MIRPS, it is necessary to foster a legal and institutional 
environment for the care of displaced persons that facilitates the development of 
public policies for prevention, protection and finding solutions. Funding must also be 
guaranteed to enable these policies to be implemented and to highlight the issue of 
addressing internal displacement in the four countries.
As public participation is vital, consultations should be held with communities and 
organizations and spaces for dialogue between State institutions and groups of displaced 
and at-risk people should be promoted. It is also imperative to organize awareness 
events with decision makers responsible for internal displacement and for assistance 
and protection pathways, as well as to build technical and operational capacity.
It is essential to develop strategies to prevent and address specific risks to women, 
children, transporters, traders and people at risk of being dispossessed of their 
land, as well as to formulate and implement a prevention and protection strategy in 
schools. Information systems to determine more accurately the number of persons 
internally displaced by violence and conflict or disasters should be designed and 
implemented and a confidential system for registering abandoned property and 
homes should be established.
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IV. COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT 
PLAN: A STRATEGIC PROPOSAL 
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A. General and specific objectives
Diagram IV.1 
General and specific objectives of the Comprehensive Development Plan
Create a sustainable development space across El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 
and south-southeast Mexico,a enhance well-being and make migration a choice rather than an obligation
Promote initiatives to improve economic performance, attract investment, increase trade, 
foster income generation and boost creation of decent, worthwhile work, first and foremost 
in the territories that are more predisposed to migration
Promote sustainability, resilience to climate change and comprehensive risk management, 
to mitigate the impact of climate change as a driver of migration
Guarantee the fundamental rights, care, protection, security and dignity of people throughout the 
migration cycle (origin, transit, destination and return), fostering safe, orderly and regular migration
Promote universal access to social rights and well-being for equality
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a South-southeast Mexico comprises the states of Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Quintana Roo, Oaxaca, Puebla, Tabasco, Veracruz and Yucatán.
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Map IV.1 














Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
B. Guiding principles
The guiding principles are criteria and definitions that organize the work and maintain 
consistency between the proposed objectives and the means for achieving them. In 
the event of conflict, they also provide elements for the correct interpretation of the 
proposals. Broadly speaking, the guiding principles provide the structure, method of 
operation and content of the proposals for action and their subsequent evaluation. 
The Comprehensive Development Plan’s strategy and actions are based on 13 guiding 
principles (see diagram IV.2).
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Diagram IV.2 
Guiding principles of the Comprehensive Development Plan for El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and south-southeast Mexico




Best interests of the child
Dialogue- and  
consensus-based 
decision-making

















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
C. Strategic pillars 
The Comprehensive Development Plan for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
south-southeast Mexico is divided into four strategic pillars agreed by the countries: 
(i) economic development; (ii) social well-being; (iii) environmental sustainability, 
climate change and adaptation, and disaster risk reduction; and (iv) comprehensive 
management of the migration cycle. Given their characteristics, the strategic pillars 
do not operate in isolation but, on the contrary, act as a sorting criterion to facilitate 
interconnectedness between pillars. In other words, each strategic pillar meets 
specific objectives and makes sense in itself but, given the Plan’s comprehensive 
nature, some strategic areas reinforce others and the proposed actions are interrelated 
(see diagram IV.3).
For this reason, two basic criteria were established for classifying the various 
recommendations, actions and projects under the strategic pillars: 
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 • Activities shall be assigned to the pillar where the most resources are concentrated.
 • Activities relating to the migration cycle management pillar pertain only to migrants 
who are in transit, awaiting asylum or have expressed the desire to return to their 
country of origin.
Diagram IV.3 




climate change adaptation, and 
disaster risk reduction
Comprehensive management 
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PILLARS
4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
For implementation of the Comprehensive Development Plan, the strategic pillars 
have been disaggregated into two levels: programmes and projects (see diagram IV.4).
Diagram IV.4 








Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Based on consultation with the countries, an analysis of the actions of the funds, 
programmes and specialized agencies of the United Nations system and the 
interventions of different national donors and multilateral and financial institutions in 
the four countries, a taxonomy has been developed that allows the strategic pillars to 
be linked with concrete projects, establishing programmes to coordinate the various 
actions associated with the Plan’s implementation (see table IV.1).
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Table IV.1 
Comprehensive Development Plan: strategic pillars and programmes
Strategic pillars Programmes
Economic development Enabling infrastructure 








Violence prevention and a culture of peace
Environmental sustainability, climate 
change and adaptation, and disaster 
risk reduction
Knowledge creation, data and tools for climate change adaptation and disaster risk
Resilience-building to prevent disaster displacement
Climate change and nature-based solutions




Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
In order to provide the realism that the Comprehensive Development Plan requires, 
ECLAC, in its role as coordinator of this initiative, has made an effort to gather 
and agree on a set of concrete project proposals. These are organized under the 
15 programmes of the four strategic pillars of the Plan. This process has involved 
the funds, programmes and specialized agencies of the United Nations system and 
the Governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, as well as the 
highest authorities of the states of south-southeast Mexico. These project proposals 
are a tool to visualize countries’ needs and priorities and to connect them to the 
mechanisms and actors that allow their financing and subsequent implementation. 
Financing may come from the restructuring of the public budget, loans secured from 
international banks or various sources of international cooperation. Furthermore, 
bearing in mind that it is not a complete and closed set, the 114 project proposals 
included in this document allow for the implementation of initiatives that give life to 
the Comprehensive Development Plan. In fact, some of the proposals are ongoing or 
soon to be implemented initiatives, which could easily be scaled up and expanded 
to provide greater coverage. The Comprehensive Development Plan is a framework 
that allows for the generation of synergies between the multiple initiatives that are 
currently being deployed in the subregion.
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1. Economic development pillar
Poor levels of development in the northern countries of Central America and 
south-southeast Mexico act as triggers for migration. This is evident when comparing 
these countries with some of their neighbours, such as Costa Rica or Panama, which 
have higher levels of human development and small migration flows. There is a close 
relationship between migration and unequal socioeconomic structures incapable of 
creating enough decent jobs and guaranteeing citizens’ individual and social security. 
Labour productivity in the United States is more than 10 times that of El Salvador, 
Guatemala or Honduras, and more than 4 times that of Mexico. Added to this is 
demand for low-cost, unskilled labour from the United States and other countries, 
which have legislation that inadvertently fosters illegal, disorderly and unsafe 
migration flows. In recent times, migration dynamics have been altered by tighter 
border containment measures, a situation that has been exacerbated by disruptive 
events, such as environmental disasters and high levels of violence.
If Governments fail to promote adequate levels of investment and decent job creation, 
people’s improved capacity as a result of social policies may lead to a greater propensity 
to migrate. A strong investment push is therefore needed to create large-scale decent 
work, while continuing to build workforce capacity. Synchronized social and economic 
policies encourage people to put down roots and they build confidence, turning 
migration into a choice rather than an obligation. If there is no big investment push 
and productivity and wage gaps are not closed, the pressure to migrate will continue.
Low productivity and insufficient decent job creation are also the result of a weak 
production structure. The production of goods and provision of services in rural areas of 
northern Central America and south-southeast Mexico, which are major migrant-sending 
countries, are low value added. Value chains have few linkages between segments 
and contain power asymmetries that give control (with the resulting appropriation 
of value) to traders and intermediaries, to the detriment of producers. Poor capacity, 
scarce financial resources for investment and innovation and infrastructure problems 
limit progress on quality and competitiveness.
To overcome these problems, the Comprehensive Development Plan includes an 
economic development pillar divided into five programmes, with their associated actions:
 • Enabling infrastructure 
 • Trade promotion and regional integration
 • Production development
 • Territorial development
 • Macroeconomics for development
(a) Enabling infrastructure development programme 
Infrastructure helps to enhance productivity and competitiveness through improvements 
in connectivity, energy sources, access to resources and markets and even human 
capital formation. Infrastructure also facilitates the provision of such services as 
health, education, housing, transport, sanitation, security, culture and sport.
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Infrastructure construction contributes to growth in gross domestic product (GDP) 
through its role as a multiplier in the use of basic inputs such steel, cement, finishing 
materials and equipment. Owing to its impact on job creation, it also contributes to 
growth in domestic demand by increasing consumption capacity.
Many social programmes resort to implementing small-scale infrastructure investment 
plans as a means of transferring resources rapidly to the most vulnerable sectors, 
using employment-intensive methodologies.
Infrastructure management and construction is a sensitive area of resource 
allocation. The large-scale resources involved and options for making them 
available, the risks of non-transparent practices in the definition of infrastructure 
projects and their characteristics, as well as in the award of contracts and in cost 
review and control, often place them at the centre of a public outcry. This can 
lead to reluctance by officials responsible for implementing projects, who end up 
obstructing investment processes for fear of being plunged into legal challenges 
and proceedings.
In northern Central America and south-southeast Mexico, the capability of States to 
provide enough of the good-quality public goods that are an intrinsic part of their 
people’s development and aspiration is poor. Fiscal weakness leads to low levels of 
public investment in both infrastructure and social services.
For the private sector to act as investor and help to close infrastructure gaps, it will 
be necessary to define a robust legal framework that provides conditions of security 
for both the investor and the States involved. This framework should incorporate 
best practices that discourage corruption and may be based on various forms of 
public-private partnership, co-financing or concessions to mobilize resources from 
private investors, sovereign wealth funds and investment funds.
The Comprehensive Development Plan highlights the need to undertake large-scale 
infrastructure projects and reduce energy costs to support the integration of countries 
and territories, strengthening local economies, securing food supplies and reversing 
environmental damage. Over the past decade, infrastructure investment in northern 
Central America and south-southeast Mexico has focused on transport and energy. In 
the transport sector, the little investment made has been concentrated in major road 
corridors, ports and airports, which has contributed to gradually eroding the coverage 
and quality of secondary roads, country roads and bridges: all infrastructure that is 
essential to social connectivity and economic development.
The objective of the enabling infrastructure development programme is to create 
conditions for development in territories with high levels of poverty and unemployment 
stemming from lack of infrastructure, in order to increase social cohesion and 
lessen the factors inducing people to leave their place of origin. The distinctive 
economic, social and geographical characteristics of the remotest areas mean that 
their populations have little access to markets and services (health, education 
and sanitation).
To advance the programme, ongoing actions that could contribute to its implementation 
need to be taken into account: (i) Central American Regional Framework Policy on 
Mobility and Logistics, approved by the Heads of State and Government of Belize, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
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Panama in December 2017; (ii) national road maintenance programmes in Guatemala, 
El Salvador, Honduras and Mexico; and (iii) recommendations by the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on human rights and infrastructure.
To develop actions at regional, national and territorial levels, the programme is divided 
into three subprogrammes:
 • Transport infrastructure to: create the conditions for the coordination of large 
investments in regional transport infrastructure (co-modal corridor); promote 
road, rail and port infrastructure projects in accordance with national priorities; 
and support initiatives for the development of logistics infrastructure in specific 
territories, such as the isthmus of Tehuantepec in Mexico and the Plan for the 
Pacific in El Salvador.
 • Energy infrastructure to create the conditions for investment in production 
development and a transition towards renewable energy sources, regulatory 
convergence and the subregional interconnection of these infrastructure projects.
 • Safe drinking water and sanitation infrastructure required to improve the coverage 
and quality of essential services.
Diagram IV.5 
Enabling infrastructure development programme
Modernization and improvement 
of the safe drinking water and 
sanitation service
Infrastructure for supplying 




Co-modal logistics corridors for 
integration and development





Plan for the Pacific, El Salvador
Transport and
logistics infrastructure
Connection between Mexico and the 
Electricity Interconnection System 
for the Countries of Central America 
(SIEPAC) and second SIEPAC circuit
Gas pipeline between Mexico and the 
northern countries of Central America
Energy infrastructure
Universal access to electricity from 
renewable energy sources in 
northern Central America and 
south-southeast Mexico
Strategic investments for the 
energy sector
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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Table IV.2 
Enabling infrastructure development programme
1. Actions 2. Impacts
 • Connect the Electricity Interconnection 
System for the Countries of 
Central America (SIEPAC) with Mexico 
 • Diversify the supply of hydrocarbons 
for the northern countries of 
Central America by means of a gas 
pipeline with Mexico
 • Develop logistics corridors that create 
an expanded logistics market 
 • Provide universal access to modern 
electricity services
 • Create job opportunities and access 
to better road infrastructure
 • Expand access to basic services
 • Improved safety, continuity and competitiveness of electric power supply, with 
1,800 kilometres of works for the second SIEPAC circuit and 225 kilometres for 
the interconnection between Mexico and SIEPAC 
 • Introduction of natural gas to the northern countries of Central America and 
creation of 6,000 direct jobs during the construction phase and 20,000 direct 
and indirect jobs in the long term
 • 30% reduction in logistics costs in subregional trade and 25% reduction in 
road accidents
 • Solar panels installed in 200,000 homes and 10,000 schools and health centres
 • 10 terawatt-hours of electricity generated annually and 4 million annual tonnes 
of carbon dioxide equivalent avoided
 • Improved access and connections in 50% of inland settlements
 • New road infrastructure in prioritized territories
3. Programme project proposals
1.1 Connection between Mexico and the Electricity Interconnection System for the Countries of Central America (SIEPAC) 
and second SIEPAC circuit
1.2 Gas pipeline between Mexico and the northern countries of Central America
1.3 Co-modal logistics corridors for integration and development
1.4 Universal access to electricity from renewable energy sources in northern Central America and the states  
of south-southeast Mexico
1.5 Plan for the Pacific, El Salvador
1.6 North-south rail connection, Guatemala
1.7 Development of rural roads, Guatemala
1.8 Modernization and improvement of the safe drinking water and sanitation service, Honduras
1.9 Road logistics infrastructure, Honduras
1.10 Strategic investments for the energy subsector, Honduras
1.11 Development of the isthmus of Tehuantepec: multimodal interoceanic corridor, Mexico
1.12 Infrastructure of autonomous solar water-pumping systems in rural communities, state of Campeche
1.13 Reconstruction of interregional feeder roads, state of Chiapas
1.14 Modernization and expansion of Chiapas Port, state of Chiapas
1.15 Highway between Acapulco International Airport and the new Pacific tourist development, state of Guerrero
1.16 Rehabilitation of the market area in Oaxaca’s ‘Central de Abastos’ wholesale market (Margarita Maza de Juárez 
market), state of Oaxaca
1.17 Highway to the Papaloapan basin and bypass in the city of Tuxtepec, state of Oaxaca
1.18 Access road to the new port of Frontera, state of Tabasco
1.19 Industrial and logistical infrastructure for trade with Central America, state of Tabasco
1.20 Alvarado multimodal cabotage terminal, state of Veracruz
1.21 Distributed power generation project, state of Yucatán
1.22 Improved connectivity and mobility conditions in the municipalities lagging furthest behind, state of Yucatán
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Note: Projects 1.5 onwards (in bold) are projects prioritized by the Governments of the Northern Central 
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(b) Trade promotion and regional integration programme
Much of the trade between the northern countries of Central America, and between 
them and Mexico, is exempt from tariffs but is subject to non-tariff barriers at border 
crossings. There are regulatory and logistical constraints, as well as administrative 
practices, which hamper and drive up the cost of trade between the three countries 
and Mexico and hinder the creation of regional production chains. This is all the more 
serious because most of the goods exported to Mexico by the northern countries of 
Central America come from rural areas, which are responsible for sending the largest 
number of migrants.
Despite their geographic proximity, Mexico’s trade with northern countries of Central America 
accounts for a small proportion of its total trade and is skewed in Mexico’s favour. 
Trade facilitation measures could increase productivity and competitiveness with 
actions that allow goods and services to move safely and efficiently. A reduction in 
trade-related costs through border measures would come from harmonizing and 
simplifying documents and from automating customs procedures. It is important 
to advance the harmonization and mutual recognition of animal and plant health 
standards to limit room for discretion, which creates unnecessary barriers to trade, 
especially for agricultural products. Actions to advance institutional arrangements 
and foster cooperation on trade facilitation and the movement of people would 
therefore deepen production integration between El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 
and Mexico. The proposals contained in this programme mutually reinforce those in 
the production development programme, which seek to promote linkages between 
the four countries (see section c).
Table IV.3 
Trade promotion and regional integration programme
1. Actions 2. Impacts
 • Harmonize institutional arrangements and 
facilitate movement between the northern 
countries of Central America and Mexico
 • Promote the harmonization and mutual 
recognition of skills, requirements and 
procedures in animal and plant 
health matters
 • Increased trade between the northern countries of Central America and Mexico
 • 50% reduction in time and costs associated with customs procedures 
in the subregion
 • 15% increase in Central American exports of products listed as sensitive
 • Increased trade between the northern countries of Central America and Mexico
3. Programme project proposals
1.23 Trade facilitation between Mexico and the northern countries of Central America
1.24 Harmonization of standards and reduction of technical barriers to trade: equalizing capabilities between countries
1.25 Deepening trade and production linkages through the Customs Union between El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 
and Mexico, Hondurasa
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a Project prioritized by the Governments of the Northern Central American countries, the Government of 
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c) Production development programme
The production development programme fosters progressive structural change, namely 
greater diversification and technology intensity in the creation of value added and 
employment, to increase productivity, social inclusion and environmental sustainability. 
The programme’s initiatives seek to: coordinate government support for small producers 
and increase partnering between them; facilitate the participation of all stakeholders 
in policy-making and implementation; broaden access to new markets; improve the 
technological performance of the production structure; promote innovation; and 
increase climate change resilience and adaptation.
The forces driving migration are magnified in rural areas: low productivity, lower 
wages, precarious social security, scarce and weak enabling infrastructure, higher risk 
of agroclimatic disasters and catastrophic events, lack of risk transfer mechanisms 
and new forms of personal insecurity. In situations of extreme poverty, some of the 
population resorts to the illegal economy and organized crime to finance the cost of 
migration, making migrants and their families vulnerable and at risk of exploitation. 
At the same time, the mass exodus of young people accelerates population ageing.
To overcome the low-growth trap, public policies in such areas as production 
development, macroeconomics, social development and the environment need to be 
integrated and coordinated. Industrial or production development policy (of special 
importance for the objectives of the production development programme) entails the 
implementation, by certain State institutions and economic actors, of instruments 
to: boost production, processing or service activities; increase production integration 
and complementarity; and incorporate growing technology intensity and knowledge 
into production processes. It includes such instruments as innovation promotion, 
investment in education and skill-building, export promotion, support for micro-, small 
and medium-sized enterprises and the promotion of competitiveness. It ranges from 
policies targeting infant industries and promoting innovation to trade and regulatory 
policies to create the legal and economic framework for companies to operate.
This programme focuses on production development policies, organized around two 
subprogrammes (see diagram IV.6).
























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
(i) Strengthening value chains
Value chains are strengthened by linking their segments, incorporating new actors 
and through economic and social upgrading. Economic upgrading means pivoting 
production patterns in segments of the chain, and in the chain as a whole, towards 
better products and services, superior production processes or higher value-added, 
more knowledge-intensive activities. Social upgrading enables actors in the chain and 
their communities to improve their standard of living based on employment conditions 
that include social protection, labour rights and a safe working environment, especially 
for young people and women.
The United Nations system, in particular the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), has designed a number of methodologies for strengthening 
national and regional value chains. A systemic approach has been adopted, which 
incorporates not only the segments in the chain but also the public and private actors 
that regulate or support its activities (government agencies, universities, service 
providers, business chambers or research centres). A core component is dialogue 
between public and private actors in advisory boards to discuss diagnoses and 
proposals. This serves to enrich the analysis, establish or reinforce commitments 
between members of the chain, foster the formulation of innovative strategies, 
facilitate agreements and increase decision-making transparency.
The objective of this subprogramme is to formulate and implement strategies for 
social and economic upgrading in selected value chains. The activities are divided 
into three areas: (i) strengthening rural value chains, where United Nations system 
activities in northern Central America and Mexico have led to the identification of 
opportunities in the aquaculture, coffee, agro-industry and rural tourism value chains; 
(ii) strengthening value chains for export-oriented manufacturing and services; and 
(iii) promoting regional value chains to enhance regional integration, leveraging 
economies of scale and complementarity between countries.
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This subprogramme has cross-cutting elements. First, the strengthening of each value 
chain must include climate change adaptation and mitigation actions. Second, the 
strategies will include the operation of a support fund (trade promotion, technology, 
and business cluster consolidation and integration) to finance implementation of the 
strategies. The strategies also provide for promoting the productive investment of 
family remittances, with a view to the economic upgrading of value chains in migrants’ 
countries of origin and in their principal country of destination, the United States.
(ii) Generation and use of new technology
In Mexico and northern Central America, there is recognition of the importance of 
science, technology and innovation to increase economic growth rates and advance 
progressive structural change. However, research and development spending as a 
percentage of GDP remains very low, having remained largely unchanged over the past 
15 years. Other indicators, such as the number of graduates, science and technology 
researchers and patent applications, also show significant lags.
Countries in the subregion face challenges in terms of connectivity, especially 
Internet access. The incorporation of digital technologies into the production and 
service sectors is also extremely limited. Digitization could have a greater impact on 
improving education, health, gender equality and political transparency, ultimately 
improving quality of life.
This under-resourcing of science, technology and innovation is set against an 
international backdrop of increasing segmentation of markets and value chains, amid 
a technological revolution. This creates opportunities for, and justifies, cross-border 
policies and initiatives, especially given the need to design and implement strategies 
requiring large investments. The states of south-southeast Mexico and the northern 
countries of Central America share a similar pattern of production specialization 
in which agricultural, agro-industrial and energy activities are extremely important. 
While there are research centres in these areas with similar lines of work, there are 
few or no linkages between them, missing an opportunity to enhance their activities, 
improve their performance and achieve economies of scale.
The objective of this subprogramme is to promote the generation and use of new 
technology, as well as to enhance innovative activities, with a view to increasing 
productivity, stimulating economic growth and improving quality of life. The activities 
seek to boost innovation systems and integration between northern Central America 
and Mexico in science, technology and innovation for the implementation of regional 
initiatives to address common challenges. The actions include the creation of a 
regional fund for science, technology and innovation to support regional initiatives, 
in particular financing regional basic or applied research groups, regional innovation 
consortia, academic exchanges and infrastructure sharing.
Another objective is to formulate a cooperation agenda that increases digital inclusion 
in order to enhance the economic and social impact of the adoption and use of these 
technologies. This would entail implementing: strategies for broadband expansion and 
digital inclusion in rural and peri-urban areas; electronic commerce programmes for 
micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises by means of capacity-building, research, 
innovative solutions, partnership structures, associations and the incorporation of 
digital tools; and systems to support the creative industries through finance, partnering 
programmes and technical assistance for entrepreneurs.
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Table IV.4 
Production development programme
1. Actions 2. Impacts
 • Strengthen rural value chains for goods and services with a 
view to increasing producers’ value added and incomes
 • Establish integrated community development models around 
tourism and the conservation of natural, historical and 
cultural resources
 • Strengthen export-oriented manufacturing and services 
value chains
 • Establish regional value chains
 • Develop a cooperation agenda that increases digital inclusion
 • Strengthen innovation systems and integration in science, 
technology and innovation
 • Better quality of life for agricultural producers  
in the subregion:
 - Increased productivity of 50,000 coffee producers
 • Creation of a support fund to benefit 20 value chains
 • Incorporation of 600,000 new Internet users and 
2,000 companies benefit from support programmes
 • Ten cross-border science, technology and innovation projects
 - 20% increase in the profits of participating 
small and medium enterprises
 - One patent and three scientific publications per project
3. Programme project proposals
1.26 Strengthening rural value chains and creation of a support fund in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico
1.27 Strengthening the coffee chain and the production systems of small coffee producers in northern Central America 
and south-southeast Mexico
1.28 Digital cooperation agenda between Mexico and northern Central America
1.29 Towards a regional innovation system in northern Central America and Mexico: integration in science, technology 
and innovation
1.30 Promotion of diaspora investment in El Salvador, El Salvador
1.31 ‘Walls of prosperity’ plan: Guatemala-Mexico, Guatemala-Honduras and Guatemala-El Salvador cross-border 
development, Guatemala
1.32 ‘Sello blanco’ white quality label for local products, Guatemala
1.33 Strengthening value chains to upgrade micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises, Guatemala
1.34 Development of value chains that boost and create opportunities in the territories, Honduras
1.35 Improving logistics performance, competitiveness and regional economic integration, Honduras
1.36 Maya Ka’an project: community development with tourism and conservation of natural, historical and cultural 
resources, state of Quintana Roo
1.37 Establishment of a juicing microenterprise in the northern region, state of Veracruz
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Note: Projects 1.30 onwards (in bold) are projects prioritized by the Governments of the Northern Central 
American countries, the Government of Mexico, or the states of South-Southeast Mexico.
(d) Territorial development programme
This programme helps to create conditions for development in rural territories with 
high levels of poverty, food and nutrition insecurity and environmental vulnerability. 
These territories are linked closely with intermediate cities, which play a key role as 
service providers and market opportunities. Fostering this link between urban and rural 
areas is vital to mitigating or eliminating the factors that lead people to leave their 
place of origin, thereby reducing irregular, disorderly and unsafe migration. In dialogue 
with national Governments, a number of priority territories have been identified where 
the main factors driving high migration flows are concentrated:
 • South-southeast Mexico, where a rural and smallholder-farming population 
predominates, with an economy based on maize, beans and other products for 
home consumption in which production conditions must be improved. The Mexican 
Government has prioritized these territories, which are home to indigenous peoples 
with ancient cultures, to benefit from a large share of its public programmes. The 
Budget
US$ 1.54 billion 
Duration
5 years
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authorities of these states submitted projects to the Federal Government and the 
United Nations system, which have been incorporated into the Comprehensive 
Development Plan.
 • The northern border of Guatemala is another strategic area that plays a critical role 
in migration. This area has been prioritized by the Guatemalan Government, which 
is seeking to create “Walls of prosperity”, based on a local economic development 
policy focused on job creation and the promotion of micro-, small and medium-sized 
enterprises and small family farming production units (see section c).
 • The tri-national Trifinio region, shared by El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, 
which has high biodiversity and a large number of smallholder and indigenous 
farmers, where a development strategy is being implemented that must be boosted 
by the Comprehensive Development Plan.
 • Guatemala’s Atlantic and Pacific coasts, where linkages could be created between tour 
operators and food and service providers in its budding tourism sector. Something 
similar could be done in coastal areas of south-southeast Mexico, El Salvador and 
Honduras, where it is feasible to establish biological corridors, natural parks and 
biodiversity management mechanisms in a virtuous circle involving tourism, the 
environment, agricultural development, rural development and the consolidation 
of urban small and medium-sized enterprises.
 • Urban areas in the municipality of Tapachula and in the isthmus of Tehuantepec 
region, in southern Mexico, which are subject to strong pressure from the flow 
of migrants and have a large floating population. Municipal, state and national 
authorities, together with the United Nations system (United Nations Human 
Settlements Programme, United Nations Development Programme and other 
agencies), are seeking to implement an urban development programme by 
applying the concept of integrated urban operations, which deploy territorial 
strategies at the local level. The aim is to construct a model of planning and social 
intervention that can be applied to other intermediate cities in the subregion 
and that complements the rural approach of ministries of agriculture and other 
development ministries or agencies.
ECLAC and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) have 
identified further territories that could be prioritized by national Governments.1 The 
Comprehensive Development Plan proposes to choose some 40 priority territories on 
which to focus a strategy of social and productive inclusion that creates opportunities 
and thereby improves economic and labour force inclusion and the living conditions 
of individuals and their families. The challenge is to highlight the production potential 
of each territory that would complement approaches focused on immediate results 
and purely aid-oriented approaches (which are also essential).
The programme strategy comprises five elements: (i) urban-rural linkages approach 
to territorial development; (ii) vision of comprehensive territorial development and 
habitat to enhance links and complementarities between urban and rural realities; 
(iii) strengthening spaces for participation and local governance; (iv) creating spaces 
 
1 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “Ruralidad, hambre y pobreza 
en América Latina y el Caribe”, Project Documents (LC/TS.2018/119), Santiago, 2018.
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and tools for broadening and deepening multi-stakeholder, multilevel dialogue and 
collaboration; and (v) generating public goods and support for the productive and 
social inclusion of vulnerable populations.
The aim and focus of this programme are based on the experiences and lessons 
learned by Governments, civil society and funds, programmes and specialized agencies 
of the United Nations system, and are connected with ongoing national and local 
strategies, which are key to the successful implementation of this component of the 
Comprehensive Development Plan.
The actions and investments of the territorial development programme will be carried 
out under the leadership of each Government, together with stakeholders in each of 
the rural territories. These actions will focus primarily on 40 territories: half the actions 
will be deployed in northern Central America and the other half in south-southeast 
Mexico.2 In these territories, the interventions will take place at territorial, partnership 
and individual levels. At the individual level, coverage of 400,000 farms (production 
units) is planned: 200,000 in northern Central America and 200,000 in south-southeast 
Mexico. This will be supported by a number of actions, including a single investment 
fund. In northern Central America, these farmers account for 13.3% of the total universe 
(1.5 million production units), while in south-southeast Mexico they account for 8% 
of the total (2.6 million production units). Added to these family farmers is a large 
percentage of households without access to land. The programme therefore supports 
a wide range of activities apart from agriculture, which will be promoted through the 
policy guidelines of the Comprehensive Development Plan, especially those relating 
to production chains.3 After selecting the territories for each of the programme’s 
interventions, a working model will be implemented to ensure that final beneficiaries 
are targeted, prioritizing the most vulnerable and food-insecure segments.
The programme is organized into six subprogrammes (see diagram IV.7):
 • Strengthening territorial institutions and participation
 • Local markets
 • Productive investment in lagging territories
 • Entrepreneurship by rural young people and women and by indigenous peoples 
 • Basic services for rural households and territories
 • Development of intermediate cities
Alongside these actions targeted at rural territories, macrosector actions will be 
implemented to create conditions for boosting production chains and clusters 
in such areas as agriculture, industry, agro-industry, tourism, rural services and 
environmental services.
2 As the precise number of territories and their specific selection will be decided jointly with each 
Government’s authorities, the figure of 40 territories is only a guide.
3 See section c) concerning the production development programme.










































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Table IV.5 
Territorial development programme
1. Actions 2. Impacts
 • Strengthen institutions and the 
participation of local communities
 • Stimulate local demand: markets and 
public procurement of food
 • Create a single investment fund for 
production development, innovation 
and entrepreneurship
 • Support rural entrepreneurs: young people, 
women and indigenous peoples
 • Provide basic services for households
 • Develop intermediate cities to enhance 
links between rural and urban areas
 • Opportunities and economic stability for 400,000 production units 
(farming families):
 - Increased productivity, increased production for home consumption and sale
 - Higher incomes: 160,000 indigenous farmers, 150,000 rural women  
and 100,000 young people
 - New irrigation systems: 20,000 production units and 60,000 hectares
 - Linkage between local and regional markets: 120,000 producers 
 • Quality of life in 40 territories:
 - 35% improvement in secondary and tertiary roads
 - Solar power: 200,000 families
 - Safe drinking water: 40,000 households
 - Urban planning and development in intermediate cities
3. Programme project proposals
1.38 Strengthening territorial institutions and participation 
1.39 Local markets and public procurement of food
1.40 Basic investment for production development, innovation and entrepreneurship: single investment fund 
1.41 Entrepreneurship: young people, women and indigenous peoples
1.42 Basic services for rural households and territories 
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3. Programme project proposals
1.44 Territorial development of the Trifinio region, El Salvador
1.45 Surf City El Salvador: holistic tourism development programme in the maritime and coastal area, El Salvador
1.46 Territorial economic development in Guatemala, Guatemala
1.47 Strengthening of the tourism sector in Guatemala, Guatemala
1.48 Comprehensive territorial development in the Dry Corridor of Honduras, Honduras
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Note: Projects 1.44 onwards (in bold) are projects prioritized by the Governments of the Northern Central 
American countries, the Government of Mexico, or the states of South-Southeast Mexico.
(e) Macroeconomics for development programme
Even though macroeconomic (fiscal, monetary and macroprudential) policies affect 
economic growth, production sector dynamism, social well-being and environmental 
sustainability, macroeconomic policies in northern Central America and Mexico are 
not organized around a strategy of long-term economic growth and development.
A sustained increase in investment and productivity is essential to achieving progressive 
structural change (one that increases the diversification and technology intensity of 
the production apparatus), which calls for stability and predictability. Macroeconomic 
policy plays a key role in this by minimizing the amplitude and frequency of business 
cycles and helping to sustain investment and productivity growth at levels conducive 
to the continuous expansion and use of productive capacity. Macroeconomics for 
development must: expand the countercyclical and long-term growth role of fiscal 
policy; redesign the institutional context in monetary, exchange and credit terms; and 
strengthen macroprudential policy.
In a slowdown or recession, the most important autonomous component of a 
countercyclical fiscal policy is public investment, which not only influences the 
business cycle but also brings about positive medium- and long-term effects. Public 
investment spending must therefore be protected and prevented from being used 
as an adjustment variable in the downward phase of the cycle.
As private credit is markedly procyclical, especially in contraction phases, monetary 
authorities should not only monitor inflation but also pay attention to the dynamics of 
the financial cycle, its relationship with the level of activity, and other macroeconomic 
variables such as the exchange rate.
Tax collection rates are particularly low in all four countries, especially Guatemala and 
Mexico. Stronger public finances and debt sustainability are prerequisites for them to 
boost their economic growth and lay the foundations for further long-term development.
Fiscal policy needs to support growth and facilitate public budgets with more space 
for social investment, infrastructure deployment, maintenance and recovery, and the 
expansion of universal social protection. Tax reform is therefore needed urgently to 
combat tax evasion, avoidance and privileges and increase collection rates significantly. 
On the public spending side, efforts should be stepped up to improve progressivity and 
quality and to ensure greater flexibility in the execution of public spending. Renewed 
Table IV.5 (concluded)
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fiscal covenants, monitored closely by civil society, can improve control over public 
spending, ensure greater efficiency and transparency and reduce corruption. However, 
while high and sustained levels of remittances have positive effects on the economies 
of northern countries of Central America and Mexico, they also create macroeconomic 
problems, such real exchange rate appreciation, consumer price rises and higher 
imports. Conversely, if incentives are given and recipients’ capacities are built, it is 
possible to trigger changes in the production structure, by investing in value chains 
in rural territories, for example.
In the initial phase, the macroeconomics for development programme provides for: 
preparing country-specific studies, which will serve as the basis for designing and 
implementing new fiscal strategies; formulating strategies to coordinate macroeconomic 
policy with policies for production development, social well-being and environmental 
sustainability; boosting interagency coordination by means of ad hoc technical 
committees; and designing new fiscal strategies for the collection and efficient use 
of public revenues. This would help to: improve understanding of the tools at the 
disposal of northern countries of Central America and Mexico to boost their economic 
development; coordinate public policies to comply with the Sustainable Development 
Goals; build tax collection capacity; and enhance understanding of instruments for 
increasing efficiency and flexibility in the execution of public spending.
The ministries responsible for public finances should establish a work strategy and 
dialogue mechanism for conducting studies and formulating policies. This strategy 
should be tailored to each country’s distinctive characteristics.
Table IV.6 
Macroeconomics for development programme
1. Actions 2. Impacts
 • Formulate strategies to coordinate macroeconomic policies
 • Boost interagency coordination
 • Design new fiscal strategies for the collection and efficient use 
of public revenues
 • Deepen the integration of financial systems
 • Establishment of a technical committee for public 
policy coordination
 • Integrated financial programming in each country
 • Adoption of a fiscal strategy for revenue collection and 
spending in northern Central America and Mexico
2. Programme project proposals
1.49 Identification of fiscal and financial spaces for compliance with the Comprehensive Development Plan 
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2. Social well-being pillar
For migration in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico to be a voluntary 
decision and not one imposed by an array of deprivations and lack of alternatives, it 
is essential to improve people’s living conditions significantly, especially in territories 
highly predisposed to migration. Indeed, enhancing the well-being and quality of life 
of these populations is an end in itself and a public duty, even though, at different 
times, it may be reflected in changing migration patterns.
As the policy proposals grouped into programmes under the social well-being pillar 
were conceived as an integral part of interventions for achieving the goals of the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in the northern countries of Central America 
and the states of south-southeast Mexico, they are aligned with the Regional Agenda 
for Inclusive Social Development agreed by the countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean.4
The proposals under this pillar are presented as a unique opportunity to facilitate 
achievement of the social targets in the Sustainable Development Goals in countries 
with common issues, including migration, poverty, vulnerability and inequality, informal 
employment, child undernutrition and food insecurity, low educational attainment, 
poor quality education (including lack of access to comprehensive sexuality education), 
limited access to quality health services within a context of epidemiological transition 
and high child and teenage pregnancy rates, as well as high rates of violence and 
femicide. All these issues stand in the way of progress on well-being and make it 
difficult to achieve social and labour market inclusion without leaving anyone behind. 
To move forward on these issues and take advantage of the window of opportunity that 
has opened up to these countries, particularly in view of the potential demographic 
dividend, it is not enough just to expand the coverage of services: there also needs to 
be a focus on policy areas that foster synergies, both within each pillar and between 
the different pillars of the Comprehensive Development Plan, in order to generate 
sustainable impacts. The cost of not doing so is high and the consequences could 
be irreversible.
The social well-being pillar has been conceptualized as a coordinated system of public 
policies for addressing core components of development relating to social and labour 
market inclusion in the countries and for making steady progress in: eradicating all 
forms of poverty and eliminating violence (as major causes of migration); ensuring 
universal social and cultural rights; lessening deprivation; and increasing participation 
and social cohesion, while tackling the challenges of inequality and discrimination 
from an intercultural perspective.
4 On 3 October 2019, the participants in the third session of the Regional Conference on Social 
Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, held in Mexico City, adopted the Regional Agenda 
for Inclusive Social Development as “a technical and political instrument that will enable progress 
towards the implementation of the social dimension of sustainable development and the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development,” and so contribute to eradicating poverty and achieving higher levels of 
equality and well-being in Latin America and the Caribbean.
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In pursuit of the objectives to address the situation in the northern countries of 
Central America and the states of south-southeast Mexico, six public policy programmes 
have been prioritized, which contribute to achieving social and labour market inclusion 
and universal social protection coverage by coordinating joint actions and proposals 
from the different areas. These programmes focus on the following aspects:
 • Social and labour market inclusion
 • Life skills
 • Comprehensive child development
 • Lifelong health
 • Violence prevention and culture of peace
Each programme comprises several elements, which in turn translate into sectoral 
policy actions in the areas of work, health, education, culture, social protection and 
human security, institutional capacity-building and leveraging opportunities for 
regional integration and technological change. To reflect the holistic approach of the 
Comprehensive Development Plan, the programmes in the social well-being pillar 
interact with one another and with programmes in the Plan’s other pillars. In addition, 
each programme prioritizes certain populations owing to their specificity and needs.
Implementation of the proposed policies will help to improve key indicators on 
decent work, malnutrition, health, education, culture, social protection, violence and 
social cohesion.
The social well-being pillar is not intended to cover all areas of social policy in the 
northern countries of Central America and the states of south-southeast Mexico 
but rather to focus on what are seen as key areas for inclusive development. These, 
coordinated with existing policies and actions, will enable progress to be made in 
multiple dimensions that are important to sustainable development.
While efforts under the Comprehensive Development Plan are a significant boost, 
they are not enough in themselves to achieve sustained levels of social well-being. 
They need to be complemented by long-term country policies, which will require a 
major update in terms of taxation, financing, investment and institutions, with a legal 
basis suited to needs and to organizational and management models. Each country’s 
public policies, in such areas as work, education, health and housing, play a key role in 
making the Plan’s achievements viable and sustainable. For the social well-being pillar, 
it is particularly important for countries to move towards universal social protection 
systems, without which there is a risk of failing to achieve the desired outcomes in 
terms of a significant improvement in everyone’s standard of living.
Diagram IV.8 shows a summary list of the main policy areas included in each programme.



































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Given their multidimensional nature, the proposals may relate to more than one 
programme in the social well-being pillar. The different project proposals are described 
for each programme and, at the end of each section, there is a table summarizing 
each proposal’s involvement in the various programmes.
(a) Social and labour market inclusion programme
Decent, productive, high-quality employment is vital not only for individuals and their 
families to earn the income required to maintain an adequate standard of living but 
also for achieving sustainable economic development. It is also key to reducing poverty 
and inequality and promoting well-being and social inclusion. Only one in every four 
Latin American households is in a situation of dual (social and labour market) inclusion 
and there are wide disparities, which impact most heavily on rural households headed 
by an indigenous or Afrodescendent person or a person with disabilities.
Labour markets in Latin America and the Caribbean, in general, and those in the 
countries involved in the Comprehensive Development Plan, in particular, are 
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characterized by high levels of informality and large gaps in job quality, limited access 
to social protection and low labour income, with even wider disparities in the case 
of women. This includes lack of social security, leading to lack of health insurance 
and pensions, unregulated employment contracts and working hours unprotected 
by labour inspection, lack of unemployment and occupational accident and disease 
insurance, and low maternity and paternity protection coverage.
One of the least protected forms of labour force participation is unskilled own-account 
work, which is a very important source of job and income creation in the region’s 
labour markets, especially for women and young people. Unpaid family workers and 
a significant proportion of wage workers, including those in domestic service, are 
also excluded from social protection. Changes in the world of work, coupled with 
the technological revolution, may drive up still further the proportion of employed 
persons in a situation of insecurity. While the current rapid and intense changes are 
creating production processes and markets that offer new opportunities, they also 
pose risks to the world of work.
Although the future of work is linked to the technological revolution, it also depends 
on new value chain configurations, demographic trends and the urgent transition to 
environmentally sustainable economies. The net result will depend on macroeconomic 
dynamics and forms of work organization, as well as on political and institutional 
factors that make investment in skills and instruments for matching supply and 
demand for labour crucial.
In order to ensure that the generations to come acquire the skills and competencies 
required for the future labour market, measures must be taken to improve the quality 
and relevance of education, prevent early school leaving and act in concert to achieve 
a balance in education between opportunities and outcomes. At the same time, 
opportunities for lifelong learning should be boosted, given the need to acquire new 
competencies that are useful in addressing the changes. This makes it essential to 
improve and strengthen the system of education and technical and vocational training 
to adapt it to an increasingly complex world where lifelong learning skills will need 
to be enhanced (in coordination with private enterprise and public institutions) and 
where education must prepare everyone for citizenship, democracy and the demands 
of the new labour market.
Key to furthering social and labour market inclusion is the ability to thrive in the 
digital age, which requires important transversal competences to adapt to a changing 
world, such as critical thinking, problem solving and creativity and, in particular, 
social-emotional skills, including self-confidence, collaboration and persuasion, and 
leadership and management skills. It is also vital to have the tools for people to learn 
and unlearn continually.
To boost countries’ productivity and capabilities, with increasing levels of inclusion 
and sharing in the benefits of development and the exercise of rights, progress is 
needed in social inclusion and labour market inclusion simultaneously.
This programme seeks to implement labour and productive policies for improving both 
the supply and demand for labour, in order to increase labour market inclusion and 
close existing gaps in the labour market. This makes labour and productive inclusion 
policies, together with financial inclusion and strategies for the formalization of wage 
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work and own-account work, key to reducing inequalities in a range of areas, from 
education and technical and vocational training, to access to credit, entrepreneurship 
opportunities and contributory social protection for groups facing the greatest barriers, 
to help fulfil the pledge in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development that no 
one will be left behind.5
This component of the social well-being pillar focuses on the disparities in labour 
market inclusion faced by young people, women, adults from households with a 
low socioeconomic status, migrants, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples 
and Afrodescendent populations. The programme also seeks to boost the process 
of transition from education and training to the labour market, in line with projected 
demand for workers with a range of different skills. To address the need for social and 
labour market inclusion, two programmes by the Mexican Agency for International 
Development Cooperation (“Sowing Life”6 and “Youth Building the Future”) have begun 
to be implemented in the three northern Central American countries.
It is not enough merely to facilitate access to work: there is also a need to foster 
decent, well-paid, productive, quality employment, in conditions of freedom, equity, 
safety and human dignity. This means reinforcing labour institutions to expand the 
formalization of employment, adapt labour codes and social security systems to 
the new realities and ensure labour regulation and inspection bodies that guarantee 
workers’ rights. It is also important to guarantee freedom of association and strengthen 
collective bargaining.
This component of the social well-being pillar requires interconnected policies in a 
variety of fields, especially work, education, social protection, production development 
and health. It also relies directly on the investment and economic development 
initiatives in the economic development pillar, as it depends on these initiatives 
producing growth in demand for labour.
In terms of desired outcomes, the social and labour market inclusion programme 
seeks to make significant progress in reducing the unemployment rate, raising the 
income of workers (particularly those living in poverty and socioeconomic vulnerability), 
lessening informal employment and expanding social protection coverage, as well 
as increasing productivity rates. This should result in better functional distribution of 
income and a sustained reduction in poverty.
5 See United Nations, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), 
2015 [online] https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/70/1.
6 See proposal 3.16 of the environmental sustainability, climate change and adaptation and disaster 
risk reduction pillar.
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Table IV.7 
Social and labour market inclusion programme
1. Actions 2. Impact
 • Provide training and promote the employment of young people at risk
 • Assist in setting up productive enterprises and provide the relevant training
 • Increase the coverage of secondary education and the development of relevant 
skills for life and work
 • Implement reforms to reduce informality in companies and employment
 • Improve labour intermediation systems
 • Support indigenous and Afrodescendent women and young people to reduce 
inequality gaps and conditions of exclusion
 • Carry out institutional reforms to improve social protection coverage 
 • Implement the Child Labour Risk Identification Model
 • Generate reliable and comparable information on living and employment conditions
 • Improved conditions of training and 
access to employment for young people
 • Reduction in opportunity gaps for 
indigenous and Afrodescendent women 
and young people
 • Increased average years of schooling
 • Reduced levels of informality in 
companies and employment
 • Increase in workers’ income
 • Improved social protection coverage
 • Reduction in child labour
3. Programme project proposals
2.1 Sustainable employment for young people at social risk in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras and the states 
of south-southeast Mexico
2.2 Youth employment with a gender perspective
2.3 Building equality: leadership and empowerment of indigenous, Afrodescendent and Garífuna women in northern 
Central America and south-southeast Mexico 
2.4 Closing inequality gaps for indigenous peoples
2.5 Comprehensive strategies for formalizing companies and employment in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 
and south-southeast Mexico 
2.6 Training for the future workplace
2.7 Non-contributory pensions and social protection for groups with low coverage: migrant workers and their families, 
own-account workers, micro-enterprises, female domestic and migrant workers
2.8 Prevention and eradication of child labour
2.9 Youth building the future in south-southeast Mexico and northern Central America, Mexico 
2.10 Reappropriation of public spaces and creation of technological research projects through the participation and 
job training of young people aged 15–29 years, state of Campeche
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Note: Projects 2.9 onwards (in bold) are projects prioritized by the Governments of the Northern Central 
American countries, the Government of Mexico, or the states of South-Southeast Mexico.
(b) Life skills programme 
Early childhood education is a fundamental human right that provides people with 
access to the enjoyment of other rights. It is vital to developing socialization and 
facilitating social and labour market inclusion. Although this begins before children 
start school and continues into adulthood, the school stage is when critical processes 
for acquiring and developing skills, enhancing analytical capacity and creativity and 
exercising citizenship occur. More years of schooling in quality education programmes, 
including comprehensive sexuality education, with a humanistic approach, facilitate 
the development of individual abilities, prevent early and unwanted pregnancies, 
create better job opportunities and higher incomes to ensure minimum levels of 
well-being, and empower people to participate more fully in democratic societies.
Insufficient schooling among the labour force and lack of quality, inclusion and 
equity in education are major constraints on building capacity, with consequences 
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the fact that education is a human right, investment in human capacity-building is 
justified from an economic standpoint, both for society as a whole and individually 
(in terms of returns and better-quality job opportunities). Education also facilitates 
social inclusion (in terms of health and self-care, for example) and provides people 
with the tools they need to integrate as full citizens into today’s complex world 
(empowerment and political participation). While this has been true for several 
decades, a quality educational process is all the more important now, in view of the 
skills required for adequate social and labour market inclusion enabling a transition 
to just, egalitarian, peaceful and inclusive societies, low-carbon economies and the 
exercise of citizenship in today’s knowledge society.
In recent decades, the subregion has made progress in terms of the proportion of 
young people who complete an educational cycle. However, the amount of progress 
varies from one country to another, and even within individual countries, where many 
young people are still excluded from education, especially at the secondary level. 
They also face inequalities in education provision, which are expressed in the quality 
of services, infrastructure, size of schools, teaching staff and learning achievement.
It will be a major challenge to turn the education system into a real mechanism for social 
and labour market inclusion to achieve adequate levels of well-being and reduce social 
inequalities. The issue is not just the number of years a person remains in schooling 
but what and how they learn along the way and how increased schooling relates to 
ever more expansive and dynamic labour markets that also contain significant barriers 
to access, as well as mechanisms of exclusion and hierarchy. This makes it crucial to 
promote an inclusive and multicultural education system, with initiatives to prevent 
bullying and violence and comprehensive education on sexual and reproductive rights.
The priority of this dimension of the social well-being pillar is to address the 
inequalities and gaps faced by children, adolescents, young people, lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender and intersex persons, persons with disabilities, indigenous 
peoples and Afrodescendent populations.
Below are some of the possible ways to meet the challenge of building an education 
system that transfers twenty-first century skills:
 • Rethinking the purpose of teaching, with a humanistic approach, and recognizing 
education as a right and public good that is not just an instrument or input for 
a production process but a key element of people’s personal development and 
development as citizens.
 • Identifying new cross-sector approaches to overhaul completely the functioning 
and governance of the education system, as well as the link between training 
policy and policies for development and poverty reduction.
 • Resolving outstanding issues of coverage and advancement. Basic access still 
needs to be extended to a “hard core” of exclusion. There is a need to expand 
provision of both infrastructure and second-chance or reintegration programmes 
that include the migrant returnee population.
 • Improving quality and relevance for the acquisition of new competencies to 
facilitate adaptation to technological change and participation in twenty-first 
century society: redefining curricula, teaching and the assessment of education 
outcomes to suit specific contexts and the needs of individuals and communities 
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by incorporating ethnic and sociocultural diversity into the assessment of learning, 
as well as the more general civic education requirements; ensuring innovative and 
flexible education and training provision; promoting greater participation; and 
adjusting school culture to youth culture.
 • Addressing postponement factors: gender gaps tend to become more pronounced in 
the presence of other structural determinants of inequality, such as poverty, living in 
a rural area or membership of an indigenous people or Afrodescendent population.
 • Investing in teaching. Pre-service and in-service teacher training should be updated 
and, to attract the best teacher candidates, it is imperative for the profession to 
recover lost prestige.
 • Establishing reintegration and retention policies for adolescent fathers and 
mothers, to include: pregnancy prevention; minimum comprehensive services 
for sexual and reproductive health; exercise of citizenship and empowerment of 
girl children and adolescents; elimination of discrimination; maternity and early 
childhood care and support; guaranteed continuation of studies (which extends 
to the care of others generally); and a gender equality approach (ensuring that 
men share the responsibility for and participate in childrearing).
Giving a chance to all types of potential includes:
 • Ascertaining the diverse range of trajectories and providing the opportunity to 
continue studying in a flexible way; offering the chance to enter and exit the system 
with intermediate qualifications; organizing training systems that facilitate flow 
between programmes, continuation of studies and refresher courses; strengthening 
both formal systems and alternative forms of provision, such as mobile or evening 
schools and distance secondary education (using information and communication 
technologies); enhancing care services; and recognizing the need for lifelong 
learning opportunities.
 • Improving curricula, teaching and educational environments, while supporting 
countries in achieving target 4.7 of Sustainable Development Goal 4: “By 2030, ensure 
that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable 
development, including, among others, through (…) sustainable lifestyles, human 
rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global 
citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to 
sustainable development.”7
 • Fostering school or the educational environment as a safe space that is free from 
violence (bullying and gender-based violence, homophobia, dating violence and 
any other type of violence) and includes civic education and training.
 • Enhancing linkages between the education sector and health, with health promotion 
interventions and actions to prevent child sexual abuse, gender-based violence 
and teen pregnancy. 
The life skills programme relates to both the economic development pillar (through its 
link with the labour market and the skills required for a specific structure of production) 
and the environmental sustainability pillar (through the impact of environmentally 
sensitive training on the personal, community and professional levels).
7 See United Nations, “Sustainable Development Goals” [online] https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/
education/.
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Implementation of the proposals under the life skills programme is expected to 
significantly improve educational indicators, with higher rates of coverage, lower 
rates of school exclusion, higher rates of graduation from upper secondary education 




1. Actions 2. Impact
 • Design and implement mechanisms and alternative 
arrangements for reintegration into education
 • Design protocols and train teachers to tackle violence and 
respond to emergencies in school
 • Improve school infrastructure to cope with 
natural disasters
 • Strengthen national and subnational education systems
 • Establish mechanisms for accelerated alternative/
non-formal education and education bridges
 • Design new training packages
 • Create a development and training centre specialized 
in  he needs of migrants
 • 100% of municipalities have educational 
reintegration mechanisms
 • 500,000 people who have fallen behind complete their 
secondary education
 • 60,000 schools (18 million pupils) have an environment that 
is safe, free from violence and resilient to natural disasters
 • Reduction in early school leaving
 • Improved basic skills in reading and mathematics
 • Young people trained and accredited for digital skills and 
green jobs
 • Improved educational environment suited to continuing 
education needs
3. Programme project proposals
2.11 Guarantee that everyone in regions with the highest migration rates has the opportunity to access good-quality, relevant 
basic and secondary education in safe, resilient environments that are free from violence
2.12 “Mi Nueva Escuela” project to modernize the education system, El Salvador
2.13 Strengthening associations of municipalities, Guatemala
2.14 University centre for the comprehensive development of south-southeast Mexico and northern Central America,  
state of Tabasco
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Note: Projects 2.12 onwards (in bold) are projects prioritized by the Governments of the Northern Central 
American countries, the Government of Mexico, or the states of South-Southeast Mexico.
(c) Comprehensive child development programme 
The decision to make early childhood and early childhood development a substantive 
programme in a development strategy for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
south-southeast Mexico was backed by accumulated evidence on: the role that such 
policies play in the exercise of the rights of children and their families; their role in 
people’s cognitive development and acquisition of non-cognitive skills and their 
benefits for countries’ productivity; the contribution of such policies to labour force 
participation, especially that of mothers; and their potential to assure equality, social 
cohesion and sustainable development in countries, targeting the underlying causes 
of violence and social inequality.
There is compelling research confirming the role of early childhood experiences as 
the fundamental building block for a person’s health and development in later stages 
of life, as well as the positive impact of early childhood investment on society: for 
instance, early childhood policies can increase equality and reduce the intergenerational 
transmission of poverty. In contrast, severe distortions during the early childhood 
development cycle, caused by such factors as malnutrition, have a profound effect on 
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through a child’s life cycle.8 Malnutrition exacts high economic costs, the current and 
future repercussions of which have not been sufficiently highlighted. Despite the 
fact that such policies as cash transfers for families with children and care policies, 
including care leave and services, have had a proven effect on poverty reduction 
and women’s entry into paid work in developed countries, the coverage of these 
policies is still poor in Latin America and very poor in northern Central America and 
south-southeast Mexico.9
Comprehensive early childhood care policies for early childhood development require 
a coordinated system of interventions in different areas, coupled with a life cycle 
approach. Key areas are maternal and child health, nutrition, early stimulation, early 
and preschool education, and care, within the framework of the social protection 
system. The various types of care leave and arrangements for reconciling paid and 
unpaid care work in families, as well as care services, transfers and regulations, are 
also important here, as they all contribute to a culture of shared social responsibility, 
to the labour market inclusion of women and men and to early childhood care. Other 
social protection benefits include contributory and non-contributory family allowances, 
as well as other mechanisms for cash and in-kind transfers, designed to protect the 
income of families with children at this stage of the life cycle.
The comprehensive child development programme seeks to promote comprehensive 
early childhood care policies with a special emphasis on children under 6 years of 
age living in poor, rural, indigenous or Afrodescendent households, women during 
pregnancy and postpartum and childcarers. The programme proposals include 
initiatives for protecting the human rights of women involved in transnational chains 
of care, increasing the coverage and quality of essential services for comprehensive 
early childhood development and reducing chronic undernutrition.
Its implementation would impact not only on the social well-being pillar but also on 
the economic development pillar and on the considerations relating to management 
of the migration cycle and the protection of the rights of children in their different 
stages of life. It also relies directly on the investment and economic development 
initiatives contained in the Comprehensive Development Plan and on the extent to 
which these initiatives lead to growth in demand for labour.
Key indicators for measuring achievement of the objectives of the comprehensive 
child development programme include: higher birth control and early childhood 
development rates; a decrease in chronic undernutrition; an increase in children’s 
attendance at childcare and development centres; and a decrease in late-age enrolment 
in primary education.
8 In an analysis of 21 Latin American countries, Guatemala was found to be the country with the highest 
prevalence of chronic undernutrition (46.5%), while Mexico was among the countries with the highest 
prevalence of overweight and obesity in children and adolescents (See A. Palma, “Malnutrition among 
children in Latin America and the Caribbean”, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), 2 April 2018 [online] https://www.cepal.org/en/insights/malnutrition-among-children-latin-
america-and-caribbean).
9 The information available for eight Latin American countries, around 2014, shows that, in Mexico, 
attendance of preschool education by children aged 35 years was 71.8%, while in Honduras it was 
only 37.6% (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of 
Latin America, 2016 (LC/PUB.2017/12-P), Santiago, 2017).
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Table IV.9 
Comprehensive child development programme
1. Actions 2. Impact
 • Prepare legislative proposals to protect the labour rights of 
women engaged in care work
 • Raise awareness and provide training and technical support 
for the development of caregiver support programmes
 • Reduce coverage gaps in essential services (health, nutrition, 
education and protection)
 • Strengthen institutional mechanisms for identifying needs, 
policy-making and management 
 • Improve primary health care and the development of quality 
control systems for health services
 • Increase prenatal checks and early child development
 • Expand the coverage, access and use of health, nutrition and 
child development services
 • Improvement in the rights and employment status of 
200,000 women engaged in care work
 • Provision of essential comprehensive development services 
to 1.6 million children under 6 years of age
 • At least one-third reduction in multidimensional child 
poverty in selected municipalities
 • At least one-third reduction in the number of out-of-school 
children in selected municipalities
 • Improved access, coverage and use of health and nutrition 
services in selected municipalities
 • Reduced levels of undernutrition in children under 5 years 
of age in selected municipalities
3. Programme project proposals
2.15 Increasing the coverage and quality of essential services for the comprehensive early childhood development of the most 
vulnerable children in northern Central America and Mexico
2.16 Comprehensive early childhood care to prevent and reduce chronic undernutrition in 35 prioritized municipalities in two 
departments of Guatemala
2.17 “Crecer Juntos” National Policy to Support Early Childhood Development, El Salvador
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Note: Project 2.17 (in bold) is a project prioritized by the Governments of the Northern Central American 
countries, the Government of Mexico, or the states of South-Southeast Mexico.
(d) Lifelong health programme
Health is the bedrock for the full development of people and societies. However, the 
enjoyment of this fundamental right is one of the biggest social debts in northern 
countries of Central America and the nine states of south-southeast Mexico. A good 
state of physical and mental health that facilitates participation in education and the 
labour market, coupled with nearby, timely and relevant health services, are factors 
that encourage people to put down roots.
A major challenge for improving people’s health indicators and closing the notable 
gaps in this area is lack of access to timely, high-quality health services. Access can 
be limited by several barriers, including those of an economic, geographical, cultural, 
linguistic or attitudinal nature. There is still great fragmentation and overlap of benefits 
and health care coverage, as seen by the wide disparities in the quality of services 
available to different population groups, which serve to perpetuate inequities.
Improving the health of people living in the countries involved in the Comprehensive 
Development Plan should therefore be seen as a strategic investment that would have 
positive externalities in other areas of development, such as the ability to study, acquire 
new skills and participate in the labour market. While genetic factors may play a role 
in health, social determinants are fundamental. The physical, economic and social 
environments in which people are born, grow and develop have a major influence 
on the development, identification and treatment of diseases. As a result, poverty, 
inequality and social exclusion have a significant impact on people’s health. In view 
of the interplay between health and other areas of social well-being, interventions 
for improving people’s health status should adopt a holistic approach, with initiatives 
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People’s healthy development and growth should be seen as a continuum in which 
each stage is linked closely with the stages before and after. Promoting people’s 
health in a broad sense therefore calls for a holistic approach that addresses the 
changing needs and challenges they face to secure lifelong health: from maternal 
and child health to chronic disease and the care of older persons.
It should be a priority to ensure that access to health services for people living in the 
municipalities and territories most predisposed to migration is improved significantly 
and that health services are adequate, timely, nearby and high-quality, with a focus 
on rights, a gender perspective, interculturality and a life-cycle approach.
The lifelong health programme seeks to improve access to services, move towards 
universal coverage and forge synergies between health and social protection 
strategies in the territories most predisposed to migration. The programme considers 
the social determinants of health, in order to promote investment in preventive 
actions for reducing disease risk. This includes timely access to immunization and 
monitoring services, the extension of primary health care services and the promotion 
of community health, healthy eating and access to clean drinking water and 
sanitation services.
As mentioned earlier, the lifelong health component has two-way links with policies 
in different areas, especially education, work and social protection. Lifelong health is 
also linked directly with the environmental sustainability pillar and the management 
of the migration cycle pillar. In the former case, it is because the environment 
is a space where certain pollutants can proliferate (or be controlled) and where 
climate-change-related disasters occur and, in the latter case, it is because of the 
special health risks posed by migrants in transit.
The desired outcomes of the lifelong health programme are better health coverage 
and control indicators, lower morbidity and mortality rates and longer life expectancy.
Table IV.10 
Lifelong health programme
1. Actions 2. Impact
 • Improve medical equipment and facilities (surgeries, clinics and hospitals)
 • Improve medicine supply processes
 • Achieve universal vaccination and implement policies to reduce maternal and child mortality
 • Enhance skills for managing and monitoring social protection programmes and access to health
 • Implement sexual and reproductive health programmes and support packages
 • Build the capacity of migrant care centres and health units
 • Improved effective access 
to health services for 
10 million people in the 
municipalities most 
predisposed to migration
 • Increased care of migrants
3. Programme project proposals
2.18 Universal access to adequate, timely, nearby health services, especially in the municipalities and territories most 
predisposed to migration
2.19 Humanitarian and development interventions by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in northern Central America 
and Mexico
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(e) Violence prevention and culture of peace programme
As mentioned below, violence is a theme running through the recent history of countries 
in the subregion and, while violence has changed in nature and armed conflicts have 
ended, it is still very prevalent. Its current characteristics (level, intensity and territorial 
expression, transnational character, femicide, hate crime10 and its link with organized 
crime) make a multisector perspective vital.
Given the distinctive types of violence currently seen in these countries, the violence 
prevention and culture of peace programme focuses on young people. This is one 
of the stages of life most affected by the phenomenon of violence and youth is one 
of the main factors contributing to mortality and the burden of disease during this 
stage, especially in men. The high visibility and increasing involvement of young 
people in gangs or other organized forms of urban violence reinforce a stigmatized 
view of young people as perpetrators of violence, associating them in the public 
imagination with negative attributes, such as deviant or dysfunctional. Studies 
conducted in Central America have found such violence to be more a consequence 
of the marginalization and exclusion suffered by young people in various parts of 
the subregion, leading to the formation of alternative membership groups, such as 
criminal youth gangs (maras), which offer a different sort of social inclusion: inclusion 
within exclusion. The commonest forms of social exclusion found to trigger violence 
among young people are urban marginalization, lack of access to channels of social 
mobility and consumption, exclusion from education and work, socialization from an 
early age in aggressive behaviours and crime (in families and neighbourhoods) and 
thwarted expectations when the extended schooling of many young people fails to 
guarantee better job opportunities or enhanced well-being.
One of the most widespread forms of violence is gender-based violence, which affects 
women, girl children and adolescents, especially those in a situation of exclusion and 
vulnerability as a result of poor living conditions. Some of the causes of gender-based 
violence lie in deeply ingrained cultural norms and patterns that devalue women and 
girls in a society where they experience unequal power relations. Migrant women, 
girl children and adolescents are a group particularly vulnerable to violence, including 
sexual violence. The consequences of violence are very serious, not only for the victims 
but also for their families, the community and society as a whole.
It is essential to recognize safety and a life free from all forms of violence as 
ineluctable rights and to spearhead a cultural change based on peace, tolerance and 
an appreciation of human life in all its diversity. To reverse violence, particularly in 
urban areas, consideration should be given to designing comprehensive policies, with 
a stronger presence of the State, which focus on the multiple causes of violence, with 
measures for prevention, public safety, reducing impunity, rehabilitation and restoration. 
This calls for strategies to be coordinated at the different levels, incorporating the 
10 Hate crime is defined as any malicious act, usually perpetrated with cruelty, which includes, but is 
not limited to, violations of the right to life, personal integrity or personal liberty intended to cause 
the victim serious harm or death, where the aggression is based on rejection, intolerance, contempt, 
hatred and/or discrimination towards a vulnerable group, in this case the lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender and intersex population. Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL), Diagnóstico sobre 
los crímenes de odio motivados por la orientación sexual e identidad de género en Costa Rica, Honduras 
y Nicaragua, 2013 [online] http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r33181.pdf.
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territorial perspective. Long-term strategies should be considered for recovering aspects 
of the wider social context, such as a culture of peace, fostering non-violent conflict 
resolution and encouraging violent actors to cease violence of their own volition. It 
is also necessary to recognize the shared responsibility of all social actors, as well 
as to promote an environment of institutional trust, especially in institutions like the 
police and judiciary, moving away from a concept of public safety to one of human 
security and a culture of peace.
Such an environment is not achievable in the short term. Just as the landscape 
of violence has not been reversed, reversal initiatives should take a gradual 
approach, which will certainly work faster than the process of deterioration. It 
should also be acknowledged that, while the establishment of these elements is a 
prerequisite for reversing the processes of violence, it is not enough in itself. There 
need to be institutional reforms and responses that consider the social divide, 
which induces people to join gangs to meet their need for an identity, a sense of 
belonging and, above all, self-realization. This will lead to the design of responses 
that ought to meet young people’s need for social participation without the 
current violence.
The violence prevention and culture of peace programme formulates responses to 
manifestations of violence occurring closest to people, in the areas of prevention 
and containment, expanding the options for the social inclusion of young people in 
a society that currently excludes and stigmatizes them and that fails to ensure their 
personal fulfilment. The programme contains responses to strengthen institutions and 
the rule of law and involve those population segments and urban and rural territories 
that are most vulnerable in this respect: young people of low socioeconomic status, 
women, the police, indigenous peoples and Afrodescendent populations.
This component has two-way links with policies in different areas, especially education, 
health, safety, work, social protection and production development. As homicides, 
like femicides and extortion, have a direct impact on investment decisions, local 
economies, micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises, productivity and economic 
development in general, work is required on multisector policies to create spaces of 
synergy with benefits to facilitate investment, growth and productivity. This makes 
the link with the economic development pillar important.
The desired outcomes of the actions in the violence prevention and culture of peace 
programme are a reduction in victimization, homicide and femicide rates, a decrease 
in extortion and an increase in levels of cohesion, interpersonal trust, participation 
and support for democratic processes.
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Table IV.11  
Violence prevention and culture of peace programme
1. Actions 2. Impact
 • Provide technical assistance to design targeted strategies and build local capacity 
for crime prevention and public safety
 • Strengthen municipal systems for the protection of children and adolescents
 • Create spaces for education and comprehensive development
 • Inform the migrant population about the most prevalent risks and crimes, 
their rights and access to justice
 • Coordinate national responses to the most prevalent crimes
 • Build capacity for detecting and investigating crimes against migrants, as well as 
for the legal and operational framework to fight corruption and organized crime
 • Offer an integrated response service (pilot project) for survivors of gender-based 
violence and human trafficking
 • Provide technical assistance to improve the legislative framework for preventing 
human rights violations and ensuring redress where necessary
 • Build the capacity of local governments for violence prevention, inter-agency 
coordination, crime control and prosecution, social rehabilitation and integration, 
and victim care and protection
 • Reduced crime levels and increased 
public safety
 • Access to education and cultural activities 
for the residents of selected municipalities 
 • Reduced vulnerability of migrants to crime
 • Countries have improved capacity to deal 
with trafficking and gender-based violence
 • Countries have an improved legislative 
framework for protecting human rights
 • Reduced impact of violence and crime 
through prevention and control
 • Guaranteed compliance with the law and 
guaranteed comprehensive care and 
protection for victims
3. Programme project proposals
2.20 Enhancing human security at the local level
2.21 Preventing and responding to violence against children and adolescents and promoting the responsible use 
of information and communication technologies in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico
2.22 Regional programme for the protection, assistance and access to justice of migrants from northern Central America 
(El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) and Mexico, with a focus on fighting corruption
2.23 Reinforcing Assistance to Child Victims of Trafficking (ReACT)
2.24 Strengthening the rule of law, the human rights approach, the administration of justice and the fight against impunity i  
El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico 
2.25 Support for the implementation of comprehensive security and peaceful coexistence policies
2.26 Information management for evidence-based public safety policies, with a gender perspective
2.27 Putting into operation an arts and crafts factory and fitting out areas for inclusive social development, a culture 
of peace and the prevention of violence and crime, state of Quintana Roo, Mexico
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Note: Project 2.27 (in bold) is a project prioritized by the Governments of the Northern Central American 





193C O M P R E H E N S I V E  D E V E L O P M E N T  P L A N
3. Environmental sustainability, climate 
change and adaptation, and disaster risk 
reduction pillar
Owing to their geographical location, the northern countries of Central America and 
the states of south-southeast Mexico face multiple risk factors, such as a prolonged 
hurricane season from the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean, hydrometeorological 
hazards, strong seismic activity and volcanic eruptions arising from the geomorphology 
of their land where active tectonic plates meet and recurrent forest fires are exacerbated 
by climate change.11
Their exposure and vulnerability place El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras among 
the countries in the world with the highest disaster risk from natural hazards or the 
greatest economic losses as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) over the 
past 20 years.
Climate change and environmental degradation compound the risks and undermine 
economic activity, especially that of the agricultural sector, which provides between 15% 
and 30% of the subregion’s employment. In such a context, disaster impacts (such as 
cyclical drought) drive people away from their region of origin. Indeed, erratic rainfall 
has made the Central America Dry Corridor one of the most susceptible areas in the 
world to climate variability and change.12 Half the population of the Dry Corridor of 
Guatemala and Honduras live in rural areas and below the poverty line.13 The vast 
majority of this population are indigenous peoples who are disproportionately affected 
by climate change because they rely directly on fragile ecosystems, rainfed agriculture 
and forest products. Climate change, which is a major cause of rural migration, 
intensifies other socioeconomic and social instability-related causes of migration.
For all the above reasons and by virtue of the Paris Agreement’s nationally determined 
contributions and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, 
this pillar of the Comprehensive Development Plan on environmental sustainability, 
climate change and adaptation, and disaster risk reduction seeks to address the 
factors described above and proposes different ways of achieving more inclusive and 
sustainable economic development in the subregion. Its objectives are to:
 • Expand information for decision-making on climate change impacts and disaster 
risk, and build the capacity of national actors to anticipate, prevent and respond 
to such events in a timely manner.
11 See United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR)/Coordination Centre for the Prevention 
of Natural Disasters in Central America and the Dominican Republic (CEPREDENAC), Informe Regional 
del Estado de la Vulnerabilidad y Riesgos de Desastres en Centroamérica, 2014 [online] https://eird.org/
americas/docs/informe-regional-centromericano-RAR.pdf. 
12 The Central America Dry Corridor belongs to one of the three climatic zones of Mesoamerica. Comprising 
a region of dry tropical forest on the Pacific side of Central America, it extends from the coast of Chiapas 
in Mexico to western Costa Rica and the western provinces of Panama. The Dry Corridor traverses 
El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, three countries in the subregion that are highly vulnerable and 
exposed to both drought and extreme rainfall.
13 See Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “Chronology of the Dry Corridor: the 
impetus for resilience in Central America”, 2017 [online] http://www.fao.org/in-action/agronoticias/
detail/en/c/1024539/. 
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 • Implement public policies with a development approach that takes into account 
climate change and disaster risk.
 • Increase public and private investment and reduce economic losses resulting from 
climate change and disasters.
 • Include climate-risk and disaster management as criteria for evaluating public 
and private investments.
 • Build the resilience of urban, coastal and rural territories, focusing on the 
gender perspective.
 • Address the impact of climate change through nature-based solutions that enable 
communities to make efficient use of resources and generate income.
 • Reduce disaster displacement by mitigating risk, responding to disasters in a timely 
and effective manner, preventing the creation of new risks and building resilience.
 • Implement coordinated regional measures to deal with internal displacements, 
including development initiatives that address the underlying factors.
To achieve these objectives, the pillar will focus on three areas: (i) knowledge 
creation, data and tools for climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction; 
(ii) resilience-building to prevent disaster displacement; and (iii) nature-based solutions.
Diagram IV.9 summarizes the main policy areas under each programme.
Diagram IV.9 
Environmental sustainability, climate change and adaptation, and disaster risk 
reduction pillar 
Resilience-building 













adaptation and green 
job creation
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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(a) Knowledge creation, data and tools programme
The lack of appropriate disaggregated data is one of the main constraints on 
comprehensive risk management and climate action. The collection, analysis and use 
of data is key to designing and enhancing public policies and interventions in this area.
The purpose of this programme is to build technical and institutional capacity to 
prepare and update hydrometeorological and geological data, disaggregated statistics 
and timely information for preventing and responding to natural events. It also 
aims to help update and strengthen early warning systems for multiple risks. This 
requires institutional coordination mechanisms to be reinforced at both the national 
and regional levels to enable them to manage the information that is generated. In 
addition, hydrometeorological and geological information products and services need 
to be designed and implemented at the national and local levels.
Not only does systematic assessment quantify the effects of a disaster, it also helps 
to reduce the risk of future events. Ongoing data collection makes it possible to 
anticipate risks, guide policy interventions to address underlying issues that exacerbate 
disaster risk and boost financial protection. Data highlight vulnerabilities, making 
them useful for such purposes as setting intervention priorities, relocating exposed 
settlements, developing maintenance plans and designing targeted interventions 
to support vulnerable populations. Climate projection models are also important for 
anticipating actions and reducing disaster risk.
Setting up a satellite account provides information for the design of policies to 
build disaster resilience. Progress in this area would enable the effects of a natural 
or human-induced event and its repercussions on the economy, society and the 
environment to be ascertained systematically (in both monetary terms and physical 
units). This would facilitate an assessment of the impact of disasters on development 
progress and potential delays in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals. To this 
end, a methodological guide for setting up satellite accounts to assess disasters and 
train technical officers in methodological aspects needs to be developed, validated 
and disseminated.
The ability to identify spaces for synergy, recognize the comprehensive nature of 
disaster risk reduction and adopt a multisectoral approach calls for an understanding of 
disasters, their causes and effects. This makes capacity-building crucial to disaster risk 
reduction. To reduce disaster risk, it is essential to have highly skilled institutions and 
officials that are able to identify spaces for collaboration, leverage available information 
and design comprehensive public policies. Institutional capacity must therefore be 
as cross-cutting in nature as the effects of these destructive events and calls for the 
involvement of such sectors as finance, micro-, small and medium-sized enterprise, 
education, health, culture and heritage, housing, transport, energy, hydroelectric power, 
water and sanitation, telecommunications and the environment, as well as productive 
sectors like tourism and agriculture. Based on information on the potential impact of 
a disaster on sectors such as education, energy or transport, it is possible to develop 
targeted public policies and move towards comprehensive risk management.
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In parallel with building institutional capacity, it is also desirable to implement 
arrangements for working on the ground with communities affected by disasters 
or climate change impacts. This would make it possible to ascertain communities’ 
needs and establish a common language to enhance the transfer and appropriation 
of knowledge and technology. The formation of joint working groups and ongoing 
feedback between local institutions and communities could build community resilience.14
Table IV.12 
Knowledge creation, data and tools programme
1. Actions 2. Impact
 • Conduct an analysis of gaps and opportunities in statistical 
information generation
 • Build technical and institutional capacity through regional workshops 
and meetings
 • Generate and update statistical and hydrometeorological information
 • Design or update a platform for the integration of any regional 
information generated and processed 
 • Develop a methodological guide for disaster measurement
 • Disaster prevention and anticipation at the 
national level
 • Reduced human and infrastructure exposure to hazards 
and associated disaster risk
 • Reduced disaster impact on rural areas: 
 - 3.6 million agricultural production units
 - National parks and forest corridors
3. Programme project proposals
3.1 Building technical and institutional capacity for generating climate and geological data to prevent and address 
disaster risk
3.2 System of satellite accounts to measure disasters and their impact on regional and national development: 
methodological guide
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
(b) Resilience-building to prevent disaster 
displacement programme
The purpose of this programme is to build institutional capacity for risk management 
and sectoral policy design, financial protection, strengthening national public investment 
systems and minimizing the number of people displaced by disasters. This would 
enhance knowledge of the effects of hazards arising from economic, social and 
environmental vulnerability, improve the quality of public interventions and reduce 
the impact of extreme events.
This programme seeks to promote investment to reduce displacement and improve 
response and care for displaced populations. This requires an understanding of 
disaster displacement processes and institutional capacity-building for preventing 
and addressing such movements. The aims are to develop disaster risk reduction 
plans that incorporate displacement as an important dimension and to establish an 
integrated cross-border system for managing information on the population displaced 
by extreme events. It is also necessary to improve care for vulnerable communities 
and environmental migrants in northern Central America.
14 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) use Participatory Integrated Climate Services for Agriculture 
(PICSA) in Latin America and the Caribbean (including Guatemala and Honduras) and, to date, have 
been fairly successful in building resilience and avoiding climate change-related crop losses. PICSA 
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A systemic view is essential for meeting humanitarian needs, especially those arising 
from violence, migration and displacement. This can take the form of recovery strategies 
that consider increased conflict situations and natural hazards (such as a post-disaster 
needs assessment or recovery and peacebuilding assessment). Interventions in 
strategic geographic areas characterized by large migrant populations and complex 
crisis situations also need to guarantee livelihoods, mainly among the poor and 
excluded population, particularly women and young people. Appropriate targeting of 
public assistance on the most affected people and adaptation of the different social 
protection systems will make it possible to promote ways of addressing the underlying 
causes of vulnerability as part of a comprehensive approach (for example, by developing 
employment programmes for infrastructure improvement, slope restoration or water 
conservation). It is necessary to promote strategies for a transition to development, 
such as support for clusters and the promotion of alternative productive activities, as 
part of programmes to aid rapid recovery of food production and livelihoods.
The abovementioned tools of post-disaster needs assessment and recovery and 
peacebuilding assessment generate contingency or response plans, as well as recovery 
and rehabilitation plans. Apart from these tools, there are financial protection strategies 
to support Governments’ ability to cope with the impact of disasters (or climate change), 
reduce budget volatility, improve planning processes and set priorities and courses 
of action. Further benefits include transparency, efficient use of resources, increased 
responsiveness, financial inclusion and risk sharing. Not only must the State protect 
its investments in public infrastructure and as a provider of services and assistance, 
it must also mitigate the potential impact of its public protection responsibility on 
public finances. Such investments must therefore be resilient and have financial 
protection, especially as the countries involved in the Comprehensive Development 
Plan require infrastructure investment worth around 6% of their annual GDP.
Public investment protection would reduce capital losses from disasters and protect 
the users of such services and infrastructure. The aim is to develop a methodology 
for incorporating multi-hazard disaster risk reduction and climate change response 
criteria when identifying, formulating and evaluating public investment projects. It 
will also be necessary to design and validate a methodological guide for the hazard 
and vulnerability assessment of the weakness of structures at project sites and to 
build the resilience of public and private infrastructure to disaster events.
The proposed actions should be accompanied by awareness-raising initiatives for 
decision-makers (at all levels) and by institutional capacity-building for the proper 
management of resources and use of any methodologies developed. A further aim is 
to collect information for quantifying the fiscal cost of disasters and their impact on 
countries’ progress and of a cost-benefit analysis adopting a disaster risk reduction 
and climate change response approach to public investment projects.
Agricultural insurance mechanisms serve to reduce the vulnerability and social 
exclusion of small-scale producers in rural areas. This calls for comprehensive 
productive and financial services that support inclusive and sustainable economic 
growth and incorporate the disaster risk and climate change adaptation dimension. 
Parametric agricultural micro-insurance is one response to climate challenges. The 
aim is to provide small-scale agricultural producers with versatile, flexible and open 
insurance mechanisms, basic agroclimatic data and the participation of agricultural 
cooperatives, mutual associations and microfinance institutions that market such 
risk transfer instruments actively in rural areas.
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Table IV.13 
Resilience-building to prevent disaster displacement programme
1. Actions 2. Impact
 • Prepare disaster risk reports
 • Conduct national studies on vulnerability to gradual and sudden 
climate change factors
 • Build capacity nationally and locally (including local governments 
and companies)
 • Formulate disaster risk reduction plans
 • Systematize best practice
 • Design and implement a pilot programme for agricultural 
micro-insurance based on climate indices
 • A disaster risk reduction plan is implemented 
in 15 cities
 • 1,200 national and regional/local officials are trained 
in disaster management
 • Disaster management legislation is adopted
 • Four technical and regulatory instruments for 
incorporating disaster risk reduction and climate 
change response criteria into public investment
 • 99,000 small-scale producers have 
agricultural insurance
3. Programme project proposals
3.3 Institutional resilience-building in local and national governments in northern Central America and south-southeast Mexico 
for disaster risk reduction and prevention of migration flows
3.4 Protection of national public investment through disaster risk reduction and climate change response
3.5 Agricultural micro-insurance with climate change adaptation measures for small-scale staple grain and coffee producers
3.6 Assisting and building the resilience of households and communities vulnerable to food insecurity in the Dry Corridor 
of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras
3.7 Agricultural micro-insurance with climate change adaptation measures for small-scale staple grain and coffee 
producers, Honduras
3.8 Strengthening the sustainable, climate-resilient coffee value chain, Honduras
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Note: Projects 3.7 and 3.8 (in bold) were prioritized by the Governments of the Northern Central American 
countries, the Government of Mexico, or the states of South-Southeast Mexico.
(c) Climate change and nature-based solutions programme
The link between climate change and migration has risen to prominence of late. 
Significant levels of out-migration from many regions have signalled the need to 
ensure sustainable lifestyles for vulnerable populations. To this end, the United Nations 
system is seeking to coordinate actions among its agencies offering solutions. The 
climate change and nature-based solutions programme includes three subprogrammes 
with environmental, social and economic objectives: (i) sustainable seas and coasts; 
(ii) sustainable productive activities with nature-based solutions; and (iii) climate 
change mitigation and adaptation and green job creation.15
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), over 
the coming decade, ocean industries will grow at least as fast as the global economy 
as a whole.16 Ocean industries can contribute to the energy, tourism and transport 
sectors and create jobs in fisheries and food production. The impact of climate shocks 
on these industries can therefore have serious social and economic consequences.
15 An example of a nature-based solution that encompasses the three subprogrammes is mangrove 
restoration, which: (a) helps to protect coasts from hurricane-force winds; (b) increases areas for 
breeding and early development of species important to artisanal fisheries; and (c) expands the 
options for carbon capture (mangroves being forests).
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Holistic approaches can be used in nature-based sustainable productive activities 
to encourage many families to put down roots in their places of origin. Options can 
be developed to create sustainable livelihoods, while preserving the natural heritage 
and ecosystem services and promoting climate change resilience. They provide an 
opportunity to improve production processes, create incentives, mobilize sources 
of finance and strengthen value chains. It is also possible to promote economic 
activities that develop territories, landscapes, trade in sustainable or green products 
and biocultural heritage.
As urban and rural women, many of whom are indigenous, are particularly affected by 
the conditions where they live, it is important to mainstream the gender perspective 
into the subprogrammes. The actions should also consider the participation of young 
people to create social capital and enable generational renewal.
As the northern countries of Central America have a high degree of urbanization, 
climate change mitigation and adaptation actions in urban areas are also proposed. 
In the case of mitigation, electromobility projects are recommended in transport 
systems, together with energy efficiency projects targeting small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Ecosystem-based adaptation is proposed in 10 cities.
The subprogrammes’ actions and activities consider the creation of green jobs and it 
is recommended to highlight their relevance in national plans and sectoral strategies. 
Progress would also be made in designing a system of economic incentives for 
generating co-benefits from ecosystem services. The final proposal is for mitigating 
forced migration, through rapid interventions in contingency situations, capacity-building, 
developing integrated urban operations and enhancing well-being in neighbourhoods 
with high levels of out-migration.
Diagram IV.10 
Climate change and nature-based solutions programme
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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(i) Sustainable seas and coasts 
Designing the sustainable seas and coasts subprogramme calls for the adoption of 
a sustainable blue economy strategy, the promotion of aquaculture value chains and 
the development of sustainable and inclusive artisanal fisheries, within a watershed 
management framework that eradicates sources of human impact (such as plastic 
waste) at the local level.
The northern countries of Central America and the states of south-southeast Mexico 
have abundant coastal marine resources. The transition to sustainable ocean economies 
based on the conservation and restoration of marine and coastal ecosystems, recognized 
as natural heritage, supports sustainable development and offers an opportunity to 
generate long-term socioeconomic changes.
The design of the proposed subprogramme is based on: promoting and harmonizing 
practices for the conservation and sustainable use of the marine and coastal natural 
heritage; building the capacity of national Governments; applying tools, methods and 
processes for mainstreaming sustainable blue economy principles; and implementing 
mechanisms for transitioning to economically, socially and environmentally sustainable 
activities in marine ecosystems.
Given the large share of artisanal fishing in the fisheries sector, the aim is to improve 
the working conditions of artisanal fishers, who are currently marginalized from the 
social security system and excluded from pension policies. To compound this, 84% of 
artisanal fishers have received no training of any kind and 86% have not accessed credit.
Mainstreaming a comprehensive wetland and watershed approach engages local 
communities and addresses the causes of coastal ecosystem degradation. This is 
important, as any mangrove protection action taken at coast level depends on the 
conditions in watersheds and surrounding wetlands, especially the quantity and 
quality of the waters flowing into mangroves.
To improve water quality, pollution from human activity needs to be eradicated. In 
recent years, there has been an increase in the generation and entry of plastics into 
coastal marine ecosystems. Not only can marine plastic waste have a significant 
ecological impact through entanglement and ingestion, it can also act as a vector for 
transporting invasive species and other pollutants. Plastic waste has an economic 
impact on a range of coastal sectors, such as tourism and recreation, shipping, 
fisheries, aquaculture, agriculture and human health. The intervention also proposes 
strengthening the legal framework, through technical assistance to all three levels 
of government for eliminating single-use plastics and preventing them from ending 
up in seas and oceans. At the same time, it will support capacity-building for the full 
implementation of national and local legislation on the matter. The intervention also 
promotes capacity-building for implementing a circular economy in order to change 
production patterns, increase resource efficiency and minimize waste in value chains. 
A final aim is to foster and build capacity for implementing circular economy ventures.
(ii) Sustainable productive activities with nature-based solutions
To promote the sustainable development of rural communities living close to areas 
of high biological importance or communities acutely vulnerable to climate change, 
it is necessary to propose nature-based solutions for sustainable productive activities 
that help to protect or conserve areas of high biodiversity value and to reduce the 
migration of vulnerable populations.
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Actions to help mitigate and solve such issues should be comprehensive and take a 
multidisciplinary, cross-sector approach. They should meet the Sustainable Development 
Goals and promote cooperation not only between local and regional stakeholders 
but also between ministries and countries.
The most appropriate approaches should be sought for prioritizing and establishing 
nature-based actions. Watershed and landscape approaches can be useful in establishing 
local actions. Territorial approaches are needed to prioritize and establish actions in 
places where they create synergies between stakeholders. Productive activities must 
be made sustainable by using agroecological or other practices to help maintain and 
preserve ecosystem services; they also need to take into account value chains. Not only 
do such practices boost climate resilience significantly,17 they also reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and increase sustainable development alternatives, demonstrating 
the close relationship between sustainability and short- and long-term resilience.18
Incentives are needed to promote best practice, recognize the capacity of producers 
(some of whom already comply with international standards for export) and reinforce 
the domestic market through anchor firms that promote local sales and consumption. 
The market should be considered from the outset in any solutions adopted. Another 
incentive is payment arrangements for ecosystem services, identifying cobenefits 
stemming from the implementation of nature-based solutions, such as agroforestry, 
which can generate such positive externalities as carbon capture or sequestration and 
water conservation. First, it is necessary to build the capacity of national institutions for 
implementing an appropriate and transparent identification, monitoring, information 
and verification system. Next, a pilot scheme could be developed, with the support of 
international funds, that lays the foundation for systems to coordinate national and 
private contributions that generate income for communities on the ground. These 
actions should promote the conservation and wise use of natural resources, as this 
is the only way to ensure that people’s livelihoods continue into the future. In short, 
nature-based sustainable production systems can help to reduce negative ecosystem 
impacts and conserve biodiversity.
(iii) Climate change mitigation and adaptation and green job creation
One of the main social consequences of climate change is migration, which adds to 
the growth of already overcrowded urban areas. Rapid urban growth is particularly 
important in small and medium-sized cities, which are expanding faster than most 
megacities. Rapid, unplanned urbanization puts increasing pressure on city authorities 
to expand the provision of basic services and infrastructure, in turn impacting on urban 
ecosystems. The damage to ecosystems and people is compounded by the adverse 
effects of climate change. Cities also consume more than two thirds of the world’s 
energy and account for over 70% of its carbon dioxide emissions.
17 In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, farmers using diversification practices, such as cover crops, 
intercropping and agroforestry, sustained less damage than their neighbours using conventional 
monoculture: they had between 20% and 40% more surface cover, more soil moisture, less soil erosion 
and fewer economic losses (C. Nicholls and M. Altieri, “Bases agroecológicas para la adaptación de 
la agricultura al cambio climático”, Cuadernos de Investigación UNED, vol. 11, No. 1, Distance State 
University (UNED) of Costa Rica (see [online] https://revistas.uned.ac.cr/index.php/cuadernos/article/
view/2322/2829).
18 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that nature-based solutions could 
provide more than one third of the mitigation needed by 2030 to stabilize global warming at below 
2 degrees Centigrade (see [online] https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/326e/cf86/773f944a5e06b75dfc5866bf/
sbstta-23-03-en.pdf).
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This subprogramme identifies electromobility as a component for mitigating these 
emissions. Energy efficiency also provides a cost-effective and high-impact opportunity 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. An industrial approach to emissions reduction and 
energy efficiency would have a dual benefit: mitigation and production development.
Apart from mitigation, action to adapt urban systems to the adverse effects of climate 
change is vital. The subprogramme proposes an ecosystem-based adaptation component 
to be implemented in 10 cities. A further important factor is mainstreaming the gender 
perspective into urban adaptation, for which the formulation and implementation of 
socially just, equitable and egalitarian policies will be promoted.
Climate change mitigation and adaptation will impact on economic activities and 
community social dynamics, especially job creation and income opportunities. This 
calls for a just ecological transition that guarantees ways for maximizing decent work 
opportunities for all, reducing inequalities, promoting social justice and supporting 
activities impacted by climate change.
Table IV.14 
Climate change and nature-based solutions programme
1. Actions 2. Impact
 • Deploy a sustainable seas and 
coasts strategy
 • Implement sustainable productive 
activities with nature-based solutions 
 • Conduct actions for climate change 
mitigation and adaptation and green 
job creation
 • Implement afforestation and create 
forest corridors
 • Build capacity for establishing a payment 
mechanism for ecosystem services
 • Comprehensive wetlands and watersheds approach 
 • Sustainable blue economy strategy: fostering the innovation and trading capacity 
of the aquaculture and artisanal fishery value chains 
 • Restoration of 1,000 hectares of mangroves 
 • Access to financial services for 5,000 rural women and young people
 • Reforestation of 1 million hectares and creation of 100,000 jobs 
 • 100,000 hectares covered by payment systems for ecosystem services
 • Creation of 40 nature tourism destinations
 • Introduction of at least 30 electric buses
 • Implementation of a plan for the adoption and consistent implementation 
of energy efficiency in small and medium-sized enterprises nationwide
3. Programme project proposals
3.9 Sustainable seas and coasts in northern Central America and south-southeast Mexico
3.10 Sustainable productive activities with nature-based solutions
3.11 Small-scale afforestation, payment for ecosystem services and creation of a forest corridor in northern Central America 
and south-southeast Mexico 
3.12 Climate change mitigation and adaptation and green job creation
3.13 Guatemala-Mexico Volcán Tacaná Park
3.14 Sustainable water resources management for food security and sustainability, Guatemala
3.15 Strengthening mechanisms for environmental sustainability and climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, Guatemala
3.16 “Sowing Life” in south-southeast Mexico and northern Central America, Mexico
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Note: Projects 3.14, 3.15 and 3.16 (in bold) were prioritized by the Governments of the Northern Central 
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4. Comprehensive management of the 
migration cycle pillar
Migration from northern Central America and Mexico has traditionally been in search 
of better life chances in other countries, particularly the United States. This is in 
response to such factors as precarious working conditions, economic inequality and 
lack of opportunities in migrants’ countries of origin. Poverty, social exclusion, family 
reunification, food insecurity and extreme weather events are further major push factors 
for migration. Other causes of internal or international displacement are persecution, 
insecurity and violence (including gender-based violence).19
In line with ever tighter human mobility policies to discourage immigration (particularly 
irregular immigration), Governments have stepped up the number of detentions and 
the scale of return flows. These policies extend to forcibly displaced persons: more 
than 318,000 people from northern Central America applied for asylum in 2018 and 
a similar number were displaced internally within their country in 2019. Growing 
xenophobia and gender discrimination is having a severe impact on the rights and 
lives of women and girls.
Violence exposes migrants (including returnees) and forcibly displaced persons to 
security risks, particularly those who have fled violence or who face threats. Such 
vulnerability makes people, especially young people, more likely to engage in informal or 
illegal economic activities. Some migrants and forcibly displaced persons in vulnerable 
situations are obliged to carry out illegal activities or forced labour as victims of 
human trafficking. Over the past decade, violence in Central America —largely related 
to rivalry between gangs (maras), extortion, struggles to control territory and drug 
trafficking— has reached unprecedented levels.20
At the same time, vulnerability to disasters and climate change can cause displacement 
and affect migrants’ ability to return because food insecurity and lack of job opportunities 
in the primary sector impair livelihoods in the communities of return. Limits on asylum 
applications and migration to the United States lead people to seek alternative routes 
of entry, which tend to be more expensive and create an environment conducive 
to crime relating to irregular migration (such as human smuggling and trafficking, 
extortion, and sexual and gender-based violence).
The social, cultural and economic reintegration of returnees is hindered by limited and 
ineffective institutional capacity with poor coverage. The growing number of internally 
displaced persons, returnees and deportees who have been away from their places 
of origin for a long time makes the process of protecting human mobility increasingly 
complex, especially for local governments, whose capacity to generate opportunities 
and benefits for migrants and forcibly displaced persons to mitigate adverse factors 
is often overwhelmed.
19 Since 2018, there has been a rapid change in migration flows. The number of whole-family migrations 
increased significantly, with more children and older persons. Between 2018 and 2019, the number 
of people travelling in family units rose from 107,000 to 457,000. See United States Customs and 
Border Protection, “U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Apprehensions FY2018”, November 2018 
[online] https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration/fy-2018; and “U.S. Border Patrol 
Southwest Border Apprehensions FY2019”, November 2019 [online] https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/
stats/sw-border-migration/fy-2019.
20 According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), in 2015 the death rate in Latin America and 
the Caribbean was five times higher than the world average. It is the most dangerous region in the 
world for young people, with around 70 adolescents dying every day from interpersonal violence.
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To remedy this, the comprehensive management of the migration cycle pillar proposes 
actions at two levels: a comprehensive national response programme and a regional 
actions programme. While the response programme proposes human mobility projects 
for each country involved in the Comprehensive Development Plan, the regional 
programme is divided into focus areas that bring together a set of linked actions.
(a) Comprehensive national response programme
The countries involved in the Comprehensive Development Plan are places of origin, 
transit and return of migrants, refugees and nationals; to a lesser degree, some are 
also places of destination. The causes of migration and forced displacement are 
multifactorial, while human mobility impacts on various areas of society, such as 
health, security, the economy and education.
To meet these challenges, the comprehensive national response programme proposes 
institutional capacity-building actions for each country or subregion to tackle the 
effects of forced displacement and migration. The programme will be implemented 
by a team of government and United Nations representatives. Comprehensive national 
responses include specific proposals to tackle emergencies from the standpoint of 
protection and assistance to migrants. These actions include: direct humanitarian 
assistance and provision for basic needs; referral systems; emergency consular 
assistance; evacuation procedures; border management and admission policies in 
areas of cross-border flows; health care and psychosocial support; and coordination 
between Governments and other humanitarian actors.
Table IV.15 
Comprehensive national response programme
1. Actions 2. Impact
 • Improve registration, reception, accommodation and 
emergency care systems
 • Ensure access to immigration and identity documents
 • Use a local care system model to address forced 
displacement due to violence
 • Facilitate the development and implementation of 
employment programmes
 • Improve the access of the migrant population and 
the host population to education, health and 
sanitation services
 • Strengthen reception and assistance systems for 
people in transit and returnees
 • Develop a sustainable reintegration response system
 • Establishment of formal registration systems that generate 
disaggregated statistical data on returnees, asylum seekers, refugees 
and migrants
 • 100% of asylum seekers and refugees in Mexico have 
immigration documentation
 • 17 local care systems up and running in El Salvador and 
30 humanitarian aid centres reinforced in Guatemala
 • 24,000 people hired by employers in integration zones in Mexico
 • 32,000 people in Mexico have social security and benefit from 
care services
 • 500 Hondurans benefit from reintegration programmes 
 • Entrepreneurship course for at least 40% of returnees, internally 
displaced persons or persons at risk of displacement in El Salvador
3. Programme project proposals
4.1 Strengthening immediate and long-term responses to forced displacement and human mobility in El Salvador, with 
a gender equality and human rights approach
4.2 Strengthening immediate and long-term responses to forced displacement and human mobility in Honduras
4.3 Catering to the immediate needs of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in Mexico and promoting their long-term 
local integration 
4.4 Greater opportunities and social inclusion for children, adolescents and their families, while promoting local governance 
in Honduran municipalities with the largest migrant population
4.5 Strengthening immediate and long-term responses to forced displacement and human mobility, Guatemala
4.6 Catering to the immediate needs of Honduran migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in Mexico and promoting 
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3. Programme project proposals
4.7 Boosting humanitarian aid for migrants, state of Puebla
4.8 Human mobility, assisted repatriation and reintegration, state of Puebla
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Note: Projects 4.5 onwards (in bold) are projects prioritized by the Governments of the Northern Central 
American countries, the Government of Mexico, or the states of South-Southeast Mexico.
(b) Regional actions programme
(i) Information management
The production, analysis and dissemination of high-quality, timely and reliable data 
(target 17.18 of the Sustainable Development Goals) is needed to manage human 
mobility effectively. Nevertheless, there is a gap in information production and 
availability, coupled with limited coordination between countries for exchanging data, 
particularly on gender issues. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the 
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the global compact on 
refugees all call for new rules to be implemented on human mobility by harnessing 
traditional data sources and exploring new ways of collecting and analysing data.
This demand for data poses challenges for existing information platforms in countries 
of the subregion. Information on human mobility is heterogeneous and not timely. 
Population censuses, which are the chief source for measuring mobility, provide data 
only every 10 years, despite mobility changing constantly. This situation has tended to 
persist because alternative methodologies and information sources, such as surveys 
and administrative records, have not been implemented.
At present, international agencies collect most of the information available on human 
mobility in the subregion, in a situation where all countries keep administrative records 
but have different practices for collecting and managing data (on such factors as 
arrivals and departures, visas, asylum claims, resident permits and work permits). 
International best practice emphasizes the need for Governments and stakeholders to 
exchange comparable information and for evidence-based policymaking. Methodological 
differences in data collection between countries hinder this process and the accurate 
and up-to-date identification of migration trends. Each national entity tends to carry 
out its activities independently and with little coordination.
Based on experience in the subregion, a coordination and monitoring mechanism will 
therefore be created to enrich the information and knowledge produced by participating 
entities. Mexico’s Migration Policy, Registration and Identity of Persons Unit will work 
with the Global Centre of Excellence on Gender Statistics (CEGS) to produce relevant 
information for Governments and other stakeholders in order to meet the challenges 
of human mobility in the subregion effectively.
(ii) Gender perspective
Migration and forced displacement impact on women and girls differently. A full 
68.3% of female migrants and forcibly displaced females entering Mexico reported 
having been victims of violence on route to the United States. Almost one third of the 
women surveyed had suffered sexual abuse during their journey (31.4%). Considering 
Table IV.15 (concluded)
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only rape and other forms of direct sexual violence, 10.7% of women were found to 
have been affected during their transit through Mexico. Violence has a devastating 
impact on psychological well-being and the ability to reach out for help: 47.1% of the 
victims stated that the violence they had suffered had affected them emotionally.21
There are major shortcomings with respect to protection of women and girls, in such 
areas as: gender-sensitive shelters; alternative measures to detention; psychosocial 
care in migrant holding centres and during the asylum procedure; emotional support 
measures; access to medicines and health care (particularly in the area of sexual and 
reproductive health); access to employment and training opportunities; and legal support.
During forced displacement and migration, especially whole-family displacement, 
women also act as caregivers, a role that they are assigned traditionally based on 
gender bias. In some cases, this prevents them from completing the formalities to 
apply for international protection when they need it and limits their employment 
and training opportunities.
For these reasons, the gender-based actions seek to promote an integrated institutional 
response for the protection and empowerment of women and girls on the move 
throughout the migration cycle, with particular regard to preventing and responding 
to violence against women, delivering empowerment and care services to migrant 
families and providing greater access to reintegration and empowerment assistance 
to returnee women and girls.
(iii) Children, adolescents and families
The main causes of migration and forced displacement impact significantly on the 
lives of children and adolescents who migrate or are forcibly displaced, often alone. 
They are particularly vulnerable to rights violations throughout the migration cycle. 
Children left behind by displaced parents are also more vulnerable to exploitation, 
poverty and abuse. Many try to rejoin their parents once they reach adolescence.
While in transit, migrant children are exposed to multiple risks, such as travelling 
through dangerous areas, crime, abuse and exploitation, compounded by a lack of 
specialized shelters, care or legal representation. While arrival at the destination 
may bring some temporary relief, vulnerabilities persist. The risk of deportation and 
return, even for children in need of international protection, is ever present throughout 
their journey; if they needed international protection, there are clearly violations of 
international law. Deportation procedures are often traumatic, as they tend to involve 
the detention of minors and are not usually coordinated with the country of origin, 
leaving these children lost in the system or unprepared for the return. Furthermore, 
children may suffer discrimination and stigma upon their return. The dangers associated 
with reintegration into their communities may require them to be given relocation 
support and alternative care. Lack of information on regular migration channels and 
unawareness of emerging local development options in the subregion make irregular 
migration an ongoing challenge.
The actions targeted at children, adolescents and families seek to improve the 
comprehensive protection of migrant children and their families and their access to 
high quality, culturally relevant services in countries of origin, transit, destination and 
21 See Doctors without Borders (MSF), Forced to flee Central America’s Northern Triangle: A Neglected 
Humanitarian Crisis, Geneva, 2017.
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return. They also aim to build the capacity of Governments, civil society and the private 
sector to disseminate information to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration and 
promote development alternatives to irregular migration.
(iv) Climate change and disasters
Climate change impacts (including droughts, floods, desertification, air pollution 
and sea level rise) and disasters have direct consequences for human mobility. More 
and more people are being displaced by environmental impacts. Although there is 
a two-way relationship between the environment and human mobility, the lack of 
specific studies tends to obscure the environmental consequences of migration and 
displacement. As a result, these factors are considered only rarely in humanitarian 
response or development planning. Continuing on the same path will lead to the 
worsening of negative impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity, making it difficult 
to meet the Sustainable Development Goals and creating a negative feedback 
loop. Furthermore, the unmonitored environmental impacts of human mobility on 
public health and disaster risk will continue to increase and will demand increased 
humanitarian aid. Climate change and disaster actions help to improve the way in 
which environmental migration is treated, for both sudden disasters and slow-onset 
events. The aim is therefore to build capacity, prevent forced migration, improve climate 
change adaptation and disaster resilience, and protect rights.
(v) Regular labour migration
Human mobility in Central America and Mexico is largely labour migration, driven 
by such factors as the subregion’s linkage with the global economy and its mobility 
facilitation policies. The lack of a robust protection system and effective mechanisms 
for responsible labour recruitment creates a permissive environment for unscrupulous 
recruitment practices, leading to abuse, exploitation and human trafficking.
Close collaboration between the relevant government institutions, labour recruitment 
agencies, employers and civil society is proposed to reduce or eliminate the exploitation 
and abuse of migrant workers during the recruitment process. Representatives of 
labour migrants should take part in the process and special attention should be paid 
to different gender groups.
Actions include research by academics, non-governmental organizations and the 
United Nations system to gain a better understanding of the practices for recruiting 
migrant workers and of responsibility for informal and fraudulent recruitment tactics 
designed to control and maintain workers in situations of human trafficking, abuse 
and exploitation. The actions also aim to enhance employment-related information, 
consulting, advisory, conciliation and dispute resolution services for migrants by the 
countries’ ministry of labour and judiciary. It is also imperative to support States 
in developing the appropriate institutions, public policies and legal framework for 
protecting and respecting the human rights of people on the move.
(vi) Border management
The borders of the countries involved in the Comprehensive Development Plan have 
structural weaknesses and some sections are porous owing to ineffective controls. 
There are insufficient human and logistical resources to meet needs. Limited control 
over irregular migration flows and smuggling and trafficking of migrants, coupled with 
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unawareness of the States’ international obligations in this regard, impair diplomatic 
relations between countries of transit and destination. Poor border control and weak 
presence of law enforcement officers in border areas lead to the proliferation of illegal 
activities, such as smuggling and trafficking of migrants. This heightens national and 
regional security concerns.
The regional actions programme will support the work of the Central American 
Commission for Migration (OCAM) to combat human smuggling and trafficking, in 
line with international obligations on refugees’ access to territories. This will be done 
through advice and support for the validation of documents.
(vii) Health 
Factors of human mobility and the conditions under which it takes place affect the 
physical and mental well-being of migrants, especially forcibly displaced persons 
and those fleeing natural or human-made disasters (or both). In many instances, 
migrants’ lack of legal status, stigma, discrimination, xenophobia, cultural barriers 
and low income limit their access to basic health services, vaccination programmes 
and other public health actions. This creates a vicious circle that undermines health 
still further.
Some displaced persons and migrants have mental disorders and would benefit from 
culturally appropriate, timely and accessible mental health services. Despite this, 
they often face great barriers to accessing mental health and psychosocial support 
services —two types of assistance that are particularly limited for people without 
health insurance or the financial means to pay for such services. Sometimes they do 
not use the services for fear of retribution, such as being reported to the authorities 
or even deported.
The actions of this subprogramme aim to facilitate migrants’ access to community-
based mental health and psychosocial assistance services.
(viii) Diaspora and remittances
Diaspora contributions provide a lifeline for many people in the communities of origin 
and help to reduce poverty. Remittance flows facilitate access to better health care and 
food, increase children’s educational opportunities, improve housing and sanitation, 
promote entrepreneurship and financial inclusion and reduce inequity. Diaspora support 
is particularly important in northern Central America, where remittances account for 
a large share of gross domestic product.
To enable migrants and the diaspora to contribute fully to the sustainable development 
of their host countries and communities of origin, the programme seeks to invest in 
the development and mutual recognition of the skills, qualifications and competencies 
of migrants and refugees. Access to the social protection system for displaced 
persons and their dependents in the countries of origin will be facilitated, improving 
instruments, supporting the establishment of mechanisms for the portability of 
social security and the benefits acquired, and fostering bilateral dialogue between 
the countries of origin and destination. The financial inclusion of migrants, refugees 
and their families will be fostered, promoting the faster, safer and cheaper transfer 
of remittances and their efficient and sustainable use. Support will also be given to 
boosting consular assistance, as well as to cooperation between the four countries 
to promote more efficient, better quality care in countries of destination.
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Table IV.16 
Regional actions programme
1. Actions 2. Impact
 • Protect and empower women and girls on 
the move
 • Improve the comprehensive protection of migrant 
children and their families
 • Enhance care for vulnerable communities and 
environmental migrants
 • Provide migrants with employment-related 
information, consulting, advisory, conciliation and 
dispute resolution services
 • Contribute to efforts against human trafficking
 • Respond to psychosocial and mental health needs
 • Facilitate migrants’ access to the social 
protection system
 • Improve knowledge production on the migrant 
population and the migration cycle
 • Boost the diaspora’s contribution to host 
countries and communities of origin
 • Access to protection, care and support services for 100,000 women 
and 30,000 girls
 • 20,000 unaccompanied children recover from the mental trauma 
of physical and sexual violence, abuse and forced migration
 • Public health interventions benefit 600 members of populations 
vulnerable to slow-onset climate change impacts
 • 5,000 people are provided with employment-related information, 
consulting, conciliation, inspection and dispute resolution services 
 • Eight monitoring stations are set up to receive and protect 
10,000 smuggled migrants
 • Community mental health and psychosocial assistance teams support 
1,200 migrants 
 • 53.5% of the country’s population have an account in a regulated 
financial institution
 • 16 workshops are held to build the capacity of Governments to collect, 
analyse and systematize data on human mobility
3. Programme project proposals
4.9 Management of information on human mobility
4.10 Protection and empowerment of women and girls throughout the migration cycle in northern Central America and Mexico
4.11 Migration and forced displacement of children, adolescents and families
4.12 Human mobility, climate change and disasters
4.13 “Welcoming Cities”: improving urban governance in the context of human mobility
4.14 Promoting regular labour migration and access to justice for workers
4.15 Reinforcing border management and controlling crime
4.16 Preventing and controlling migrant smuggling and crime against migrants in northern Central America (El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras) and the states of south-southeast Mexico
4.17 Improving access to community-based mental health and psychosocial assistance services for displaced persons and 
host communities in border areas of northern Central America and Mexico
4.18 Migrant protection and productive investment of remittances
4.19 Promotion of diaspora investment, El Salvador
4.20 Integration of Honduran migrant workers into the United States labour market, Honduras
4.21 Productive investment of remittances, Honduras
4.22 Portability of the social security contributions of undocumented migrant workers in the United States, Honduras
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Note: Projects 4.19 onwards (in bold) are projects prioritized by the Governments of the Northern Central 
American countries, the Government of Mexico, or the states of South-Southeast Mexico.
D. Cross-cutting issues
All the strategic pillars should consider the following four cross-cutting issues: 
(i) institutional strengthening; (ii) regional integration; (iii) technological change; and 
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Diagram IV.11 
Comprehensive Development Plan: strategic pillars and cross-cutting issues
Economic development
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change and adaptation, and 
disaster risk reduction
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
1. Institutional strengthening
Economic and social development entails changing structures to lead to more egalitarian 
societies with greater technical and administrative capabilities, which are reflected 
in steady increases in productivity within a context of environmental sustainability.
This requires public institutions gradually and in a sustained manner to build their 
capacity for public policy foresight, design and implementation, and its respective 
evaluation and adjustments.
This Comprehensive Development Plan proposes a set of actions that can be 
implemented by States, local administrations or a variety of public or private bodies. In 
all cases, the actions should help the four countries involved in the Plan to build their 
institutional capacity gradually, including improvements in participation, evaluation 
and transparency mechanisms.
For the purposes of this document, governance is understood to mean the set of 
practices, processes, customs and rules within which the various public sector and civil 
society stakeholders, trade associations and lobbyists interested in the implementation 
of common initiatives, and all the actors involved therein, interact.22 Governability is 
understood to mean the degree to which the current system is effectively and efficiently 
conducted. Lastly, public management addresses the aspects of public affairs (res 
publica) management relating to the planning, budgeting, investment, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of public policies, programmes and projects. 
Over the past 12 years, poverty in northern Central America has declined less than 
the Latin American and Caribbean average. While democracy became the established 
form of government, little progress has been made in building institutions that create 
22 See World Bank, World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law, Washington, D.C., 2017.
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opportunities for economic and social development, and corruption has continued to 
stand in the way of progress. Institutional distortions still make it more feasible and 
cost-effective to purchase goods and services in other markets. These institutional 
weaknesses and limited governability create competitive domestic markets and 
perpetuate structural imbalances of low productivity, high inequality and poor resilience 
in northern Central America and the states of south-southeast Mexico.
The challenge facing the Comprehensive Development Plan is to build inclusive, 
resilient and efficient societies where fewer people live in poverty in the face of a 
fledgling institutional framework and a problem of credibility on the part of citizens. 
Effective governability and the functioning of institutions will be a cornerstone for 
the creation of opportunities with which individuals and societies can forge their own 
destiny and collaborate with others. In El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, 
governability will be the foundation underpinning the Comprehensive Development 
Plan when it comes to expanding opportunities.
The sustainability of development is called into question when a significant proportion 
of citizens claim to have ceased to see democracy and governability as the means 
for improving their quality of life. Rising inequality and stagnating poverty reduction 
have created a widespread perception of lack of progress and opportunities.
Fewer and fewer citizens are voting in elections and are demanding public services 
from elected officials more insistently, with the expectation of improving their quality 
of life in some way. The same is true of demands for citizen security, where it is the 
public sector that has the central responsibility for providing opportunities and the 
means for resolving conflict peacefully and ensuring public security and protection.
For the public sector to be able to respond to citizens effectively, far-reaching changes 
in public institutions are required. The new challenges of governability cannot be met 
without a rethink of democracy and the major agreements on peaceful coexistence. 
Right now, the challenge is to focus support on shaping a social contract that 
guarantees harmony, builds trust, promotes more meaningful participation and 
improves responsiveness to social demands. Effective governability means catalyzing 
institutional processes that create:
 • Opportunities for socioeconomic development and meaningful participation, by 
strengthening institutions that guarantee the right to inclusive participation in 
public life for women, young people, indigenous peoples, migrants, displaced 
persons and persons with disabilities. It is also important to create institutional 
conditions for strong —but also fair and sustainable— economic growth.
 • Opportunities for institutional change, by promoting management and implementation 
capabilities in centres of government, the design and follow-up of innovative 
solutions for public service provision, and institutional strengthening to fight 
corruption and bolster accountability, all designed to improve the responsiveness 
of State institutions to public demands.
 • Opportunities for peaceful coexistence and citizen security, through comprehensive 
public policies based on statistical evidence, knowledge and innovation development, 
and guaranteed access to justice, human rights and victim care and protection. 
To move forward on these points, it is necessary to support and foster capacity 
for managing conflict through processes of dialogue and mediation as tools for 
social cohesion, conflict transformation and restoration of trust.
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(a) Public procurement: a challenge for governance
The Comprehensive Development Plan will be implemented by public institutions 
from the northern countries of Central America and the nine states in south-southeast 
Mexico, through a large number of public-private partnerships in a territory characterized 
by weak State institutions.
The main deliverers and implementers of the Comprehensive Development Plan will 
be public administrations at every level (federal, national, departmental or municipal, 
as appropriate) and their main focus will be public-private partnerships, through 
the instrument of public procurement. This makes the proper functioning of public 
procurement systems for public inputs, goods and services a prerequisite for the 
Comprehensive Development Plan to produce results.
Government procurement can play an essential role in improving the residence situation 
of the most vulnerable populations. That means conceptualizing the combined power 
of government procurement (of services and public goods, including infrastructure) 
as a tool for promoting economic development, transcending the traditional view of 
public procurement simply as a sourcing process. Seen strategically, combining the 
public procurement of all decentralized levels has great potential to create employment 
and income, even in the short term, which is what the Comprehensive Development 
Plan needs in order to generate quick wins.
Over the past two decades (especially the last five years), the main focus of public 
procurement has been on increasing transparency, public scrutiny and accountability 
of transactions. In countries involved in the Comprehensive Development Plan, more 
modest progress has been made in evaluating the performance of public suppliers 
and contractors. There have been even fewer instances where the public sector has 
managed to boost efficiency (doing more with less), reduce waste along the supply 
chain and increase value for money in contracted public inputs, services and goods. 
Although there are a number of cases in the four countries where public institutions 
have been successful in increasing value for money in public procurement, these 
achievements have tended to tend involve only part of the chain and the ability 
to sustain value for money appears to be still in its infancy. In other words, public 
procurement systems in all four countries are far from taking into consideration 
responsible production and consumption and their positive or negative impacts on 
the community, the environment and future generations.
Practically speaking and in light of their results, the chief structural (and structuring) 
weaknesses identified in the subregion’s public procurement systems are as follows.
 • Excessive regulations, which can make it difficult to carry out strategic public 
procurement. They can occur at any level, from national legislation (federal and state 
legislation in the case of Mexico), to regulations, rules and internal organization of 
institutions. In some cases, excessive regulations stem from a desire to prevent 
corruption, fraud, embezzlement, conflicts of interest and other harmful conduct. 
This has led to the implementation of a series of mechanisms (which are often 
highly complex and contradictory in their different levels and manifestations) 
to discourage such practices. In such a scenario, procurement stops, leading to 
shortages of public inputs and goods and, in some cases, to the creation of a 
special or exceptional emergency regime, which results in special procurement at 
extremely high prices, with low quality and suspicions of corruption.
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 • A focus on the formal aspects and decoupling of actual outcomes. Regulatory 
agencies tend to focus on procedural compliance rather than on the final outcomes 
of procurement and the interests of the institution and the public. This confines 
officials in charge of public procurement to making decisions permitted by the 
rules, even when the consequences work against the public interest. At the same 
time, private stakeholders in procurement processes are required to compete more 
on compliance with formal details than on the quality and price of the goods and 
services they offer.
 • The public-private system has no incentive to secure the best value for money in 
the public interest. This is coupled with a framework unconducive to obtaining 
the best value for money in government procurement, which translates into loss 
of purchasing power and constrains the State’s ability to provide quality public 
goods and services. It also gives private actors no incentives to submit proposals 
that create more value at lower prices.
 • A low level of professionalization and recognition of public purchasers. There are 
large and substantive imbalances between government purchasers and private 
sector suppliers in terms of rewards and access to education and training. This 
creates a situation where the managers of large public funds do not tend to benefit 
from training on strategic issues but merely on formal ones. This tends to lead 
to extremely asymmetric relationships between purchasers and suppliers, both 
technically and legally. Public institutions are usually bad at purchasing.
 • Lack of incentives to value creativity, innovation and new technology. There are no 
incentives for the public-private system in countries involved in the Comprehensive 
Development Plan to transcend the conventional. There are notable lags in 
incorporating into the public domain the methodological and technological 
innovation issues that have revolutionized daily life in our society in recent years.
Public procurement is a key tool for achieving macroeconomic development goals 
and is underutilized in all four countries. This perspective has several key elements, 
the most important of which are as follows.
 • Use of the economic power of government procurement as a tool for directing 
financial flows towards target segments of development policies. For instance, 
sizing criteria for the content of each contractual unit can be used to incorporate 
micro, small and medium enterprises. Preference mechanisms can be used to give 
a margin of financial tolerance for contracting companies with a majority of women, 
populations with certain ethnic or regional characteristics, or local producers.
 • There is a clear link between more efficient government procurement, enhanced 
social inclusion (and local political participation) and poverty reduction, which helps 
to improve people’s residence situation, as it is precisely the most disadvantaged and 
vulnerable segments of society that rely the most heavily on public goods and services.
 • An explicit orientation in government procurement towards performance in the 
public interest and objectivity will also improve links between public administration 
and the private sector. This will attract companies that traditionally choose not 
to participate in public tenders, which tend to be those with the best ethical 
conduct, reasonable costs and products and services of satisfactory quality and 
those more oriented towards innovation and creativity because their business is 
to supply the private sector.
214 C O M P R E H E N S I V E  D E V E L O P M E N T  P L A N
 • Lastly, the quality of government procurement management is a clear and highly 
visible indicator of the quality of governance, which contributes to the credibility 
of public management and builds public trust. A development plan can hardly 
be implemented successfully in a context where the Government does not have 
the support and trust of the population, companies and social communicators.
All four countries involved in the Comprehensive Development Plan have made 
progress in improving public procurement transparency, a trend that must continue 
because technology enables continuous development. Guatecompras (Guatemala), 
Honducompras (Honduras), CompraSal (El Salvador) and Compranet (Mexico’s federal 
level) are all in the process of incorporating transactional mechanisms into existing 
information facilities on opportunities, contract awards, registers and training. 
The objective of local development, employment and worker training can be met 
by facilitating supplier registration mechanisms and setting the requirements for 
companies to supply or build the capacity of local populations. This vision considers 
transparency as the tool it really is, without making it an end in itself but rather seeking 
to expand the supplier base by broadening government procurement opportunities. 
By subscribing to the principles of safe work, combating child labour, promoting 
gender equality and respect for the environment in the selection, use and disposal 
of materials, several objectives are met simultaneously through minor adjustments 
to government procurement processes.
Another key element for facilitating the successful implementation of the Comprehensive 
Development Plan is to use first-rate methodologies and instruments to make an 
objective evaluation of the legitimacy of both projects and the public procurement 
to be carried out. In other words, it needs to be determined whether the contract to 
be awarded (even if it is through an open and competitive process) procures works, 
goods or services that are essential and those most suited to meeting public demand, 
or on the contrary, whether it is non-essential procurement intended to benefit 
certain suppliers. Indeed, a study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) finds that in 20 of Mexico’s 32 states, legislation does not 
make it compulsory to measure either a project’s feasibility or the contributions it 
would make to the contracting entity’s performance. This provides fertile ground for 
procurement that is unnecessary or, at the very least, not a priority or unsuited to 
meeting the population’s most urgent needs. There have been cases of civil works 
contracts whose cost-benefit was not duly assessed but were awarded nonetheless 
and which remained in force and continued to be executed over several successive 
administrations because the cost of terminating them outweighed the economic and 
financial disadvantages of completing them.
The relationship between government purchasers and private sector suppliers should 
be considered from an innovative perspective unlike the current one. The prevailing 
vision in all four countries (as in the rest of Latin America) is that suppliers will take 
every opportunity to exploit the State, while in the private sector there is a belief 
that a large proportion of public procurement is influenced unduly by politically or 
economically motivated favouritism. Building buyer-supplier relations under these 
assumptions leads to the establishment of a series of preventive measures that 
add substantial costs to the procurement process and result in a net loss in each 
contract, culminating in definite prevention costs for situations whose occurrence is 
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uncertain. Today’s easy access to information makes it more feasible to record the 
performance of suppliers and hence to apply defined levels of confidence to suppliers 
with a positive record, saving on costly additional guarantees, bonds and penalties. 
For those choosing to migrate, the opportunity to acquire training in certain tasks 
for which there will be demand from the State, or the formation of State sponsored 
worker cooperatives that are given a margin of preference in the evaluation and award 
of public contracts, can be key elements in promoting local development.
Recognized instruments and methodologies should be used to conduct rapid diagnoses 
of the public procurement capacity of agencies implementing the Comprehensive 
Development Plan, especially at the most decentralized territorial levels, and action 
learning-based programmes for building this capacity should be undertaken as part 
of the Plan when carrying out procurement for the Plan’s projects.
The Comprehensive Development Plan should also make an in-depth assessment of 
the risk inherent in increasing financing for the public-private activities involved in the 
Plan, especially in areas where State institutions are very weak and where many show 
signs of the presence of illegal organizations. It is vital to ensure that the resources 
to be invested do not nurture or strengthen lobbyists operating illegally.
(b) Towards fair and equitable public management
To promote the governability of the Comprehensive Development Plan, it is necessary 
to focus on both the governance and management aspects.
The above considerations regarding public procurement systems should be understood 
within a broader framework of public affairs management. It might be useful to 
adopt an approach of fair and equitable public management, which considers various 
concurrent perspectives of public management, all focused on one core perspective: 
sustainable profitability, which is of primary public interest.
On the one hand, fair and equitable public management is an enabler of the 
Comprehensive Development Plan and its chances of success and, on the other, the 
Plan provides a great opportunity for the countries involved to move towards ensuring 
fairer and more equitable public management.
Among the seven perspectives illustrated in diagram IV.12, the core perspective is 
sustainable profitability. Sustainable profitability is the result of good public management 
that includes the other six perspectives because the public interest (and, in this case, 
the interest of the Comprehensive Development Plan) is for the actions of projects, 
programmes and public policies to be implemented by maximizing their profitability 
(value for money) sustainably. This means transcending individual transactions and 
processes to consider the full cycle of the process in question, including its impacts 
and environmental and social footprints both on today’s communities and societies 
and on future generations.
216 C O M P R E H E N S I V E  D E V E L O P M E N T  P L A N
Diagram IV.12 
















Source: United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).
Fair and equitable public management is one side of the coin, the flip side of which 
is the fight against corruption: every concrete step that produces fairer and more 
equitable public management squeezes out corruption and illegality a little more 
and, in so doing, enters a virtuous circle that increases the satisfaction of citizens 
and their access to rights, participation in the administration of their communities 
and desire to help build a better society in the territories in question.
Fair and equitable public management promotes the strengthening of public-private 
partnerships (and their in-depth reform, where such partnerships may have become 
impaired) by focusing directly on the public interest: the implementation of economic 
and social development policies and the achievement of institutional changes, such 
as the active inclusion of contributions from diversity and equality. It is of no less 
importance to the Comprehensive Development Plan that the fair and equitable 
public management approach has demonstrated in a number of cases that it is 
able to achieve significant savings in public funds. These funds can be reinvested to 
expand coverage (towards universal access to public services, spaces and goods), 
while at the same time reducing the space for malpractice and corruption, which in 
turn fuel illegality.
As mentioned below, the application of the fair and equitable public management 
approach should focus not only on building the management capacity of Comprehensive 
Development Plan implementers, including their public procurement systems, but also 
on other phases in the chain, such as: planning and project, programme and policy 
management; monitoring and assurance; management of all partner organizations; 
and transparent accountability, with citizen participation and social auditing.
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2. Regional integration
The northern countries of Central America play an active role in the process of 
Central American integration, which has expanded their scope for economic action and 
regional cooperation, thereby increasing their scale, offsetting their small economies 
and broadening areas of cooperation and coordination. As this provides countries 
with regional actions that may align with those of the Comprehensive Development 
Plan, the Plan must strengthen these actions.
Given that Mexico has trade agreements with all the countries involved in the 
Central American integration process, some of the actions proposed in the Plan help 
to deepen these agreements and must be aligned with the objectives for in-depth 
integration of these economic and social spaces. Mexico and Central America also 
have forums for dialogue and policy consensus and have created regional cooperation 
mechanisms that can contribute actively to achieving the Plan’s objectives.
3. Technological change
Progressive structural change is a product of innovation and increased productivity 
in existing sectors. This change is associated with long-term adjustments in the 
composition of economic systems, resulting in significant shifts in the relative 
importance of different sectors in terms of employment, production and trade. It is 
also associated with successful integration into high-growth global markets, leading 
to an increase in aggregate demand, economic activity and job creation.
The cross-cutting issues provide for the gradual development of technological changes 
and for scientific and technological capacity-building that ensure the sustainability 
of the changes being promoted.
4. Partnership-building: private sector and civil 
society participation
A successful sustainable development initiative necessitates partnerships between 
Governments, the private sector and civil society (Sustainable Development Goal 17). 
These inclusive partnerships, built around Comprehensive Development Plan objectives, 
will broaden the initiative’s impact, enable a greater number of citizens to participate 
and expand investment options. 
Action is needed to facilitate and drive the transformative power of billions of dollars 
of private funding to meet Comprehensive Development Plan objectives, as public 
investment is not enough in itself to tackle the transformation challenge ahead. 
Long-term investment, including foreign direct investment and local investment, is 
needed for all the lines of action outlined.
E. Project proposal portfolio
It is important to agree on a minimum package of actions and projects aligned with 
the objectives, areas of opportunity and strategic pillars, and their cross-cutting 
issues. The package of actions and projects must provide for the following elements.
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1. Linkages with national planning and budget systems
All four countries involved in the Comprehensive Development Plan have national 
development plans and public expenditure planning systems aligned with this strategy. 
It is important for the Plan to be brought into line with national priorities, planning 
systems and budget structures. A mechanism for alignment with the ministries or 
departments responsible for public expenditure planning systems was therefore 
established to review and agree the Plan’s priorities. In the main, this process was 
carried out with designated authorities in the finance, planning and foreign affairs 
ministries of the four countries involved in the Plan. In the case of Mexico, dialogue 
was also established with the authorities of the nine states in the south-southeast 
of the country.
2. Synergies with ongoing actions and projects
The countries and their cooperation agencies, international organizations, the funds, 
programmes and specialized agencies of the United Nations system, multilateral 
banks, and private sector and civil society cooperation bodies have ongoing actions 
in all four member countries of the Comprehensive Development Plan, and some of 
these actions are in line with the Plan’s objectives and pillars.
It is necessary to adjust the timelines and, if possible, increase the budgets of these 
ongoing actions, to ensure that they become part of the Comprehensive Development 
Plan’s time frames and objectives, even if their original governance remains the same.
To this end, ongoing activities have been mapped to seek synergies and complementarities 
between the proposed actions and these ongoing activities.
3. Setting priorities and clear time-bound targets for actions 
and projects
An exercise to prioritize actions and projects was conducted by the public institutions 
responsible for planning and scheduling public spending and the regional institutions that 
implement projects in accordance with the guidelines of the respective line ministers.
This planning will be a critical input for organizing the actions of the Comprehensive 
Development Plan and aligning them with national development plans. It will also 
provide donors, cooperation agencies and international organizations with the 
information needed to conduct their actions in line with these priorities, in accordance 
with their decision-making mechanisms.
4. Project coordination and execution mechanism: aligning 
the actions of different institutions with Comprehensive 
Development Plan objectives
In addition to the national and local plans, policies and actions of the four countries’ 
Governments, the Comprehensive Development Plan includes five types of partner 
that help to achieve its objectives and implement its actions: (i) the United Nations 
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system; (ii) international cooperation agencies; (iii) international financial institutions 
and development banks; (iv) regional integration initiatives; and (v) the private sector 
and civil society.
Harmonizing these partners’ lead times, governance mechanisms and mandates calls 
for flexibility in order to coordinate and align the actions of the different institutions.
Diagram IV.13 
Coordination of actions among various institutions
National and local  
plans, policies and actions












Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
5. Resource management mechanisms for new actions 
and projects
In addition to aligning the actions and plans of various institutions with Comprehensive 
Development Plan objectives, the Plan will attract resources from a range of sources, 
which it will need to manage in accordance with its objectives, strategic pillars and 
priorities. It is important to define the management of these resources as soon as 
possible, in agreement among the four countries involved in the Comprehensive 
Development Plan.
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V. COUNTRY 
PRIORITIZATION PROCESS
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Country prioritization process
As mentioned earlier, on the occasion of the inauguration of President Manuel López Obrador 
of Mexico on 1 December 2018, the Presidents of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 
and Mexico signed a declaration in which they tasked the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) to prepare a Comprehensive Development 
Plan to address the structural causes of human mobility in the four countries. Under 
this mandate, ECLAC worked with the funds, programmes and specialized agencies 
of the United Nations system to propose a plan to ensure safe, orderly and regular 
migration in these countries and, at the same time, to tackle the structural causes 
of migration.
On the occasion of the inauguration of President Alejandro Giammattei of Guatemala 
on 15 January 2020, the ECLAC Executive Secretary reported on the Comprehensive 
Development Plan’s progress to the President of Guatemala and the foreign ministers 
of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico. In bilateral meetings with the ECLAC 
Executive Secretary, the Presidents and foreign ministers appointed institutions and 
officials to prioritize Comprehensive Development Plan projects in their respective 
countries. ECLAC officials then visited the four countries and worked with the designated 
officials and their staff to identify linkages between the Comprehensive Development 
Plan and national development plans, Government plans and national goals and 
priorities. High-level officials in each country prioritized, selected and developed the 
initiatives in the Comprehensive Development Plan, as detailed below.
224 C O M P R E H E N S I V E  D E V E L O P M E N T  P L A N
A. El Salvador
The Government of El Salvador selected the projects to be prioritized under the 
Comprehensive Development Plan, following a series of meetings involving the 
Presidential Commissioner for Strategic Projects, staff from the Office of the First 
Lady and the Ministry of Tourism, and representatives from the private sector, ECLAC 
and the United Nations Resident Coordinator Office. The purpose of the meetings was 
to present and discuss some of the country’s flagship projects (“Mi Nueva Escuela”, 
“Crecer Juntos”, Surf City and Plan for the Pacific) and to ascertain their compatibility 
with the Comprehensive Development Plan’s pillars. Afterwards, the Salvadoran 
Government officials who had taken part in the meetings undertook to produce an 
information sheet summarizing each of the projects, which was appended to the 
Comprehensive Development Plan.
Priorities of the Government of El Salvador 
aligned with the Comprehensive 
Development Plan
A matrix analysis revealed over 20 direct matches between the Government of 
El Salvador’s priorities and the proposals in the Comprehensive Development Plan, 
as detailed below.
Energy plan:
 • Proposal 1.1: Connection between Mexico and the Electricity Interconnection 
System for the Countries of Central America (SIEPAC) and second SIEPAC circuit.
 • Proposal 1.2: Gas pipeline between Mexico and the northern countries of 
Central America.
 • Proposal 1.3: Co-modal logistics corridors for integration and development.
 • Proposal 1.4: Universal access to electricity from renewable energy sources in 
northern Central America and the states of south-southeast Mexico.
Digital agenda:
 • Proposal 1.28: Digital cooperation agenda between Mexico and northern 
Central America.
National and local economic development (El Salvador’s Fund 
for Municipal Social and Economic Development (FODES)):
 • Proposal 1.49: Identification of fiscal and financial spaces for compliance with 
the Comprehensive Development Plan
Model cities, including mobility and public transport:
 • Proposal 3.12: Climate change mitigation and adaptation and green job creation.
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Proposal related to El Salvador’s Cuscatlán governance plan:
 • Proposal 2.22: Regional programme for the protection, assistance and access to 
justice of migrants from northern Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras) and Mexico, with a focus on fighting corruption.
Proposals related to El Salvador’s Economic Take-off Plan:
 • Proposal 1.23: Trade facilitation between Mexico and the northern countries of 
Central America.
 • Proposal 1.26: Strengthening rural value chains and creation of a support fund in 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico.
 • Proposal 1.27: Strengthening the coffee chain and the production systems of 
small coffee producers in northern Central America and south-southeast Mexico.
 • Proposal 1.28: Digital cooperation agenda between Mexico and northern 
Central America.
 • Proposal 1.29: Towards a regional innovation system in northern Central America 
and Mexico: integration in science, technology and innovation.
 • Proposal 1.39: Local markets and public procurement of food.
 • Proposal 1.40: Basic investment for production development, innovation and 
entrepreneurship: single investment fund.
 • Proposal 1.41: Entrepreneurship: young people, women and indigenous peoples.
 • Proposal 2.5: Comprehensive strategies for formalizing companies and employment 
in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and south-southeast Mexico.
 • Proposal 2.11: Guarantee that everyone in regions with the highest migration rates 
has the opportunity to access good-quality, relevant basic and secondary education 
in safe, resilient environments that are free from violence.
 • Proposal 3.3: Institutional resilience-building in local and national governments in 
northern Central America and south-southeast Mexico for disaster risk reduction 
and prevention of migration flows. 
 • Proposal 3.5: Agricultural micro-insurance with climate change adaptation measures 
for small-scale staple grain and coffee producers.
 • Proposal 3.6: Assisting and building the resilience of households and communities 
vulnerable to food insecurity in the Dry Corridor of El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Honduras.
 • Proposal 3.12: Climate change mitigation and adaptation and green job creation.
 • Proposal 4.12: Human mobility, climate change and disasters.
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Comprehensive Development Plan proposals 
prioritized by the Government of El Salvador
1. Economic development pillar
A. Enabling infrastructure development programme
No. Title of the proposal
1.5 Plan for the Pacific, El Salvador 
C. Production development programme
No. Title of the proposal
1.30 Promotion of diaspora investment in El Salvador, El Salvador
D. Territorial development programme
No. Title of the proposal
1.44 Territorial development of the Trifinio region, El Salvador 
1.45 Surf City El Salvador: holistic tourism development programme in the maritime and coastal area, El Salvador
2. Social well-being pillar 
B. Life skills programme 
No. Title of the proposal
2.12 “Mi Nueva Escuela” project to modernize the education system, El Salvador
B. Comprehensive child development programme 
No. Title of the proposal
2.17 National Policy to Support Early Childhood Development “Crecer Juntos”, El Salvador
B. Guatemala
The projects prioritized by the Government of Guatemala under the Comprehensive 
Development Plan emerged from a process of dialogue coordinated by the Secretariat 
for Planning and Programming of the Office of the President (SEGEPLAN), with the 
participation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Finance, ECLAC 
and the United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Guatemala. At the initial 
working meetings, the ECLAC representatives made a detailed presentation of the 
Comprehensive Development Plan and an analysis of the compatibility between 
the General Government Policy and the Plan, in which they pointed out areas of 
convergence and gaps not covered by the Plan. This exercise served as the basis for 
the authorities to select priority policies.
The Government of Guatemala listed its national priorities in 11 project information 
sheets. This selection had been in based on seven criteria, including the policy priorities 
set by the Office of the President of the Republic, compatibility with the General 
Government Policy, the volume of mobilized budgetary resources and the likelihood 
of obtaining donor funding. Most of the prioritized projects were national in scope.
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Priorities of the Government of Guatemala 
aligned with the Comprehensive 
Development Plan
The General Government Policy 2020–2024 is based on the National Plan for 
Innovation and Development, which defines guidelines and strategic public actions, 
in synergy with the National Development Plan K’atun: Our Guatemala 2032 and the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The National Plan for Innovation and 
Development comprises five pillars:
1. Economy, competitiveness and prosperity.
2. Social development.
3. Governance and security for development.
4. Transparent, responsible and effective State.
5. Relations with the world.
Each pillar contains several strategic objectives that are aligned with Comprehensive 
Development Plan programmes.
Economy, competitiveness and prosperity




1. Create the right conditions and a good business 
climate for promoting increased investment and 
higher levels of competitiveness
Pillar 2 on social well-being:
B) Life skills programme
2. Promote an export model to increase exports Pillar 1 on economic development:
B) Trade promotion and regional integration programme
C) Production development programme
D) Territorial development programme
3. Develop the conditions for promoting and 
strengthening micro-, small and medium-sized 
enterprises and the cooperative sector
Pillar 1 on economic development:
A) Enabling infrastructure development programme
D) Territorial development programme
E) Macroeconomics for development programme
Pillar 2 on social well-being:
B) Life skills programme
4. Boost the development of renewable and 
non-renewable sources of energy compatible with 
environmental conservation
Pillar 1 on economic development:
A) Enabling infrastructure development programme
Pillar 3 on environmental sustainability, climate change and 
adaptation, and disaster risk reduction:
C) Climate change and nature-based solutions programme
5. Promote a socially relevant mining agenda 
compatible with environmental conservation
Pillar 3 on environmental sustainability, climate change and 
adaptation, and disaster risk reduction:
C) Climate change and nature-based solutions programme
6. Harness the country’s assets to increase tourism, 
promoting a State strategy in concert with the 
private sector
Pillar 1 on economic development:
A) Enabling infrastructure development programme
C) Production development programme
E) Macroeconomics for development programme
7. Maintain macroeconomic and financial 
system stability
Pillar 1 on economic development:
E) Macroeconomics for development programme
8. Foster a functional strategic infrastructure base 
to support economic activity and job creation
Pillar 1 on economic development:
A) Enabling infrastructure development programme.
D) Territorial development programme
9. Promote the National Irrigation Plan sustainably 
to improve productivity
Pillar 1 on economic development:
A) Enabling infrastructure development programme.
D) Territorial development programme
Pillar 3 on environmental sustainability, climate change and 
adaptation, and disaster risk reduction:
C) Climate change and nature-based solutions programme
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10. Promote sustainable agricultural production 
and marketing
Pillar 1 on economic development:
C) Production development programme
D) Territorial development programme
11. Promote sustainable rural economic development Pillar 1 on economic development:
C) Production development programme
D) Territorial development programme
12. Improve the State’s financial position and prioritize 
spending and investment
Pillar 1 on economic development:
E) Macroeconomics for development programme
Social development




1. Improve the quality of life of Guatemalans, especially the most 
vulnerable groups and families living in poverty and extreme  
poverty, through the effective and timely provision and facilitation 
of prioritized social infrastructure in education, health, nutrition 
and affordable housing
Pillar 1 on economic development:
A) Enabling infrastructure development programme.
D) Territorial development programme
Pillar 2 on social well-being:
A) Social and labour market inclusion programme
B) Life skills programme
C) Comprehensive child development programme
D) Lifelong health programme
2. Help to break the cycle of poverty by developing human capital 
and promoting social assistance programmes contingent upon 
children’s enrolment in and attendance of public schools, medical 
consultations at public health centres, child vaccination 
programmes and adult training
Pillar 2 on social well-being:
A) Comprehensive child development programme
3. Develop and boost the training and productive capacity of families 
living in poverty and extreme poverty in rural and deprived urban 
areas, through comprehensive production development programmes 
to create job opportunities
Pillar 1 on economic development:
C) Production development programme
D) Territorial development programme
Pillar 2 on social well-being:
B) Life skills programme
4. Reduce the vulnerability of people and their livelihoods to the risk 
of disasters and catastrophes through coordinated actions with 
local authorities and communities
Pillar 3 on environmental sustainability, climate 
change and adaptation, and disaster risk reduction:
D) Resilience-building to prevent disaster 
displacement programme
5. Promote government and municipal coordination of the institutions 
responsible for implementing social development policies, in order 
to ensure complementarity and create synergies to target and 
prioritize the resources available for social development
Pillar 2 on social well-being:
A) Social and labour market inclusion programme
B) Life skills programme
C) Comprehensive child development programme
D) Lifelong health programme
E) Violence prevention and culture of peace programme
Governance and security for development




1. Strengthen institutions for citizen and community security Pillar 2 on social well-being:
E) Violence prevention and culture of peace programme2. Guarantee access to swift and effective justice, as well as 
compliance with the law, promoting nationwide coverage of 
justice institutions
3. Promote crime reduction, fostering prevention programmes 
and dispute resolution bodies
4. Promote indigenous peoples’ rights and development Pillar 2 on social well-being:
A) Social and labour market inclusion programme
B) Life skills programme
5. Build the security forces’ capacity for internal order, proper border 
security, disaster response and international cooperation for peace
Pillar 2 on social well-being:
E) Violence prevention and culture of peace programme
Economy, competitiveness and prosperity (concluded)
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Transparent, responsible and effective State




2. Streamline the procedures of State institutions, incorporating 
technology and controls to ensure that citizens’ matters are 
handled and resolved promptly
Pillar 2 on social well-being:
E) Violence prevention and culture of peace programme
6. Help to promote social, cultural, economic and territorial 
development in an environmentally friendly environment in order to 
guarantee its sustainability for both present and future generations
Pillar 3 on environmental sustainability, climate 
change and adaptation, and disaster risk reduction:
C) Climate change and nature-based 
solutions programme
D) Resilience-building to prevent disaster 
displacement programme
Relations with the world




2. Promote an effective migrant support strategy in the United States 
and other countries
Pillar 4 on comprehensive management of the 
migration cycle:
A) Comprehensive national response programme
B) Regional actions programme 
3. Promote the pursuit of new markets and trade agreements and 
strengthen existing ones
Pillar 1 on economic development:
B) Trade promotion and regional 
integration programme
4. Enhance regional relations (Central America) to boost the exchange 
of goods and services, security and migration conditions
Pillar 1 on economic development:
B) Trade promotion and regional 
integration programme
Pillar 4 on comprehensive management of the 
migration cycle:
A) Comprehensive national response programme
7. Promote tourism abroad Pillar 1 on economic development:
A) Enabling infrastructure development programme.
C) Production development programme
Comprehensive Development Plan proposals 
prioritized by the Government of Guatemala
1. Economic development pillar
A. Enabling infrastructure development programme
No. Title of the proposal
1.6 North-south rail connection, Guatemala
1.7 Development of rural roads, Guatemala
C. Production development programme
No. Title of the proposal
1.31 ‘Walls of prosperity’ plan: Guatemala-Mexico, Guatemala-Honduras and Guatemala-El Salvador cross-border 
development, Guatemala
1.32 ‘Sello blanco’ white quality label for local products, Guatemala
1.33 Strengthening value chains to upgrade micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises, Guatemala
D. Territorial development programme
No. Title of the proposal
1.46 Territorial economic development in Guatemala, Guatemala
1.47 Strengthening of the tourism sector in Guatemala, Guatemala 
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2. Social well-being pillar 
B. Life skills programme 
No. Title of the proposal
2.13 Strengthening associations of municipalities, Guatemala 
3. Environmental sustainability, climate change and 
adaptation, and disaster risk reduction pillar
C. Climate change and nature-based solutions programme
No. Title of the proposal
3.14 Sustainable water resources management for food security and sustainability, Guatemala
3.15 Strengthening mechanisms for environmental sustainability and climate change mitigation and adaptation, Guatemala
4. Comprehensive management of the migration cycle pillar
A. Comprehensive national response programme
No. Title of the proposal
4.5 Strengthening immediate and long-term responses to forced displacement and human mobility, Guatemala
C. Honduras
The projects prioritized by the Government of Honduras under the Comprehensive 
Development Plan emerged from a process of dialogue between the Finance Secretariat, 
the General Secretariat of Government Coordination, the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs 
and ECLAC. At the initial meetings, the ECLAC representatives presented an overview of 
the structure and strategy of the Comprehensive Development Plan. At the meetings 
that followed, the representatives of the different Honduran Government bodies 
made important contributions that served to identify the main issues and hence 
the projects to be prioritized. Nine priority project information sheets were prepared, 
which were shared with the authorities for review.
Priorities of the Government of Honduras aligned 
with the Comprehensive Development Plan
The Government Strategic Plan 2018–2022 is the medium-term planning tool to 
further compliance with the national goals and targets of the 2010-2038 Country 
Vision and the guidelines and indicators of the 2010–2022 National Plan.
The plan has five development strands:
1. Well-being and social development.
2. Inclusive and sustainable economic growth.
3. Infrastructure and logistics development. 
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4. A more just, peaceful and inclusive society.
5. Governance, democracy and development.
Each of these strands contains several strategic objectives, which are aligned with 
the Comprehensive Development Plan programmes.
Well-being and social development




Improve the living conditions of the poorest population by developing 
the following components: extensive and improved opportunities for 
the poorest; an inclusive, quality education; healthy living; and decent 
housing, with quality, affordable basic services
Pillar 1 on economic development:
A) Enabling infrastructure development programme
Pillar 2 on social well-being:
A) Social and labour market inclusion programme
B) Life skills programme
D) Lifelong health programme
Inclusive and sustainable economic growth




Increase employment and entrepreneurship opportunities in the formal 
sector of the economy, especially for the youngest population
Pillar 1 on economic development:
C) Production development programme
Pillar 2 on social well-being:
A) Social and labour market inclusion programme
Pillar 4 on comprehensive management of the 
migration cycle:
A) Comprehensive national response programme
Infrastructure and logistics development




Boost the country’s economic growth, enhancing the competitiveness 
and productivity of sectors with the highest development potential, 
in order to attract investment and more employment opportunities 
and productive ventures
Pillar 1 on economic development:
A) Enabling infrastructure development programme
A more just, peaceful and inclusive society




Enhance citizen security to guarantee peaceful coexistence and social 
justice and improve the environment for expanding investment and 
productive activity
Pillar 2 on social well-being:
B) Life skills programme
E) Violence prevention and culture of peace programme
Governance, democracy and development




Reorganize and modernize the State, with efficient and transparent 
institutions where the rule of law and participatory democracy prevail
Pillar 1 on economic development:
C) Production development programme
D) Territorial development programme
The Government Strategic Plan 2018–2022 also includes cross-cutting issues, which 
are linked with the Comprehensive Development Plan as follows.
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Cross-cutting issues




Ensure full enjoyment of human rights; guarantee 
the population’s food and nutrition security; 
strengthen climate resilience and adaptability; 
and build planning and investment capacity at 
the territorial level
Pillar 1 on economic development:
D) Territorial development programme
Pillar 2 on social well-being:
E) Violence prevention and culture of peace programme
Pillar 3 on environmental sustainability, climate change and adaptation, 
and disaster risk reduction:
C) Climate change and nature-based solutions programme
D) Resilience-building to prevent disaster displacement programme
Comprehensive Development Plan proposals 
prioritized by the Government of Honduras
1. Economic development pillar
A. Enabling infrastructure development programme
No. Title of the proposal
1.8 Modernization and improvement of the safe drinking water and sanitation service, Honduras
1.9 Road logistics infrastructure, Honduras
1.10 Strategic investments for the energy subsector, Honduras
B. Trade promotion and regional integration programme
No. Title of the proposal
1.25 Deepening trade and production linkages through the Customs Union between El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 
and Mexico, Honduras 
C. Production development programme
No. Title of the proposal
1.34 Development of value chains that boost and create opportunities in the territories, Honduras
1.35 Improving logistics performance, competitiveness and regional economic integration, Honduras
D. Territorial development programme
No. Title of the proposal
1.48 Comprehensive territorial development in the Dry Corridor of Honduras, Honduras
3. Environmental sustainability, climate change and 
adaptation, and disaster risk reduction pillar
B. Resilience-building to prevent disaster displacement programme
No. Title of the proposal
3.7 Agricultural micro-insurance with climate change adaptation measures for small-scale staple grain and coffee 
producers, Honduras
3.8 Strengthening the sustainable, climate-resilient coffee value chain, Honduras.
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4. Comprehensive management of the migration cycle pillar
A. Comprehensive national response programme
No. Title of the proposal
4.6 Catering to the immediate needs of Honduran migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in Mexico and promoting their 
long-term local integration, Honduras
B. Regional actions programme
No. Title of the proposal
4.20 Integration of Honduran migrant workers into the United States labour market, Honduras
4.21 Productive investment of remittances, Honduras
4.22 Portability of the social security contributions of undocumented migrant workers in the United States, Honduras
D. Mexico
The projects prioritized by the Government of Mexico under the Comprehensive 
Development Plan emerged from a process of dialogue and interaction with the 
federal authorities and authorities from the nine state governments of south-southeast 
Mexico involved in the Plan. During this process, the authorities defined their priorities 
and priority projects.
A number of working meetings were held, facilitated by the ongoing support of the 
Secretariat of Foreign Affairs. There were several working meetings with the head and 
staff of the decentralized public organization Isthmus of Tehuantepec Interoceanic 
Corridor and, through the Commission for the Comprehensive Development of the 
South-Southeast Region of the National Conference of Governors (CONAGO), with 
representatives from the state governments of Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, 
Puebla, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz and Yucatán. All the projects submitted by 
the states have been approved personally by the respective governors.
Priorities of the Government of Mexico aligned 
with the Comprehensive Development Plan
The Government of Mexico’s 2019–2024 National Development Plan revives the tradition 
of a foreign policy based on: non-intervention; self-determination; relations with all 
peoples based on development cooperation; peaceful resolution of conflict through 
dialogue; rejection of violence and war; and respect for human rights.
An end to hunger- and violence-related migration
The Government of Mexico proposes to eradicate migration caused by hunger or 
violence. The Plan proposes a root solution for migration by offering all citizens proper 
living conditions to make migration a choice rather than an obligation.
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Migration: root solutions
Mexico will no longer insist on the United States amending its immigration laws and 
regulations. Instead, as part of a root solution, it proposes to tackle the underlying 
causes of migration through decent job creation, regional development and the 
construction of a welfare state. According to the National Development Plan, this 
policy is designed to ensure that no Mexican citizen is forced to leave their place 
of residence for reasons of poverty, marginalization, lack of prospects for personal 
fulfilment or insecurity. The expectation is that sectoral social programmes will have 
a concrete impact on improving living conditions in the main labour-sending areas 
and regional development projects will act as a net to capture the flow of migrants 
transiting northwards: the Mayan Train, the Trans-Isthmus Corridor and the Northern 
Border Free Zone will create jobs and decent living conditions to attract people fleeing 
poverty and induce them to settle.1
The Plan seeks to involve the United States and the northern countries of Central America in 
the solution, and considers migration to be the consequence of people’s impoverishment 
and of worsening inequalities. It can therefore be counteracted through development 
and wellbeing. The ultimate aim of this policy is to ensure that everyone is able to 
work, study and enjoy health and prospects in the place where they were born, that 
they are not forced by hunger or violence to leave their birthplace, and that those 
emigrating do so voluntarily rather than out of necessity.2
Mexico has a long tradition of being a land of asylum and refuge. Accordingly, the 
National Development Plan states that measures will be taken to enable foreigners to 
transit safely through the national territory or to settle there. The entry of foreigners 
is subject to a registration process for the purposes of security, statistics and the 
implementation of reception procedures. The plan states that it is necessary not 
only to anticipate a potential humanitarian crisis arising from massive flows into the 
country from other nations but also to raise the Mexican people’s awareness with a 
campaign to eradicate racism, xenophobia and paranoia, which it regrets to note has 
become embedded in some sectors of society.3
Comprehensive Development Plan proposals 
prioritized by the Federal Government of Mexico 
and the nine states of south-southeast Mexico
1. Economic development pillar
A. Enabling infrastructure development programme
No. Title of the proposal
1.11 Development of the isthmus of Tehuantepec: multimodal interoceanic corridor, Mexico
1.12 Infrastructure of autonomous solar water-pumping systems in rural communities, state of Campeche
1.13 Reconstruction of interregional feeder roads, state of Chiapas
1.14 Modernization and expansion of Chiapas Port, state of Chiapas
1.15 Highway between Acapulco International Airport and the new Pacific tourist development, state of Guerrero
1.16 Rehabilitation of the market area in Oaxaca’s ‘Central de Abastos’ wholesale market (Margarita Maza de Juárez market), 
state of Oaxaca
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No. Title of the proposal
1.17 Highway to the Papaloapan basin and bypass in the city of Tuxtepec, state of Oaxaca
1.18 Access road to the new port of Frontera, state of Tabasco
1.19 Industrial and logistical infrastructure for trade with Central America, state of Tabasco
1.20 Alvarado multimodal cabotage terminal, state of Veracruz
1.21 Distributed power generation project, state of Yucatán
1.22 Improved connectivity and mobility conditions in the municipalities lagging furthest behind, state of Yucatán
C. Production development programme
No. Title of the proposal
1.36 Maya Ka’an project: community development with tourism and conservation of natural, historical and cultural resources, 
state of Quintana Roo
1.37 Establishment of a juicing microenterprise in the northern region, state of Veracruz
2. Social well-being pillar 
A. Social and labour market inclusion programme
No. Title of the proposal
2.9 Youth building the future in south-southeast Mexico and the northern countries of Central America
B. Life skills programme
No. Title of the proposal
2.14 University centre for the comprehensive development of south-southeast Mexico and the northern countries 
of Central America, state of Tabasco
E. Violence prevention and culture of peace programme
No. Title of the proposal
2.27 Putting into operation an arts and crafts factory and fitting out areas for inclusive social development, a culture 
of peace and the prevention of violence and crime, state of Quintana Roo
3. Environmental sustainability, climate change and 
adaptation, and disaster risk reduction pillar
C. Climate change and nature-based solutions programme
No. Title of the proposal
3.16 “Sowing Life” in south-southeast Mexico and northern Central America, Mexico
4. Comprehensive management of the migration cycle pillar
A. Comprehensive national response programme
No. Title of the proposal
4.7 Boosting humanitarian aid for migrants, state of Puebla
4.8 Human mobility, assisted repatriation and reintegration, state of Puebla
Enabling infrastructure development programme (concluded) 


The Comprehensive Development Plan aims to create a sustainable development 
space and generate opportunities to improve the quality of life of the people 
of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and south-southeast Mexico, thus making 
migration a choice rather than an obligation. This is an joined up response by the 
United Nations system, which seeks to generate synergies and coordinate actions with 
the countries at the centre and the support of subregional integration institutions.
